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Proposal for  a 
COUNCIL  RECOMMENDATION 
ON COMMON 
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria 
(presented by  the  Commission)  . 1 
Explanatory Memorandum 
In the course of only four decades, Information Technology (IT) has come to play an important, and 
often vital, role in almost all sectors of society. As a consequence, the security of information 
systems  has become both a pervasive and an essential component of socio-political and economic 
processes. 
In this context, Security of Information Systems means, 
confidentiality - prevention of the unauthorised disclosure of informatton; 
integrity - prevention of the unauthorised modification of  information; 
availability - prevention of the unauthorised withholding of information or resources. 
Every IT system or product will have its own requirements for maintenance of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability. In order to meet these requirements, it will contain a number of security 
enforcing functions  covering, for example, areas such as  access control, auditing,  and error 
recovery. Appropriate confidence in  thes~ functions  will be needed:  in this document  this  is 
referred to .as  assurance, whether it is confidence in the correctness of the security enforcing 
functions -(both _from  the development and the operational points of view) or confidence in  the 
_  effectiveness of  those functions. 
Us_ers of  systems need confidence in the security of the system they are using. They also need a 
-y3rdstick to compare the security capabilities of IT products they are thinking of purchasing. 
Although users could rely upon the word of the manufacturers or vendors of the systems and 
products in question, or they could verify them themselves, it is likely that many users will prefer to 
rely on the result of some form of  impartial assessment  by an independent body. Such an evaluation 
of a system or product requires objective and well-defined security _evaluation criteria and the 
existence of a certification body that can confirm that the evaluation been properly conducted. 
System security targets will be specific to the particular needs of the users of the  system  in 
question, whereas product security targets will be more general so that products that meet them can 
be incorporated into many systems with similar but not necessarily identical security requirements. 
Much work has already been done on the development of IT security evaluation criteria, although 
for slightly differe-nt objectives according to the specific requirements of the countries or bodies 
involved. Most important of these, and a precursor to other developments in many respects, was the 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria, commonly known as the TCSEC or "Orange Book", 
published and used for product evaluation by the US  Department of Defense. Other countries, 
mostly European, also have significant experience in IT systems security evaluation and have 
developed their own IT security criteria. 
Seeing that work was going on in this area, and much still needed to be done, France, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom recognised that this work needed 
to be approached in a concerted way, and that common, harmonised IT evaluation criteria should be 
put forward on a Community level with the objective of coming ultimately to  an  international 
agreement. 
There are three main reasons for harmonisation: 
a)  much experience had been accumulated in the various countries, and there would be much to 
gain by jointly building on that experience; 
) b)  industry did not want different security evaluation criteria in the different countries; 
c)  the  basic  concepts  and  approaches  were  the  same,  across  countries  and  even  across 
commercial, government and defence applications. 
It was therefore agreed to build on the various national initiatives, taking the best features of what 
had already  been done and putting  them  in  a  consistent,  structured perspective.  Maximum 
applicability and compatibility with existing work, most notably the US TCSEC, was a constant 
consideration in this process. Though it was initially felt  that the work would be  limited to 
harmonisation of existing criteria, it has sometimes been necessary to extend what already existed. 
The document referred to in this Recommendation sets out the harmonised criteria. 
An  important reason for producing these internationally hannonised criteria is  to provide a 
compatible basis for certification of  evaluations by national certification bodies with the objective 
of permitting international mutual recognition of  certifications which summarise the outcome of the 
evaluations and confirm that they have been properly conducted. 
This recommendation is based on work which reflects extensive international consultation and 
practical experience. 
.. PROPOSAL FOR A RECO:MMENDATION OF THE COUNCIL 
ON COMMON 
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria 
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, and in particular 
Article 235 thereof, 
Having regard to the proposal from the Commission,( I) 
Having regard to the opinion of  the European Parliament,(2) 
Having regard to the opinion of the Economic and Social Committee,(3) 
Whereas the  Community h~  as its task, by establishing a common market and progressively 
l 
approximating the economic policies o.f the Member States, to promote throughout the· Community 
·a harmonious development of economic activity, a continued and balanced expansion, increased 
stability, accelerated raising of the standarclof living, and closer relations of the States belonging to 
it; 
Whereas information  stored, processed and transmitted electronically plays  an  increasingly 
important role in the social and economic activities; 
Whereas  efficient global communications  and  the pervasive  use of electronic  handling of 
information emphasises the need for adequate protection; 
Whereas the European Parliament has repeatedly stressed the importance of the  security of 
information systems in its deliberations and decisions; 
Whereas the Economic and Social Committee has emphasised the need to address the security of 
information systems  related issues in Community actions particularly in view of the impact of the 
completion of the .internal market; 
(1)  OJ No C  .. . 
(2)  OJNoC  .. . 
(3)  OJNoC  .. . Whereas the Commission has proposed actions in the field of data protection and the security of 
information systems  COM(90) 314;(4) 
Whereas the complexity of the security of information systems calls for the development of 
strategies to enable the free movement of information in the single market while ensuring the 
security of  information systems throughout the Community;· 
Whereas the responsibilities of the Member States in this domain implies a concerted approach 
based on close collaboration with senior officials of  the Member States; 
Whereas common evaluation criteria for information technology security play a fundamental role in 
providing a basis for international mutual recognition of  certificates; 
Whereas actions on n·ational,  international and Community level provide a  good basis  for a 
harmonisation on Community level and international agreements; 
_Whereas .sector actorS have been consulted; 
Whereas the Senior Officials Group for Security of  Infomiation Systems has recommended the use 
of  common information  technology security evaluation criteria; 
_Whereas  e.ommon  infc;I'ID2tion  technology securitY  evaltl2tion  criteria  are  req~.  !o'i·:~. 
· devetol1ment  of.  a  single  market  for  secure  IT P~  these  common  artter:~a _  ~-g. 
·  -~·m.  achieve the raq_uired e¢OOOm.ie:t of  scal2;  . .  .  __  .  . 
-.w.neieas-·the 1lSe·of commou·cri:ter..a will. be a ptereqllisl!e for-the building.of secru:e ~ 
E~  applications 2nd Services;  .  .  .. ·  · 
whei'eSS· ·these  aims.. Could not be me.t if there were  differant criteria in·  each Mem.ber Suu:e . 
.  and in eadi• eeol)OcU¢ sectOr:  .  . . 
whereas  the ·de:velopment ·Of additkmal. criterm wotlld involve multiple  b~teral actions. by. 
· Member States and would.  involve ex:~e  delAys end CWllbersome J)Tocedures,  lnclu~  a 
large n:cm1.ber  o£ individiial negotiations.  which oonld be  2-voided by a coordinated ~  ~  · 
commuili...o.y  level  . 
<4)  Commission Communication on the protection of  individuals in relation to the processing of 
personal data in the Community and Information Security HEREBY RECOMMENDS: 
1.  the  adoption of the Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) within 
evaluation and certification schemes  for an  initial period of 2  years,  to  meet immediate 
evaluation and certification needs in connection with the trade and use of IT products, systems 
and services; 
2.  to advance, under the auspices of SOG-IS, international harmonisation and standardisation of 
information technology security evaluation criteria; 
3.  to review the developments after this initial period and propose appropriate actions for the 
Community on the advice of the· Senior Officials Group for Security .of Information Systems, 
in the light of  experience and the results of the international harmonisation. 
Done at Brussels,  For the Council 
The President Annex: 
Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC) Information Technology 
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June 1991 Following extensive international review,  version 1.2 of the ITSEC is issued for operational use within 
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period. In addition, considerations arising from further'international harmonization will also be taken 
into account. 
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication 
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0  INTRODUCTION 
0.1  In the course of only four decades, Information Technology (IT) has come to play 
an important, and often vital, role in almost all sectors of organised societies.  As a 
consequence, security has become an  essential aspect of Information Technology. 
0.2  In this context, IT security means, 
confidentiality - prevention of the unauthorised disclosure of information; 
integrity- prevention of the unauthorised modification of information; 
availability - prevention of the unauthorised withholding ~f information or 
resources. 
0.3  An IT system  or  product  will  have  its  own  requirements  for  maintenance of 
confidentiality, integrity and availability.  In order to meet these requirements it 
will implement a number of technical security measures, in this document referred 
to  as  security enforcing  functions,  covering,  for  example,  areas such  as  access 
control, auditing, and error recovery.  Appropriate confidence in these functions 
will be needed:  in this  document this  is  referred to as assurance, whether it is 
confidence in the correctness of the security enforcing functions  (both from the 
development and the operational points of view) or confidence in the eft'ediveness 
of those functions. 
0.4  Users of systems need confidence in the security of the system they are using.  1bey 
also need a yardstick to compare the security capabilities of IT products they are 
thinking  of  purchasing.  Although  users  could  rely  upon  the  word  of the 
manufacturers or vendors of the systems and products in question, or they could 
test them themselves, it is likely th'at, many users will prefer to rely on the results of 
some form of impartial assessment by an independent body.  Such an evalution of 
a system or product requires objective and well-defined security evaluation c:riteria 
and the existence of a certification body that can confirm that the. evaluation has 
been properly conducted.  System security targets will be specific to the particuJar 
needs of the users ofthe system in question, whereas product security targets will 
be more general so that products that meet them can be incorporated into many 
systems with similar but not necessarily identical security requirements. · 
0.5  For a system, an evaluation of its seeurity capabilities can be viewed as a part of a 
~ore formal  procedure for  accepting  an IT system  for  use  within a  particular 
environment.  Accreditation is  the term often used to describe this procedure.  It 
requires a number of factors to be considered before a system can be viewed as fit 
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for  its  intended purpose:  it requires  assurance in the security provided by  the 
system, a confirmation of management responsibilities for security, compliance with 
relevant  technical  and  legal/regulatory  requirements,  and  confidence  in  the 
adequacy  of  other  non-technical  security  measures  provided  in  the  system 
environment.  The criteria contained in this document are primarily concerned with 
technical security measures, but they do address some non-technical aspects, such 
as secure operating procedures for personnel, physical and procedural security (but 
only where these impinge on the technical security measures). 
0.6  .  Much work has  been done previously on the development of IT security evaluation 
criteria,  although  for  slightly  different  objectives  according  to  the  specific 
requirements of the countries or bodies involved.  Most important of these, and a 
precursor  to  other  developments  in  many  respects,  was. the Trusted  Computer 
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC], commonly known as the TCSEC or "Orange 
Book",  published  and  used  for  product  evaluation  by  the  US  Department  of 
Defense.  Other countries, mostly European, also have significant experience in IT 
security evaluation and have developed their own IT security criteria.  In the UK 
·this includes CESG Memorandum Number 3 [CESG3], developed for government 
use, and  proposals of the Department of Trade and Industry, the "Green Book" 
[DTIEC],  for  ~ommercial  IT  security  products.  In  Germany,  the  German 
Information Security Agency published a first version of its own criteria in 1989 
[ZSIEC], and at the same time criteria were being developed iii France, the so-
called "Bh1e-White-Red Book" [SCSSI). 
0.7  Seeing that work was  going  on in this  area, and much still needed to be done, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom recognised that this 
work needed to be approached in a concerted way, and that common, harmonised 
IT  security  criteria  should  be  put  forward.  There  were  three  reasons  for 
harmonisation: 
a)  much experience had been accumulated in the various countries, and there 
would be much to gain by jointly building on that experience; 
b)  industry did not want different security criteria in the different countries; 
c)  the basic concepts and approaches were the same, across countries and even 
across commercial, government and defence applications. 
0.8  It was therefore decided to build on the various national initiatives, taking the best 
features of what had already been done and putting them in a consistent, structured 
perspective.  Maximum  applicability  and  compatibility with  existing  work,  most_ 
notably the US TCSEC, was a constant consideration in this process.  Though it was 
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initially felt that the work would be limited to harmonisation of existing criteria, it 
has sometimes beennecessaryto extend what already existed. 
0.9  One reason for producing these internationally harrnonised criteria is  to provide a 
compatible basis for certification by the national certification bodies within the four 
co-operating  countries,  with  an  eventual  obj~ctive  of permitting  international 
mutual recognition of evaluation results. 
0.10  This  document  sets  out  the  harrnonised  criteria.  Chapter  1  contains  a  short 
presentation of the scope of the harmonised criteria.  Chapter 2 deals with security 
functionality,  that  is  the  definition  and  description  of  security  requirements.· 
Chapter 3 defines criteria for evaluating assurance in the effectiveness of a Target 
or Evaluation  as  a  solution  to  those  requirements.  Chapter 4  extends  this  to 
consideration of the correctness of the solution.  Chapter 5 describes the permitted 
results of an evaluation, and Chapter 6 contains a glossary of those terms that take 
a more precise or different meaning in the book than in normal English (on first 
use they are printed in bold:  whereas italics are used for emphasis).  The glossmy is 
intended to help the reader not only with  the definition of words, but also with 
ideas and concepts that are special to the harmonised criteria.· 
0.11  The evaluation criteria in Chapters.3 and 4 are set out in a standardised way, which 
specifies what must be provided by  the sponsor of the evaluation (the person or 
organisation requesting evaluation) and what must be done by the evaluator (the 
independent person or organisation performing evaluation).  This categOrisation is 
intended to assist in ensuring the consistency and uniformity of evaluation results. 
For each area of evaluation, documentation that must be provided by the sponsor 
of the.  evaluation  is  identified.  This  is  then followed  by  the  criteria for  each· 
relevant aspect or phase of evaluation of that area.  These criteria are broken down 
into requirements for content and presentation of the relevant documentation that 
must be provided by the sponsor, requirements for evidence concerning what that 
documentation must show, and the evaluator actions required to be· performed by 
the evaluator both to check the documentation provided and where necessaiJ to 
perform additional tests or other activities.  In the case of criteria concerning how 
the system or product is to be used operationally, the sponsor will not,· in general, 
be able to provide evidence from actual use.  Thus the evaluator must assume for 
the purposes  of evaluation that the procedures specified by  the sponsor will be 
followed in practice. 
0.12  Within the criteria certain verbs are also used in a special way.  Shall is used to 
express criteria which must be satisfied;  may is used to express criteria which are 
not mandatory;  and will  is  used  to  express  actions  to  take place in the  future~ 
Similarly, the verbs state, describe and explain are used within criteria to require the 
provision of evidence of increasing levels of rigour.  State means that relevant facts 
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must  be provided;  describe  means  that .  the  facts  must  be provided  and  their 
relevant characteristics enumerated;  explain means that the facts must be provided, 
their relevant characteristics enumerated and justifications given. 
0.13  Other than within Chapter 4,  paragraphs are numbered sequentially within each 
chapter.  In Chapter 4, criteria are set out separately for each evaluation level.  The 
introductory paragraphs of'  that chapter are numbered as  in other chapters, but 
then the criteria paragraphs are numbered sequentially for  each level, with the 
same paragraph  numb~r covering the same topic at each level.  However,  each 
paragraph within the document is uniquely identified by the combination of chapter 
or level number and paragraph number. 
0.14  This work draws from documents that have already been extensively discussed and 
used in practice;  moreover, it is felt that the ideas and concepts have been carefully 
balanced and that the structure chosen for the ITSEC is the right one for maximum 
consistency and ease of use.  The current version  of the ITSEC benefits  from 
significant· revisions  arising  from widespread  international  review.  The  review 
process has been assisted by the Commissipn for the European Communities who 
organised an international conference at which version 1.0 was  discussed,  and a 
subsequent workshop at whjch an interim revision, version 1.1, was further refined. 
These events were supplemented by written comments from reviewers, which the 
· authors have sought to take into account in preparing version 1.2. 
0.15  It is therefore expected that these criteria will receive broad acceptance and use by 
a wide range of potential users -and market sectors;  however, it is recognised that 
improvements can and will  be made.  Comments and suggestions are therefore 
invited, and may be sent to any of the following  addresses, bearing the marking 
"ITSEC Comments": 
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Commission of the European Communities 
Directorate XIII/F 
SOG-IS Secretariat 
Rue de Ia Loi 200 
B-1049 BRUSSELS 
Belgium 
Or, for France: 
Service Central de la  S~curit~ des Systemes d'lnformation 
Division Information et Systemes 
18 Rue du Docteur Zamenhof 
F-92131 ISSY LES MOULINEAUX 
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For Germany: 
Bundesamt fiir Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik 
Am Nippenkreuz 19 · 
D-5300 BONN 2 
For the Netherlands: 
Netherlands National Comsec Agency 
Bezuidenhoutseweg 67 
P.O. Box 20061 
NL-2500 EB TilE HAGUE 
For the United Kingdom: 
Head of the Certification Body 
UK IT Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme 
Room2/0805 
Fiddlers Green Lane 
CHELTENHAM 
Glos  GB-GLS2 SAJ 
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0.16  Copies of the Community publication of ITSEC version 1.2 may be obtained from 
the Commission of the European Communities at the above address. 
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1  SCOPE 
Technical Security Measures 
1.1  A major part of the security of an IT system can often be achieved through non-
technical measures, such as organisational, personnel, physical, and administrative 
controls.  However, there is a growing tendency and need to employ technical IT 
security  measures.  Although  the  security  criteria  which  follow  are  primarily 
concerned with  technicaf security measures, they do address some non-technical 
aspects,  most  notably  the  related  secure  operating  procedures  for  personnel, 
physical  and  procedural security  of the  systems  or products involved  (but only 
where these impinge on the technical security measures). 
1.2  These criteria have been designed so as in the main part to be equally applicable to 
technical  security  measures  implemented  in  hardware,  software  and  firmware. 
Where ·particular  aspects  of evaluation  are  intended  only  to  apply  to certain 
· methods of implementation, this is indicated as part of the relevant criteria. 
1.3  These criteria are not intended to cover physical aspects of hardware security such 
as the provision of tamper resistant enclosures or the control of electromagnetic 
emanations. 
Systems and Products 
1.4  For the purposes of this document, the difference between systems and products 
can be explained  as  follows~  An IT .system  is  a  specific  IT installation with a 
particular  purpose  and  known  operational  environment.  An IT product  is  a 
hardware  and/or  software~ package  that  can  be  bought  off  the  shelf  and 
incorporated into a variety of systems.  An IT system is generally constructed from 
a number of hardware and software components.  Some components (for example, 
application software) will usually be specially constructed;  other components (for 
example, hardware) will usually be standard products.  For certain applications it 
may be possible  to  buy-in  a  single product to serve  as  a  complete system,  but 
usually  at  least  some  customisation  and  integration  to  meet ·system  specific 
requirements will be necessary.  · 
1:5  From the  point of view  of security,  the  main  difference  between systems  and 
products lies in what is  certain about  ~their operational environment.  A system is 
designed to meet the requirements of a specific group of end-users.  It has a real 
world environment which can be defined and observed in every detail;  in particular 
the characteristics and requirements of its end-users will be known, and the threats 
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to its security are real threats which can be determined.  A product must be suitable 
for incorporation in many  systems;  the. product designer can only make general 
assumptions  about  the  operational  environment  of a system.  of which  it  may 
become a component.  It is up to the person buying the product and constructing 
the  system  to  make  sure  that  these  assumptions  are consistent with  the  actual 
environment ofthe system. 
1.6  It is important for the sake of consistency that the same security criteria are used 
for both products and systems;  it will then be both easier and cheaper to evaluate 
systems containing products which have already been successfully evaluated.  This 
is why these criteria deal with the security evaluation of both IT products and IT 
systems.  Within the rest of this document, the term Target of -Evaluation (TOE) is 
used to refer to a product or system to be evaluated. 
1. 7  A TOE can be constructed from several components.  Some components will  not 
contribute to satisfying the security objectives of the TOE.  Other components will 
contribute  to  satisfying  the  security  objectives;  these  components  are  called 
security enforcing.  Finally there may be some components that are not security 
enforcing but must nonetheless operate correctly for the TOE to enforce security; 
these are called security relevant.  The combination of both the security enforcing 
components and the security relevant components of a TOE is often referred to as 
a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) (see figures 1 and 2). 
1.8  Most  evaluation work will  concentrate on  the components of the TOE that are 
stated  to  be security  enforcing  and  security  relevant,  but all  other components 
within  the  TOE will  need  to  be considered  during  evaluation .and  shown  to be 
neither security enforcing nor security relevant. 
Functionality and Assurance, Classes and Levels 
1.9  In order for a TOE to meet its security objectives, it must incorporate appropriate 
_  security enforcing functions,  covering,  for example,  areas such  as  access  control, 
auditing and error recovery. 
1.10  These functions must be defined in a way that is clear and understandable to both 
the sponsor  of evaluation and  the  independent evaluator.  They may  either be 
individually  specified,  or  they  may  be  defined  by  reference  to  a  predefined 
functionality class.  These criteria include ten example functionality classes.  These 
example classes are based upon classes defined in the German National Criteria 
[ZSIEC],  including  five  classes  that  correspond  closely  to  the  functionality 
requirements of the US Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria [TCSEC]. 
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1.11  In all cases, the sponsor of an evaluation must define  the security target for  the 
evaluation.  This must define the security enforcing functions to be provided by the 
TOE,  and  will  also  contain  other  relevant  information,  such  as  the  security 
objectives of the TOE and the envisaged threats to those objectives.  Details may 
also be given of the particular security mechanisms that will be used to implement 
the security enforcing functions. 
1.12  The security enforcing functions selected to satisfy the security objectives of a TOE 
form but one aspect of the _security target of a product or system.  No less important 
is  assurance  that  the  security  objectives  are  achieved  by  the  selected  security 
enforcing functions and mechanisms. 
1.13  Assurance needs to be addressed from several different points of view and, in these 
harmonised criteria, it has been decided to distinguish confidence in the correctness 
in the implementation of the security  enforcing functions  and mechanisms from 
confidence in their effectiveness. 
1.14  Evaluation of effectiveness aSsesses  whether the security enforcing functions  and 
mechanisms that are provided in the TOE will  actually satisfy the stated security 
objectives.  _  The  TOE  is  assessed  for  suitability  of functionality,  binding  or 
functionality  (whether  the  chosen  functions  work  together  synergistically),  the 
consequences of known and discovered vulnerabilities (both in the construction of 
the TOE and the way it will be used in live operation), and ease or use. 
1.15  In  addition,  evaluation  ·of  effectiveness  assesses  the  ability  of  the  security 
mechanisms  of the  TOE to  withstand  direct  attack  (strength  or mechanisms)  . 
. Three strength  levels  are defined  - basic,  medium,  and  high  - which  represent 
ascending levels of confidence in the ability of the security mechanisms of the TOE 
to withstand direct attack. 
1.16  Evaluation of correctness  assesses  whether the security  enforcing functions  and 
mechanisms are implemented correctly.  Seven evaluation levels labelled EO to E6 
have been defined,_representing ascending levels of confidence in correctness.  EO 
represents inadequate confidence.  El represents an entry point below which no 
useful confidence can be held, and E6 represents the highest level of confidence. 
The  remaining  levels  represent  an  interpolation  in  between.  Correctness  is 
addressed from  the point of view of construction of the TOE, covering both the 
development process and the development environment, and also the point of view 
of operation of the TOE. 
1.17  The evaluation levels are defined within the context of the correctness criteria.  Th_e 
requirements for effectiveness (including strength of mechanisms) do not change by 
level, but rather build upon the correctness assessment and are performed using the 
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documents provided by the sponsor for that assessment;  of course, in practice the 
correctness and effectiveness assessment activities will be interleaved. 
1.18  If a TOE fails  any aspect of evaluation at a particular level,  because of a lack of 
information or for any other reason, the deficiency must be remedied, or the TOE 
withdrawn from evaluation at that level.  Otherwise the TOE will  be assigned  a 
result of EO. 
1.19  The  six  successful  evaluation  levels. El to  E6  span  a  wide  range  of potential 
confidence.  Not all of these levels will necessarily be needed by or appropriate for 
all  market  sectors  that  require  independent  evaluation  of  technical  security 
measures.  Not all combinations of functionality and confidence will necessarily be 
sensible or useful.  For example, low  confidence in the functionality required to 
support a military multilevel security requirement will not normally be appropriate. 
In addition, it is unlikely that high confidence in the correctness of a TOE will be. 
combined with a requirement for a low strength of mechanisms. 
1.20  These harmonised criteria are not a design guide for secure products or systems.  It 
is  up to  the sponsor of an evaluation to  determine the security objectives of his 
TOE and to choose security functions to satisfy them.  However for each evaluation 
level, the assurance part of the criteria can be thought of as a compulsory "security 
checklist" to be satisfied. 
Assurance Profiles 
1.21  The criteria in this document require the sponsor to state the evaluation level as 
part of the security  target.  All  of the security enforcing functions listed in the 
security target are then assessed to the same level of confidence, as required by the 
stated evaluation level. 
1.22  For some TOEs, there may be a requirement to gain higher confidence in some 
security  functions  and  lower  confidence  in  others;  for  example,  some  security 
functions may be more important than others.  In these circumstances, the sponsor 
may consider producing more than one security target for the TOE.  The details of 
how  this  is  achieved,  and  under what  conditions,  is  beyond  the  scope  of these 
criteria. 
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The Evaluation Process 
1.23  The objective of the evaluation process is  to enable the evaluator to prep~e an 
impartial report stating whether or not a TOE satisfies its  security target at the 
level of confidence indicated by the stated evaluation level. 
1.24  The evaluation process is  shown in context within figure 3.  It requires the close 
involvement of the sponsor of the evaluation.  The higher the evaluation level, the 
greater will need to be the  _involvement of the sponsor.  Both users and vendors can 
act a.S sponsors for evaluation.  It is likely that a system evaluation will be sponsored 
by the intended end-users of the system or their technical representatives, and that 
a product evaluation will be sponsored by the product manufacturer or a vendor of 
the product,  but this need not be so.  Any party that can supply the necessary 
·technical information may sponsor an evaluation.  · 
1.25  First the sponsor must determine the operational requirements and the threats the 
TOE is to counter.  In the case of a system, there is a need to examine the real 
world operational environment for the system, in order to determine the relevant 
threats  that must be addressed.  For a produc;t,  there is  a need to decide what 
threats  to  security  the  product  should  address.  It is  anticipated  that industry 
organisations  and  international  standardisation  bodies  will  with  time  define 
standard  functionality  classes  for  use  as  product  security  targets.  Product 
developers who have no predetermined specialist market niche or type of user in 
mind may find that such predefined functionality classes make good security targets 
to design their products to match. 
1.26  The security objectives for the TOE can then be determined considering legal and 
other regulations.  These form the contribution to security (confidentiality, integrity 
and availability) the TOE is intended to provide.  Given the security objectives, the 
necessary  security  enforcing  functions  can  then  be  established,  possibly  in  an 
iterative way, together with the evaluation level that the TOE will have to achieve 
to provide the necessary level of confidence. 
1.27  The results  of this  work  .:.  the definition of the security enforcing functions,  the 
identified  threats,  the  identified  security  objectives,  any  specific  security 
mechanisms to be employed - becomes the security target for the development. 
1.28  For each evaluation level,  the criteria enumerate ·items  to be delivered by the 
sponsor to the evaluator.  The sponsor must ensure that these items are provided,  · 
taking care that any requirements for content and presentation are satisfied, and 
that the items clearly provide, or support the production of,  the evidence that is 
called for.  · 
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1.29  In order that evaluation can be performed efficiently,  and  at minimum cost,  the 
evaluator must work closely with the developer and  sponsor of the TOE, ideally 
from  the  beginning  of development,  to  buiid  up .  a  good  understanding  of the 
security target, and to be able to pinpoint .the evaluation implications of decisions 
as they ate made. ·However, the evaluator must remain independent and must not 
suggest how to design or implement the TOE.  This is analogous to the role of an 
external financial auditor, who must likewise build up a good working relationship 
with a financial department, and in many cases will, after examination, make use of 
their internal records and controls.  However, he to() must remain independent and 
questioning. ·  ·  ·  · 
1.30  Security test and analysis requirements within the criteria deserve special mention; 
in all cases the responsibility for testing and analysis will rest with .the sponsor.  For 
all evaluation levels except El, the evaluator will primarily check test and analysis 
results supplied by the-sponsor.  The evaluator will perform test and analysis work 
only to audit the results supplied,  to  supplement the evidence provided,  and to 
investigate wlnerabilities.  At  evalu~tion level  E 1 it  is  optional  as  to whether 
testing  results  are  provided.  If not,  the  evaluator .  must  in  addition  perform 
functional testing against the security target. 
The Certmcatlon Process 
1.31  In order for these criteria to be of practical value, they will need to be supported by 
practical schemes for the provision and control of independent evaluation, run by 
appropriately qualified and recognised national certification bodies.  These bodies 
will award certificates to confirm. the rating of the security ofTOEs, as determined 
by properly conducted independent evaluations.  They will approve procedures, as 
required by these criteria, for guaranteeing the authenticity of the delivered TOE. 
They will also.be responsible for the selection and control of approved evaluators. 
Details of-the procedures to be used by such bodies are beyond the scope of these 
criteria.  · 
1.32  These  criteria  have  been  designed  to  minimise  the ·subjectivity  inherent  in 
evaluation results.  It will be the responsibility ·of national certification bodies to 
inaintain the uniformity of certified evaluation results.  How this  is  achieved  is 
beyond the scope of these criteria.  ' 
1.33  In order for the results of.an evaiuation against these criteria to be certified by a 
· national certification· body, the evaluator will have to produce a report containing 
the results of evaluation in a form acceptable for consideration by the certification 
body.  The precise format  and content of such  reports are beyond  the scope of 
these criteria. 
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1.34  Most security targets  and TOEs will  change with  time.  The maintenance of a 
certified rating following  changes to  a TOE {whether security-related or not) or 
following changes to the security target {such as new threats or security objectives) 
will be regulated by the appropriate national certification body.  Re-evaluation will 
be necessary in some circumstances and not others.  The details of such regulations 
and procedures are also a matter beyond the scope of these criteria. 
Relationship to the TCSEC 
1.35  The Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria [TCSEC], commonly known as 
the TCSEC or "Orange Book", is a widely known and accepted basis for the security 
evaluation of operating systems.  Originally published in 1983, it is used by the US 
Department of Defense in the US  product evaluation sch.eme  operated by the 
National Computer Security Center {NCSC).  The TCSEC criteria are intended to 
match  the  security  policy  of the  US  Department of Defense.  This  policy  is 
primarily  concerned  with  maintaining  the  confidentiality of nationally classified 
information. 
1.36  The TCSEC defines seven sets of evaluation criteria called classes (D, Cl, C2, Bl, 
B2, B3  and Al), grouped into four divisions {D,  C, Band A).  Each criteria class 
covers four aspects of evaluation:  Security Policy, Accountability, Assurance and 
Documentation.  The criteria for these four areas become more detailed from class 
to class, and form a hierarchy whereby D is  the lowest and Al the highest.  Each 
class covers both functionality and confidence requirements. 
1.37  The criteria set out in the ITSEC permit selection of arbitrary security functions, 
and define seven evaluation levels representing increasing confidence in the ability 
of a TOE to meet its security target.  Thus these criteria can be applied to cover a 
wider range  of possible systems  and products than the TCSEC.  In general, for 
identical  functionality  at  an  equivalent  level  of confidence,  a  TOE baS  more 
architectural freedom to meet the ITSEC criteria than.  to meet the TCSEC, but is 
more constrained in its permissible development practices. 
1.38  A number of example functionality classes have been defined to correspond closely 
to .  the functionality  requirements  of the  TCSEC 'classes Cl to Al.  They are 
included,  as  F-Cl to  F~B3, amongst  the  example  functionality  classes  given in 
Annex A  It is not possible, however, to relate the evaluation levels directly to the 
confidentiality requirements of the TCSEC classes, as the ITSEC levels have been 
developed  by  harmonisation  of various  European IT security  criteria  schemes 
which  contain  a  number  of requirements which  do  not  appear in the TCSEC 
explicitly. 
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1.39  The intended correspondence between these criteria and the TCSEC classes is as 
follows: 
These Criteria  TCSECClass 
EO  <->  D 
F-Cl, El  <--->  Cl 
. F-C2, E2  <--->  C2 
_  F:-Bl, E3  <--->  Bl 
F-B2, E4  <--->  B2 
F-B3, ES  <--->  B3 
F-B3, E6  <--->  Al 
1.40  It should be noted that  there is  no functionality  class  F-Al as  the functionality 
requirements of TCSEC class Al are the same as for class B3.  A product which has 
been designed with the objective of successful evaluation against both the ITSEC 
and TCSEC, and which has been shown to meet one of the classes or  combinations 
in  the  table  above,  should  pass  evaluation  against  the  other  criteria  at  the 
.  equivalent class or combination.  However, at Cl the TCSEC requires evidence to 
be provided of system developer testing.  Thus an [F-Cl, El] evaluation would only 
be equivalent to Cl evaluation if the sponsor had chosen to satisfy the optional El 
requirement to provide test documentation as evidence of adequate testing against 
the security target prior to evaluation. 
1.41  Throughout the TCSEC,  the  combination of both the security enforcing and the 
security relevant  portions of a TOE is  referred  to  as  a Trusted  Computing Base 
(TCB).  TCSEC  TOEs  representative  of the  higher  classes  in' division  B  and 
division A derive additional confidence from increasingly rigorous architectural and 
design requirements placed on the TCB by the TCSEC criteria.  TCSEC classes B2 
and higher require that access  control is  implemented by  a reference validation 
mechanism,  a mechanism which  implements the concept of a reference monitor 
[AND].  Such  a reference validation mechanism must be tamper proof,  it must 
al~ays be invoked, and it must be small enough to be subject to analysis and tests, 
the completeness of which can be assured. 
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1.42  For compatibility with the TCSEC, the ITSEC example functionality classes F-B2 
and  F-83  mandate  that  access  control  is  implemented  through  use  of such  a 
mechanism.  In addition, at higher evaluation levels the ITSEC places architectural 
and  design  constraints  on  the  implementation ·of  all  the  security  enfordng 
functions.  Combined  with  the  ITSEC  effectiveness  requirements  that security 
functionality is suitable and mutually supportive, this means that a TOE capable of 
meeting ·the  higher  J ITSEC  evaluation  levels  and  which  provides  functionality 
matching these TCSEC-equivalent functionality classes, must necessarily satisfy the 
TCSEC requirements for a TCB and use of the reference monitor concept. 
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2  FUNCTIONALITY 
Introduction 
2.1  A  Target  of Evaluation  (TOE) which  provides  security  (some  combination of 
confidentiality,  integrity  and  availability)  must  contain  appropriate  security 
features.  Normally, it will be necessary to determine that an appropriate level of 
confidence can be held in- thos~ features.  In order for this to be done, the features 
themselves· must  be specified.  The  document  or documents  which  specify  the 
features, together with the desired evaluation level, make up the security target for 
the TOE. 
2.2  In these criteria, security features are viewed at three levels. The most abstract view 
is of security objectives:  the contribution to security which a TOE is intended to 
achieve.  To  achieve  these  objectives,  the  TOE must  contain  certain  security 
enforcing  functions.  These  security  enforcing  functions,  in  turn,  must  be 
implemented  by  specific  security  mechanisms.  These  three  levels  can  be 
·  summarised as follows: 
a)  Security Objectives - Why the functionality is wanted. 
b)  Security Enforcing Functions - What functionality is actually provided. 
c)  Security Mechanisms - How the functionality is provided. 
The Security Target 
2.3  The security target serves as both a specification of the security enforcing functionS, 
against which the TOE will be evaluated, and as a .description relating the TOE to 
the environment in which it will·operate.  The audience for the security target is 
therefore not confined solely to those responsible for the production of the TOE 
and its evaluation, but also includes those responsible for  managing, purchasing, 
installing, configuring, operating and using the TOE. 
2.4  The required contents of a security target can be summarised as follows: 
a)  Either  a System Security Policy 
or  a Product Rationale. 
b)  A specification of the required security enforcing functions. 
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c)  A definition of required security mechanisms (optional). 
d)  The claimed rating of the minimum strength of mechanisms. 
)  e)  The target evaluation level. 
Each of these is described in greater detail below. 
2.5  The requirements for the presentation of the security target depend on the target 
evaluation level.  The evaluation level also determines other TOE documentation 
that must be supplied for evaluation, together with requirements on its content and 
presentation, and requirements for  the evidence to  be provided to show that the 
TOE satisfies the security target. 
2.6  The  security  target  may.  be  presented  as  a  single  document,  or  as  multiple 
documents.  Where multiple documents are used, their relationships to one another 
shall be clearly indicated. 
2.7  The sponsor of an evaluation is  responsible for  the provision and accuracy of the 
security target for the evaluation. 
System Security Policy 
2.8  The contents  of a  security  target  depend  on  whether  the  TOE is  a  system  or 
product.  In the case of a system, the actual environment within which the TOE will 
be used is known, its actual security objectives can be determined and actual threats 
and  existing  countermeasures  can  be considered.  These  details  are given in a 
System Security Policy. 
2.9  The  System  Security  Policy  specifies  the  set  of laws,  rules  arid  practices  that 
regulate how sensitive information and other resources are managed, protected and 
distributed within a specific system.  It shall identify the security objectives of the 
system and the threats to the system.  These security objectives shall be addressed 
by a combination of system security enforcing functions  (implemented within the 
TOE), and also by  physical,  personnel, or procedural means associated with the 
system.  The System Security Policy shall cover all aspects of security relating to the 
system,  including  these  associated  physical,  procedural  and  personnel  security 
measures. 
2.10  All  organisations  will  have  general  security  standards  that  apply  to  all  systems 
within  the  organisation  and  define  the  security  relationship  between  the 
organisation and  the outside world.  These standards can be considered to be a 
Corporate Security Policy:  the set of laws,  rules and practices that regulate how 
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assets,  including  sensitive  information,  are  managed,  protected  and  distributed 
within the organisation.  Many organisations will have an explicit written Corporate 
Security Policy, which will  specify the rules and practices and applicable national 
and International laws  to which they conform.  , Where this is  the case, it shall be . 
referenced from the System Security Policy.  Otherwise, all relevant aspects shall be 
stated within each System Security Policy of the organisation. 
2.11  The primary responsibility of the Corporate Security Policy is to provide the context 
for the identification of system security objectives.  Identifying relevant corporate 
assets,  general  threats,  and  the  results  from . risk  analysis  will  assist  in  the 
identification of these system security objectives.  Discussion of the process of risk 
analysis is outside the scope of these criteria. 
2.12  In the context of an individual system,  the System Security Policy shall define the 
security measures to be used to satisfy the system security objectives in a way which 
is consistent with the Corporate Security Policy.  The security measures required by 
the  System  Security  Policy  will  be  implemented  by  a  combination  of security 
enforcing functions  implemented  py  the  TOE,  and  by  physical,  personnel,  and 
procedural means.  The System Security Policy shall clearly indicate the division of 
responsibility between the security enforcing functions and the other means. 
2.13  The IT security measures of a System Security Policy may be separated from the 
remainder of the System Security Policy,  and defined in a separate document:  a 
Technical Security Policy.  This is the set of laws, rules and practices regulating the 
processin~ of sensitive information and the use of resources by the hardware and 
software of an IT system. 
2.14  In many cases it may be convenient to include the specification of security enforcing 
functions as part of the System or Technical Security Policy. 
2.15  The System  or Technical  Security Policy  may  be used  as  a  basis  for  selecting 
suitable IT security products for· incorj>oration within the  system;  such product 
selection is outside the scope of these criteria. 
Product Rationale 
2.16  In the case of a product, the precise environment within which  the TOE will be 
used is not known to its developer, since it may be incorporated into more than one 
specific system and system environment.  Instead, a rationale statement shall be 
provided giving  the necessary information for  a  prospective purchaser to decide 
whether it will help to satisfy his system security objectives, and to define what else 
must be done for those system security objectives to be fully met. 
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2.17  The product rationale shall identify the intended method of use for the product, the 
intended environment for·use-ofthe product and the assumed threats within that 
environment.  It shall  include a  summary of the product's security features,  and 
define all assumptions about the environment and way in which the product will be 
used.  This shall include personnel, physical, procedural and IT security measures 
required  to  support  the  product,  and  its  dependencies  on  system  hardware, 
software, and/or firmware not supplied as part of the product. 
Specification of Security Enfo_rcing Functions 
2.18  The security target shall include a specification of the security enforcing functions 
to  be  provided  by  the  TOE.  These  functions  may  be  stated  explicitly,  or by 
reference to one or more predefined functionality  classes,  or. by  reference to an 
accepted  standard  that  defines  security  functionality.  Predefined  classes  are 
considered later in this chapter. 
2.19  One or more  standards  documents  which  address  security  may  form  part of a 
security target, by reference or by inclusion within the target.  Where the standard 
allows options, the selected ones shall be clearly identified.  Where a standard does 
not provide all the information required, the necessary supplementary information 
shall be provided explicitly within the security target. 
2.20  In the case of. a system, the security enforcing functions shall be correlated to the 
security objectives, so  that it can be seen which functions satisfy which objectives. 
(A function may satisfy, or help to satisfy, more than one objective.)  Every function 
in  the  specification  of security  enforcing  functions  shall  at a  minimum  help  to 
satisfy at least one objective.  The specification of security enforcing functions shall 
also show why the functions are adequate to counter the identified or stated threats 
· to the security objectives. 
2.21  In the case of a product, the security enforcing functions shall be correlated to the 
intended method of use of the product and the assumptions about the environment 
into  which  the  product  will  be  installed  given  in  the  product  rationale.  This 
correlation shall  include any  dependencies on other security enforcing functions 
and non-IT security measures assum,ed to be provided by the envi~o.nment. 
2.22  From  the  point  of view  of  evaluation,  the  specification  of security  enforcing 
functions is  the most important part of the security target.  These functions shall 
always  be specified in  an _informal  style,  using natural language.  In addition, at 
higher evaluation levels they must also be specified using a semiformal or formal 
style  of presentation.  Details of such  presentation styles  are given  later in this 
chapter. 
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Definition of Required Security Mechanisms 
2.23  A security target may optionally prescribe or claim the use of particular security 
mechanisms.  All  security  mechanisms  included  in  a  security  targe-t  shall  be 
correlated  to  its  security  enforcing  functions,  so  that  it  can  be  seen  which 
mechanisms  implement'  each  function  (a  mechanism  may  implement several 
functions, and a function may be implemented through the combination of several 
mechanisms). 
224  Where security mechanisms are prescribed by the security target, it is  the task of 
the developer to implement the required mechanisms.  Otherwise, it is  the task of 
the  developer  of the  TOE  to  develop  and  produce  mechanisms  which,  when 
combined, impiement the required security enforcing functions. 
Claimed Rating of Minimum Strength of Mechanisms 
2.25  Every security target shall specify a claimed rating of the minimum strength of the 
security mechanisms of the TOE against direct· attack.  This shall be one of the 
ratings basic, medium or high as defined in Chapter 3 of these criteria: 
Target Evaluation Level 
2.26  Every security target shall specify a  target evaluation level  for  evaluation of the 
TOE.  This shall be one of the ratings El, £2, £3, £4, £5 or £6 as  defined in 
Chapter 4 of these criteria. 
Examples of the Use of Existing Security Policy Documents 
2.27  These  criteria  aim  to  permit  the  use  of  existing  security  policy  documents 
developed to other criteria or standards as part or all of the security target for a 
system.  Therefore, the precise contents of the documents comprising the security 
target  are  not  prescribed.  The  minimum  information  required  for  evaluation 
against these criteria has been stated above.  Since a security target may consist of 
more than one document, existing styles of policy document can be accommodated 
(although supplementary documents may be required to complete the information 
required for the security target). 
2.28  Two  examples  are  given  below  as  to  how  particular  types  of  security  policy 
documents can meet the requirements for a security target. 
2.29  In the UK it is mandatory to produce a System Security Policy (SSP) for all systems 
that will  process  nationally  classified  information.  If the  authorising  authority 
decides  that  security  evaluation  is  necessary,  a  System  Electronic  Information 
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Security Policy (SEISP) must also be produced.  For some targ.et  e~aluation levels, 
a  Security  Policy  Model  (SPM)  must  also  be  produced.  The  SSP  contains  a 
definition  of the scope  of the system,  the security objectives  of the system,  the 
security measures to be enforced and the allocation of responsibilities for enforcing 
them (i.e. it corresponds closely to a System Security Policy as  described in these 
criteria).  It also contains a derivation of the required target evaluation level based 
on key characteristics of the system and its environment.  If  necessary, an SEISP is 
developed  from  the SSP.  It is  a  more  detailed statement of the hardware and 
software security aspects of the SSP, but still in an informal style:  it corresponds to 
a Tecbrucal Security Policy as described in these criteria.  The SPM is  a parallel 
speCification  of the  security  enforcing  functions  of an  SEISP  in  a  formal  or 
semiformal style.  It is produced where such a parallel specification is required for 
the target evaluation level. 
I 
. 2.30  A  Claims  Document  is  a  list  of Claims  about  security  enforcing  functionality 
provided by a product, made by the developer of the product, and expressed in a 
semiformal style using the Claims Language defined in Annex B of this document. 
It includes assumptions and constraints about the way the product must be used for 
these claims to be valid.  It also includes an identification of security objectives, an 
informal specification of the  claims,  a  correlation of claimed  security enforcing 
functions  to  security  objectives,  and  the  desired  evaluation  level,  in  order  to 
complete a product security target as required by these criteria. 
Generic Headings 
2.31  It will  be easier to understand a security target if the specification of its security 
enforcing  functions  has  been presented  in  a  sensible  order.  This  will  aid  the 
comparison of security targets  and simplify  the work  of evaluators.  There exist 
natural  groupings  of security  enforcing  functions  to  give  such  ordering,  and  a 
recommended set of eight generic headings for one such grouping is included as part 
of these criteria. 
2.32  The recommended headings are: 
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Identification and Authentication 
Access Control 
Accountability 
Audit 
Object Reuse 
Accuracy 
Reliability of Service 
Data Exchange. 
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2.33  ' It is recommended that these standard headings are used whenever possible.  Their 
use  will  simplify  comparison  with  other  security  targets  and  make  it  easier to 
determine  whether  or  not  a  particular  security  target  includes,  or precludes, 
functions of a particular type. 
Identification and Authentication 
2.34  In many TOEs there will be requirements to determine and control the users who 
are permitted access to  resources controlled by the TOE.  This involves not only 
establishing the claimed identity of a user, but also verifying that the user is indeed 
the  user  claimed.  This  is  done  by  the  user  providing  the  TOE  with  some 
information that is known by the TOE to be associated with the user in question. 
2.35  This heading shall cover any functions  intended to establish and verify a claimed 
identity. 
2.36  This heading shall include any functions to enable new user identities to be added, 
and old user identities· to be removed or invalidated.  Similarly, it .shall include any 
functions  to  generate,  change,  or  allow  authorised  users  to  inspect,  the 
authentication information required  to  verify  the identity of particular users.  It 
shall also include functions to assure the integrity of,  or prevent the unauthorised 
use of,  authentication  information.  It  shall  include  any  functions  to  limit  the 
opportunity for repeated attempts to establish a false identity. 
Access Control 
2.37  In many TOEs there will be requirements to ensure that users and processes acting 
on their behalf are prevented from gaining access to information or resources that 
they are not authorised to access or have no need to access.  Similarly, there will be 
requirements  concerning  the  unauthorised  creation  or  amendment  (including 
deletion) of information. 
2.38  This heading shall cover any functions intended to control the flow of information 
between, and the use of resources by,  users, processes.and objects.  This includes 
the  administration  (i.e.  the  granting  and  revocation)  of  access  rights  and  their 
verification. 
2.39  This heading shall include any functions  to  set up and maintain any lists or rules 
governing  the  rights  to  perform  dif(erent  types  of access.  It  shall  include  any 
functions  concerned  with  temporarily  restricting  access  to  objects  that  are 
simultaneously accessible by several users or processes and are needed to maintain 
the  consistency  and  accuracy  of such  objects.  It shall  include  any  functions  to 
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ensure that upon creation, default access lists or access rules apply to objects.  It 
shall include any functions to control the propagation of access rights to objects.  It 
shall  also  include  any  functions  to  control  the  inference  of information by  the 
aggregation of data from otherwise legitimate accesses. 
Accountability 
2.40  In many TOEs there will be requirements to  ensure that relevant information is 
recorded about actions _performed by .users or processes acting on their behalf so 
that the consequences of those actions can later be linked to the user in question, 
and Lie user held accountable for his actions. 
2.41  This heading shall cover any functions intended to record the exercising of rights 
which are relevant to security. 
2.42  This  heading  shall  include  functions  related  to  the  collection,  protection  and 
analysis of such information.  Certain functions  may satisfy requirements for both 
accountability and auditability and so be relevant to both headings.  Such functions 
may be included under either heading, but shall be cross-referenced to the other 
heading.  · 
Audit 
2.43  In many TOEs there will be requirements to ensure that sufficient information is 
recorded about both routine and exceptional events that later investigations can 
determine if security violations have actually occurred, and if so what information 
or other. resources were compromised. 
2.44  This  beading shall cover  any functions  intended to detect and investigate  events 
that might represent a threat to security~ 
2.45  This  heading  shall  include  functions  related  to  the  collection,  protection  and 
analysis of such information.  Such analysis may also include trend analysis used to 
attempt  to  detect  potential  violations  of the  security  target  before  a  violation 
occurs.  Certain functions  may  satisfy  requirements  for  both  accountability and 
auditability and so be relevant to both headings.  Such functions may be included 
under either heading, but shall be cross-referenced to the other heading. 
Object Reuse 
2.46  In many TOEs there will be requirements to  ensure that resources such as  main 
memory and areas of disk storage can be reused while preserving security. 
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2.47  This heading shall cover any functions intended to control the reuse of data objects. 
2.48  This heading shall include functions to initialise or clear unallocated or reallocated 
data objects.  It shall include any functions to initialise or clear reusable media such 
as  magnetic tapes, or to clear output devices such as  display screens when not in 
use. 
Accuracy 
2.49  In many TOEs there will.be requirements to ensure specific relationships between 
different pieces of data are maintained correctly, and that data is passed between 
processes without alteration. 
2.50  This heading shall cover any functions  intended to ensure that data has not been 
modified in an unauthorised manner. 
2.51  This  heading  shall  include  functions  to  determine,  establish  and  maintain  the 
accuracy of the relationships between related data.  It shall also include functions to 
ensure that when data is passed between processes, users and objects, it is possible 
to detect 'Or prevent loss, addition or alteration, and that it is not possible to change 
the claimed or actual source and destination of the data transfer. 
Reliability of Service 
2.52  In many  TOEs there will  be requirements  to  ensure  that time  critical  tasks  are 
performed when  they  are necessary,  and not earlier or later, and  that non-time 
critical tasks cannot be made time critical.  Similarly, in many TOEs there will be 
requirements to ensure  that~ access to resources is possible when it is  ne~ded, and 
that resources are not requested or retained unnecessarily. 
2.53  This  heading  shall  cover  any  functions  intended  to  ensure  that  resources  are 
accessible and usable on demand by an authorised entity (i.e.  a user or a process 
acting  on  his  behalf)  and  to  prevent  or  limit  interference  with  time-critical 
operations. 
2.54  This heading shall include error detection and error recovery functions intended to 
restrict  the  impact  of  errors  on  the  operation  of  the  TOE  and  so  minimise 
disruption or loss  of service.  It shall  also  include  any  scheduling functions  tha! 
ensure  that  the  TOE responds  to  external  events  and  produces  outputs  within 
specified deadlines. 
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Data Exchange 
2.55  In  many  TOEs  there  will  be  requirements  for  the  security  of  data  during 
transmission  over  communications  channels.  This  is  normally  referred  to  as 
communications security, as distinct from computer (IT) security.: 
2.56  This  heading  shall  cover  any  functions  intended  to  ensure  the  security ,of data 
during transmission over communications channels.  It is  recommended that such 
functions  are broken down under the following  subheadings taken from  the OSI 
Security Architecture:  -
Authentication 
Access Control 
D~ta  Confidentiality 
Data Integrity 
Non-Repudiation 
2.57  Functions shall be grouped under these subheadings in a way consistent with their 
usage and  definition in the OSI Security Architecture [OSI]. 
2.58  Certain functions may satisfy requirements for both computer and communications 
security and so be relevant to  other headings.  In this case there shall be a cross-
reference to the other relevant headings. 
Predefined Classes 
2.59  Many systems  will  have  similar security  objectives;  it will  often be  possible  to 
identify  common  sets  of security  enforcing functions  that meet such  objectives. 
Similarly, many security products will be aimed at satisfying the same market need 
and thus possess similar functionality.  Such predefined classes of common functions 
can be used as the basis for individual system and product security  targets~ or can 
be used as guidelines, to assist users in selecting appropriate seq}rity functionality 
to  meet  their  particular  security  objectives,  and  to  help  manufacturers  select 
functions  to include within products.  To obtain the maximum benefit from such 
commonality, it is desirable that standards for predefined functionality classes exist. 
These criteria  have  therefore been designed  to  permit  reference within  security 
targets to predefined classes  of security enforcing functions.  Any security target 
may reference one or more predefined classes to define part or all of its security 
enforcing functions. 
2.60  Organisations for  standardisation or representing particular market sectors  have 
already developed some standard definitions.  It is  anticipated that the availability 
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of these criteria will encourage the development of predefined classes, in a  form 
consistent for use with these criteria.  However, since IT security will continue to 
evolve rapidly, it will be necessary to define further predefined classes in the future 
as  new  groups  of functions  become  sufficiently  common  to  make  such  classes 
· worthwhile. 
2.61  As well  as  the  specification of its security functions,  each predefined class shall 
state the objective of the class, giving its envisaged use, .and reasons for the choice 
of the particular functions  included.  Predefined classes  may also contain other 
information necessary for inclusion within a security target, such as the details of 
any  mechanisms  which  are mandated for  a  class.  Provided  that  details of the 
contents of such  classes are publicly available,  the details  need not be repeated 
within each security target that references them. 
2.62  The use  of predefined  classes  is  not  obligatory.  There will  be cases  where a 
sponsor of evaluation· will wish not to use them, and cases where they cannot be 
used,  for  example  because  no  predefined  class  describes  the  desired  security 
features.  As an alternative to the use of predefined classes, the security enforcing 
functions can always be specified individually.  A statement of individual ~nctions 
can be used in combination with one or more predefined classes which partially, 
but not entirely, describe a security target.  However, a predefined class shall only 
be specified as part of a security target if all aspects of that class form part of the 
· target. 
2.63  Ten example predefined classes are given in Annex A.  These have been derived 
from functionality classes given in [ZSIEC].  All are presented in informal style, 
and in the current version of the ITSEC are in draft form only.  They are: 
a)  Example  functionality  classes  F-Cl,  F-C2,  F-Bl,  F-B2  and  F-B3  are 
hierarchically ordered confidentiality classes which correspond closely to the 
functionality requirements of the TCSEC classes Cl to Al [TCSEC]. 
b)  Example  functionality  class  F-IN  is  for  TOEs  with  high  integrity 
requirements for data and programs.  Such requirements may be necessary 
in databaSe TOEs, for example. 
c)  Example functionality class F-AV sets high requirements for the availability 
of a  complete TOE or special functions of a TOE.  Such requirements are 
significant for TOEs that control manufacturing processes, for example. 
d)  Example functionality class F-DI sets high requirements with  regard to the 
safeguarding of data integrity during data communication. 
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e)  Example functionality Class F-DC is intended for TOEs with high demands 
on  the  confidentiality  of data during  data communication.  An example 
candidate for this class is a cryptographic device. 
f)  ·Example  functionality  class  F-DX  is  intended  for  networks  with  high 
demands  on  the  confidentiality  and  integrity  of the  information  to  be 
communicated.  For  example,  this  can  be  the  case  when  sensitive 
information has  to  be communicated  via  insecure  (for example:  public) 
networks. 
2.64  There  is  no  restriction  on  the  specific  functionality  which  can  be  claimed  or 
required as a security target.  The security enforcing functions of any security target 
can be fully described within the available specification formats.  The existence of 
predefined  classes  will  not  therefore  restrict  product  manufacturers  seeking  to 
advance the state of the art, but will lessen the work involved in specifying products 
or systems which are similar to the stereotypes described, and will provide a basis 
for comparison of functionality offered.  Product security targets may, eyen when 
claiming  conformance  to  a  predefined  class,  specify  additional •  constraints  and 
details of the required surrounding environment in order to assist potential users to 
determine if the product would be suitable for their actual real-world environment. 
Specification Style 
2.65  These criteria do not prescribe the use  of particular proprietary or standardised 
methods or styles for the specification of security functions.  Nor are any methods 
or styles precluded, so  long as the requirements for presentation and evidence of 
the  target  evaluation  level  are  met.  For the  purpose  of categorising  possible 
approaches to specification, three types of style have  bee_n identified within these 
criteria:  informal, semiformal, and formal.  Each type of style is further described 
below. 
2.66  Not  all  people  who  will  need  to  use  a  security  target  will  be  familiar  with 
specifications written in a semiformal or formal style.  Thus all security targets shall 
contain a specification of the security enforcing functions  using an informal style. 
Although informal specifications do not require special training to understand, they 
are prone  to  ambiguity  and  imprecision.  Semiformal  and  formal  specifications 
r~duce that possibility of ambigility and imprecision.  Thus at the higher evaluation 
levels,  the  informal  specification  of  the  security  enforcing  functions  shall  be 
supported by a parallel semiformal or formal specification. 
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2.67  The specification technique or style used within a security target for defining tlhe 
security objectives, and for defining any prescribed or claimed security mecba.nisms, 
is outside the scope of these criteria. 
2.68  .  H a·  security target is  required to contain a specification of the· security enfon::mg 
functions in a particular type of style, that specification may be wholly or  partiaBy 
replaced by a reference to one or more predefined classes written in such a style. 
2.69  Whenever a specification in any style is  required, it may be presented as a sillgfe 
document,  or multiple  documents.  Where  multiple  documents  are us~  their 
relationships shall be clearly indicated. 
Informal Specification 
2.70  An informal  specification is  written in  natural  language,  rather than a  DOtatiiii:m 
requiring special  restrictions  or conventions.  Natural language  is  the term fm· 
communication in  any  commonly  spoken tongue  (for  example:  Dutch, E.ngtiis~, 
French, a·erman).  Specifications written in natural language are not subjCct to my 
special restrictions, but do need to  conform to  the ordinary conventions. fur tliat 
language (for example:  grammar and syntax). 
2.71  A  natural  language· specification  shall  be  written  with 'the  aim  of mimmisimg· 
ambiguity, by (as a minimum) ensuring that all terms are used consistently, and  by 
ensuring that any terms with a specialised meaning (a meaning not defmed a a 
widely used dictionary) are defined in one or more glossaries, which is inchir.ded • 
referenced.  It is unlikely that ambiguity can be ~ompletely eliminated.  Eva.l»atiirm 
will seek to identify and resolve any ambiguities that remain. 
Semiformal Specification 
2.72  A semiformal style of specification ~~quires the use of some restricted notztiOm (or 
notations),. in accordance  with  a  set  of conventions  which  are included im  ar 
referenced by the specification.  The cqnventions are specified informally.  Sl!lld't a 
notation  shall  allow  the  specification  of both  the  effect  of a  function  and an 
exceptional or error conditions associated with that function. 
2.73.  A semiformal style may either be graphical in presentation, or based on R:Stridrecf· 
use of natural language (for instance, restricted sentence structure and kcywcadJ; 
with special meanings).  Examples of semiformal styles include data-flow~ 
state  transition  diagrams,  entity-relationship  diagrams,  data  structure  dia:gram5, 
process or program structure diagrams, and the CCITf recommended specificacifiwt 
notation SOL 
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2.74  Structured design and development methods normally incorporate at least one such 
semiformal notation for requirements capture, together with prescriptive guidance 
(for instance, measures of complexity and management methods) on how to use the 
notation.  Examples of structured design methods including such notations are:  the 
Y  ourdon Structured  Method  [YSM],  Structured Analysis  and  Design Technique 
[SADT],  Structured  Systems  Analysis  and  Design  Method  [SSADM],  and  the 
Jackson  Structured  Design  [JSD)  and  Jackson  Structured  Programming  [JSP] 
methods. 
2.75  A particular example of a semiformal notation that has been successfully used in 
the definition of security targets is the Claims Language.  The Claims Language is a 
subset of English;  both the vocabulary and  the syntactic form of claim sentences 
are restricted.  It was designed (as the name suggests) to provide a structured way 
in which  claims  could  be made about the security features  of IT products.  The 
Claims Language provides for the use of natural language to express those parts of 
the  definition  of a  security  target  which  support  the  definition  of the  claimed 
security enforcing functions.  A full  definition of the Claims Language, consistent 
with these criteria, can be found in Annex B. 
Formal Specification 
2.76  A formal  style  of specification is  written in  a formal  notation based upon well-
established mathematical concepts.  The concepts are used to define the syntax and 
semantics of the notation,-and the proof rules supporting logical reasoning.  Formal 
. specifications must be capable of being shown to be derivable from a set of stated 
axioms, and must be capable of showing the validity of key properties such as the 
delivery of a valid  output for  all  possible  inputs.  Where  hierarchical  levels  of 
specification exist, it must be possible to demonstrate that each level maintains the 
properties established for the previous level. 
2. 77  The syntactic and semantic rules supporting a formal  notation used in a security 
target shall define bow to recognise constructs unambiguously and determine their 
meaning.  Where proof rules are used 'to support logical reasoning, there shall be 
evidence  that it is  impossible  to  derive  contradictions.  All  rules supporting the 
notation  shall  be  defined  or  referenced.  All  constructs  used  in  a formal 
specification shall  be completely described  by  the supporting rules.  The formal 
notation  shall  allow  the  specification  of both  the  effect  of a  function  and  all 
exceptional or error conditions associated with that function. 
2.78  Example  formal  notations  are  VDM,  described  in  [SSVDM],  Z,  described  in 
[ZRM], the RAISE Specification Language, described in [RSL], Ina Jo, described 
in [URM], the Gypsy Specification Language, described in [GYPSY], and the ISO 
protocol specification language [LOTOS].  The use of constructs from predicate (or 
Page  32  Version 1.2  28June 1991 ITSEC  FUNCTIONAliTY 
other) logic and set theory as  a  formal  notation is  acceptable, provided  that the 
conventions (supporting rules) are documented or referenced (as set out above). 
Consistency of Parallel Specifications in Different Styles 
2.79  Parallel  specifications  shall  be  presented  in  such  a  way  that  the  relationships 
between the specifications are clear, and that where each specification addresses 
the same point, that point is  addressed consistently.  Parallel specifications may be 
presented as separate do~ments, or may be interleaved in a single document. 
2.80  Where ambiguity exists in an informal specification,  the corresponding fomud or 
semiformal specification shall resolve the ambiguity.  However, it shall be an error 
for parallel specifications to  be inconsistent.  Any such error must be resolved by 
reference  to  further  information  outside  the  security  target  and  one  or both 
specifications amended. 
Formal Models of Security Policy 
2.81  At evaluation levels E4 and above, a TOE must implement an underlying model of 
security policy, i.e. there must be an abstract statement of the important principles 
of security that the TOE will enforce.  This shall be expressed in a formal style, as a 
formal model of security policy.  All or part of a suitable published model can be 
referenced, otherwise a model shall be provided as part of the security target.  Any 
of the formal specification styles  identified  above may  be used to define such a 
model. 
2.82  The formal  model  need not  cover all  the security  enforcing functions  specified 
within the security target.  However,  an informal interpretation of the model in 
terms of the security target shall be provided, and shall show that the security target 
implements the underlying security policy and contains no  functions that conflict 
with that underlying policy. 
2.83  Examples of published formal models of security policy are: 
a)  The Bell-La Padula model [BLP]  - modelling access  control requirements 
typical of a national security policy for confidentiality. 
b)  The Clark and Wilson model [CWMJ- modelling the integrity requirements 
of commercial transaction processing systems. 
c)  The Brewer-Nash model [BNM]- modelling access control requirements for 
client confidentiality, typical of a financial services institution. 
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d)  The Eizenberg model [EZBM]  - modelling access  control rights  that vary 
with time. 
e)  The Landwehr model [L  WM]  - modelling the data exchange requirements 
of a message processing network. 
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3  ASSURANCE- EFFECTIVENESS 
Introduction 
3.1  This  chapter  sets  out  evaluation  criteria  addressing  the  effectiveness  aspect  of 
assurance for a Target of Evaluation (TOE).  The baseline for evaluation is  the 
security  target,  as  defined  in Chapter  2,  which  is  simultaneously  evaluated  for 
effectiveness,  in  accordance  with  the. criteria  set  out  in  this  chapter,  and 
correctness, in accordance with the criteria set out in Chapter 4 following. 
Description of the Approach 
3.2  Assessment of effectiveness involves consideration of the following aspects of the 
TOE:  . 
a)  the  suitability  of the  TOE's  security  enforcing  functions  to  counter  the 
threats to the security of the TOE identified in the security target; 
b)  · the ability of the TOE's security enforcing functions and mechanisms to bind 
together in a way that is mutually supportive and provides an integrated and 
effective whole; 
c)  the ability of the TOE's security mechanisms to withstand direct attack; 
d)  whether known security vulnerabilities in the construction of the TOE could 
in practice compromise the security of the TOE; 
e)  that the TOE cannot be configured or used in a manner which is  insecure 
but which  an  administrator or  end-user ·of  the  TOE would  reasonably 
· believe to be secure; 
f)  whether known security vulnerabilities in the operation of the TOE could in 
practice compromise the security of the TOE  .. 
3.3  The  assessment  of  each  of  the  aspects  of  effectiveness  identified  above· is 
performed using documentation supplied by the sponsor and also documentation 
and evaluation results from the evaluation of correctness of the TOE.  This means 
that although evaluation of effectiveness can proceed in parallel with the evaluation 
of correctness, it cannot be completed until after the final results of the assessment 
of correctness are available .. 
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3.4  Specifically, the assessment of  effectiveness is based on a vulnerability analysis of 
the TOE.  This analysis has the objective of searching for all the ways in which it is 
possible for a user of the TOE to deactivate, bypass, corrupt, circumvent, directly 
attack, or otherwise defeat the security enforcing functions and mechanisms of the 
TOE.  As a  minimum,  the sponsor's vulnerability analysis  must  consider all  the 
information specified in figure 4 for the evaluation level in question (i.e.  a search 
for vulnerabilities is  to be performed using part of the total information provided 
by the sponsor for  that evaluation level).  As  the evaluation level. increases, the 
correctness criteria of Chapter 4 requires the information specified in figure 4 to be 
provided at increasing levels of rigour, as indicated by the use of ~he verbs state, 
describe, and explain. 
3.5  All critical security mechanisms (i.e. those mechanisms whose failure would create 
a security weakness) are assessed for their ability to withstand direct attack.  The 
minimum strength of each critical mechanism shall be rated either basic, medium 
or high. 
3.6  For the minimum strength of a  critical mechanism to be rated basic it shall be 
evident that it provides protection against random accidental subversion, although 
it may be capable of being defeated by knowledgeable attackers. 
3.7  For the minimum strength of a critical mechanism to be.rated medium it shall be 
evident that it provides protection against attackers with limited opportunities or 
resources. 
3.8  For the  minimum strength  of a  critical  mechanism to be rated high  it shall be 
evident  that  it  could  only  be  defeated  by  attackers  possessing  a  high  level  of 
expertise, opportunity and resources, successful attack being judged to be beyond 
normal practicality.  · 
3.9  A  TOE  will  only  fail  evaluation  on  effectiveness  grounds  if  an  exploitable 
vulnerability,  which  is  found  during  evaluation  of effectiveness,  has  not  been 
eliminated before the end of evaluation.  This includes methods of successful direct 
attack found  during the  assessment  of minimum strength  of mechanisms  which 
invalidates the claimed rating.  If any such vulnerability exists  the TOE will  be 
awarded an overall evaluation level of EO, indicating that it would be unsuitable for 
use as proposed. 
3.10  Effectiveness of a TOE is always assessed in the context of the given security target. 
For example, a security product sold for incorporation within systems may contain 
known  covert  channels.  If,  however,  the  system  security  target  has  no  access 
control requirements for confidentiality, then the presence of covert channels in the 
product is irrelevant and will not effect the ability of the TOE to meet its security 
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target, and will not cause the TOE to fail  evaluation.  If there are system access 
control requirements for confidentiality, then the system security target may specify 
acceptable maximum covert channel bandwidths.  If  covert channels are identified 
which exceed these bandwidths, or if no bandwidth is  actually specified, then the 
·evaluator must determine if the identified covert channels will  cause the TOE to 
fail evaluation on the grounds of unsuitable functionality. 
Systems and Products 
3.11  There are different requirements and options for the content of a security target for 
a TOE, depending on whether the TOE is being evaluated as a system or product. 
These differences  are set  out under Construction  - Phase  1 - Requirements in 
Chapter 4, and further explained in Chapter 2. 
EffeCtiveness Criteria - Construction 
Documentation 
3.12  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation in addition to that required 
for evaluation of correctness: 
Suitability Analysis 
Binding Analysis 
Strength of Mechanisms Analysis 
List of Known Vulnerabilities in Construction. 
Aspect 1 - Suitability of Functionality 
Definition 
3.13  As  part  of the  documentation  required  for  the  evaluation  of correctness,  the 
sponsor will provide a security target.  As part of the assessment of correctness, that 
target is examined for  coverage and consistency.  For this aspect of effectiveuess 
the security target is  used to determine whether the security enforcing functions 
and mechanisms of the TOE will in fact counter the threats to the security of the 
TOE identified in the security target. 
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Requirements for Content and Presentation 
3.14  The suitability analysis shall link security enforcing functions  and mechanisms to 
the threats, enumerated in the security target, that they are designed to counter. 
Requirements for Evidence 
3.15  The suitability analysis  shall show how the threats are countered by the security 
enforcing functions  and mechanisms.  It shall show that there are no threats that 
are not  adequately  countered  by  one  or more  of the  stated  security  enforcing 
functions.  The analysis shall be performed using, at minimum, all the information 
given in figure 4 for the evaluation level in question. 
Evaluator Actions 
"  ,  I  . 
3.16  Check that the suitability analysis provided meets all requirements for content and 
presentation  and  evidence.  Check  that  the  analysis  has  considered  all  of the 
information given in figure 4 for the evaluation level in question. 
Aspect 2 - Binding of Functionality 
Definition 
3.17  This  aspect  of  effectiveness  investigates  the  ability  of  the  security  enforcing 
functions and mechanisms of the TOE to work together in a way that is mutually 
supportive and provides an integrated and effective whole. 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
3.18  The binding  analysis  shall  provide  an  analysis  of all  potential interrelationships 
between security enforcing functions and mechanisms. 
Requirements for Evidence 
3.19  The  binding  analysis  shall  show  that  it  is  not  possible  to  cause  any  security 
enforcing function or mechanism to conflict with or contradict the intent of other 
security enforcing functions or mechanisms.  The analysis shall be performed using, 
at  minimum,  all  the  information  given  in  figure  4  for  the  evaluation  level  in 
question. 
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Evaluator Actions 
3.20  Check that the binding analysis  provided meets all  requirements for content and 
presentation  and  evidence.  Check  that  the  analysis  has  considered  all  of the 
information given in figure 4 for the evaluation level in question. 
Aspect 3  - Strength of Mechanisms 
Definition 
3.21  Even if a security enforcing mechanism cannot be bypassed, deactivated, corrupted, 
or circumvented, it may still be possible to defeat it by  a direct attack based on, 
deficiencies in its underlying algorithms, principles or properties.  For this aspect of 
effectiveness  the  ability  of these  mechanisms  to  withstand  such  direct  attack is 
assessed.  This aspect of effectiveness is distinguished from other aspects in that 1t 
requires  consideration  of the  level  of resources  that  would  be  needed  for  an 
attacker to execute a successful attack. 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
3.22  The strength of mechanisms analysis  shall list  all  security enforcing mechanisms 
that have been identified as critical within the TOE.  It shall include or reference 
analyses  of  the  underlying  algorithms,  principles  and  properties  of  those 
mechanisms. 
Requirements for Evidence 
3.23  The strength of mechanisms analysis shall show that all critical mechanisms satisfy 
the claimed minimum strength of mechanisms rating, as defined in paragraphs 3.6 
to 3.8:  in  the case  of cryptographic mechanisms,  this  shall  take  the form of a 
statement of confirmation from the appropriate national body.  Other analyses shall 
be performed using,  at minimum,  all  the  information given  in  figure  4 for the 
evaluation level in question. 
Evaluator Actions 
3.24  Check that all mechanisms that are critical have been identified as such.  Check 
that  the  strength  of mechanisms  analysis  provided  meets  all  requirements  for 
content and presentation and evidence.  Check that the analysis has considered all 
of the information given in figure 4 for the evaluation level in question.  Check that 
the  specifications/definitions  of  all  critical  mechanisms  support  the  claimed 
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minimum strength rating.  Perform penetration testing where necessary to confirm 
or disprove the claimed minimum strength of mechanisms. 
Aspect 4  - Construction Vulnerability Assessment 
Definition 
3.25  Before  and  during  the  other  aspects  of  evaluation  of  the  TOE,  various 
vulp.erabilities  in  the· construction  of the  TOE (such  as  ways  of  deactiv~ting, 
bypassing,  corrupting,  or  circumventing  security  enforcing  functions  and 
mechanisms) will  have been identified by  both sponsor and evaluator.  For this 
aspect  of  effectiveness  these  known  vulnerabilities  are  assessed  to  determine 
whether they could in practice compromise the security of the TOE as specified by 
the security target. 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
3.26  The  list  of  known  vulnerabilities  provided  by  the  sponsor  sha,ll  identify  all 
vulnerabilities in the construction of the TOE known to him.  It shall identify each 
known vulnerability,  provide an analysis  of its  potential impact,  and  identify the 
measures proposed or provided to counter its effect. 
Requirements for Evidence 
3.27  The analysis of the potential impact of each known vulnerability shall show that the 
vulnerability in question cannot be exploited in the intended environment for the 
TOE, because either: 
the vulnerability is  adequately covered by  other, uncompromised,  security 
mechanisms, or 
it can be shown that the vulnerability is irrelevant to the security target, will 
not  exist  in  practice,  or  can  be  countered  adequately  by  documented 
technical, personnel, procedural or physical  security  measures outside the 
TOE.  These external security measures shall have been defined within (or 
shall have been added to) the appropriate documentation. : 
The analysis shall be performed using,  at minimum,  all  the information given in 
figure 4 for the evaluation level in question. 
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Evaluator Actions 
3.28  Check that the list of known vulnerabilities in construction meets all requirements 
for content and presentation and evidence given above.  Check that the analysis of 
the potential impact  of each vulnerability  has  considered  all  of the information 
given  in  figure  4 for  the evaluation level  in question.  Perform an  independent 
vulnerability  analysis,  taking  into  account  both  the  listed  and  any  other known 
con.Struction vulnerabilities found  during evaluation.  Check that all combinations 
of known  vulnerabilities  have  been addressed.  Check  that  the  analyses .of  the 
potential  impact  of vulnerabilities ··contain  no  undocumented  or  unreasonable 
assumptions  about  the  intended  environment.  Check  that  all  assumptions  and 
requirements for external security measures have been appropriately documented. 
Perform  penetration  testing  to  confirm  or  disprove  whether  the  known 
vulnerabilities are actually exploitable in practice. 
Effectiveness Criteria - Operation 
Documentation 
3.29  The sponsor .shall provide the folloWing documentation in addition to that required 
for evaluation of correctness: 
Ease of Use Analysis 
List of Known Vulnerabilities in Operational Use. 
Aspect 1 - Ease of Use 
Definition 
3.30  This  aspect  of effectiveness  investigates  whet~er the TOE can be configured or 
used in a manner which is  insecure but which an administrator or end-user of the 
TOE would reasonably believe to be secure. 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
3.31  The ease of use  analysis  shall identify possible modes  of operation of the TOE, 
including operation following failure or operational error, their consequences and 
implications for maintaining secure operation. 
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Requirements for Evidence 
3.32  The ease of use analysis shall show that any human or other error in operation that 
deactivates or disables security enforcing functions  or mechanisms will be easily 
detectable.  It shall show that if it is possible to configure or cause the TOE to be 
used  in  a  way  which  is  insecure  (i.e.  the  security  enforcing  functions  and 
mechanisms of the TOE do not satisfy the security target), when an end-user or 
adrrJnistrator of the TOE would reasonably believe it to be secure, then this fact 
'Will also be detectable._  The analysis shall be performed using, at minimum, all the . 
information giv.en in figure 4 for the evaluation level in question. 
Evaluator Actions 
3.33  Check that the ease of use analysis provided meets all requirements for content and 
presentation  and  evidence.  Check  that  the  analysis  has  considered  all  of the 
information given  in  figure  4  for  the  evaluation  level  in  question.  Check the  c 
analysis  for  undocumented  or  unreasonable  assumptions  about  the  intended 
environment.  Check that all assumptions and requirements for  external security 
measures (such as external procedural, physical and personnel controls) have been 
appropriately documented.  Repeat any configuration and installation procedure to 
check that the TOE can be configured and used securely, using only the user and 
administration documentation for guidance.  Perform other testing where necessary 
to confirm or disprove the ease of use analysis. 
Aspect 2  - Operational Vulnerability Assessment 
Definition 
3.34  Before  and  during  the  other  aspects  of  evaluation  of  the  TOE,  various 
vulnerabilities in operation of the TOE will  have been identified by both sponsor 
and evaluator.  For this  aspect  of effectiveness  these  known vulnerabilities  are 
assessed to determine whether they could in practice compromise the security of 
the TOE as specified by the security target. 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
3.35  The  list  of  known  vulnerabilities  provided  by  the  sponsor  shall  identify  all 
vulnerabilities in operation of the TOE known to him.  It shall identify each known 
vulnerability, provide an analysis of its potential impact, and identify the measures 
proposed or provided to counter its effect.  · 
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Requirements for Evidence 
3.36  The analysis of the potential impact of each known vulnerability shall show that the 
vulnerability in question cannot be exploited in the intended environment for the 
TOE, because either: 
the vulnerability is adequately covered by  other, uncompromised, external 
security measures, or 
It can be shown that the vulnerability is  irrelevant to  the security target or 
will not be exploitable in practice. 
The analysis  shall be performed using,  at  minimum,  all  the information given in 
figure  4  for  the  evaluation  level  in  question.  Any  required  external  security 
measures  shall  have  been  defined  within  (or  shall  have  been added  to)  the 
appropriate documentation. 
Evaluator Actions· 
3.37  Check that the list of known vulnerabilities in operation meets all requirements for 
content and presentation and evidence given above.  Check that the analysis of the 
potential impact of each vulnerability has considered all of the information given in 
figure 4 for the evaluation level in question.  Perform an independent vulnerability 
analysis,  taking  into  account  both  the  listed  and  any  other  known  operational 
vulnerabilities found  during  evaluation.  Check  that  all  combinations  of known 
vulnerabilities  have  been addressed.  Check  that  the  analyses  of the  potential 
impact of vulnerabilities contain no undocumented or unreasonable assumptions 
about the intended environment.  Check that all assumptions and requirements for 
external  security  measures  have  been  appropriately  documented.  Perform 
penetration testing to confirm or disprove whether the known vulnerabilities are 
actually exploitable in practice. 
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INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM A CORRECfNESS ASSESSMENT 
WHICH IS USED TO PERFORM A VULNERABILI1Y ANALYSIS 
/ 
/  ES  E6 
/  E3  E4 
E1  E2  v 
INFORMATION  v  v  v  v  v  v  v  v 
... .  -~  ..  ·····~·-·  .. ~- .....  ~~-~······· 
SECURITY  TARGET  (threats,  v  v  objectives,  functions,  mechanisms,  v 
I 
......  ··-···- .  ·····- evaluation  level,  S  of  M)  ---····· 
v  v 
FORMAL  MODEL  Of  SECURITY  POLIC'I'  v  v 
..  -··- -·····--·· 
v  v  v 
fUNCTIONS  (informal)  v 
..........  ·······--·-··-·········· 
.....  v 
fUNCTIONS  (semiformal) 
/  .. 
fUNCTIONS  (formal)  v 
v  v  v  v 
... 
ARCHITECTURAL  DESIGN 
{informal)  v  v  ····- ··•· 
ARCHITECTURAL  DESIGN  v  (semiformal) 
ARCHITECTURAL  DESIGN  v 
(formal)  v  v  / 
.../  .../ 
DETAILED  DESIGN  (informal)  v 
/ 
DETAILED  DESIGN  (semiformal)  v  v  .../ 
/  v 
IMPLEMENTATION  {hardware  / 
drawings  and source  code) 
/ 
IMPLEMENTATION  (object  code)  v 
v  v  .../ 
OPERA liON (user/  administrator  v  v  v  v  documents,  delivery and 
configuration,  startup and  v  / 
operation)  v 
/EXPLAIN  v  STATE  /  DESCRIBE 
L------ LEVEL  OF"  RIGOUR ------' 
Fig. 4 Information used in a Vulnerability Analysis 
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4  ASSURANCE-CORRECTNESS 
Introduction 
4.1  This  chapter  sets  out  evaluation  criteria  addressing  the  correctness  aspect  of 
assurance  for  a Target  of Evaluation  (TOE).  The baseline for  evaluation is  a 
security  target  defined  in  accordance  with  Chapter 2.  The security  target shall 
contain the  necessary elements specified in  Chapter 2 for a system or product as 
appropriate.  This shall include the target evaluation level and the claimed rating 
for  minimum  strength ·of  mechanisms.  The effectiveness  aspect  of assurance is 
covered by the criteria detailed in Chapter 3.  · 
Characterisation 
4.2  Seven evaluation levels are  defin~~ in respect of the confidence in the correctness 
of a TOE.  EO designates the iowest level and E6 the highest. 
4.3  The seven evaluation levels can be characterised as follows: 
Level EO 
4.4  This level represents inadequate assurance. 
Level El 
4.5  At this  level  there shall be  a security target and  an informal descnption of the 
architectural design of the  TOE.  Functional testing shall indicate that the TOE 
satisfies. its security target. 
Level E2 
4.6  In addition to the requirements for level El, there shall be an informal description 
of the detailed design.  Evidence of functibnal  testing shall be evaluated.  There 
shall be a configuration control system and an approved distribution procedure. 
Level E3 
4.7  In addition  to  tQe  requirements  for level  E2,  the source  code  and/or hardware 
drawings corresponding to the security mechanisms shall be evaluated.  Evidence of 
testing of those mechanisms shall be evaluated. 
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Level E4 
4.8  In addition to the requirements for level E3, there shall be an underlying formal 
model of security  policy supporting the  security target.  The security  enforcing 
functions,  the architectural design and the detailed design shall be specified in a 
semiformal style. 
Level ES 
4.9  In addition ·to the requirements for level E4, there shall be a close'correspondence 
between the detailed design and the source code and/or hardware drawings. 
Level E6 
4.10  In addition to the requirements for level ES,  the security enforcing functions and 
the  architectural  design  shall  be specified  in  a formal  style,  consistent with  the 
specified underlying formal model of security policy. 
Summary of Requirements 
4.11  Remaining sections of this chapter contain the detailed criteria to be satisfied at 
each correctness evaluation level, under detailed headings, repeated for each of the 
levels  E 1 to  E6.  The  major differences  between levels  follow  from  additional 
requirements  in  the  investigation  of  the  Development  Process.  To  assist 
understanding of these differences, the following  diagrams show the relationship 
between key items to be supplied by the sponsor and the evaluation level at which 
they are first required by the evaluator. 
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CORRECI'NESS  CRITERIA  BY  LEVEL- DEVELOPMENT  PROCESS 
E1 
E2 
E3 
E4 
E5 
E6 
28June 1991 
REQUIREMENTS  ARCHITECTURAL 
DESIGN 
DETAILED 
DESIGN 
I 
SECURITY 
TARGET 
PROVIDED 
SEt.tlf'ORt.IAL 
FUNCTIONAL 
SPECIFICATION 
UNDERLYING 
SECURITY 
POLICY  t.!ODEL 
f'ORt.IAL 
SPECIF'ICA liON 
Of'  FUNCTIONS 
I 
INF'ORt.IAL 
ARCHITECTURAL 
DESCRIPTION 
----------- ----------
----------- -----------
---------·  ----------
SEMIFORMAL 
ARCHITECTURAL 
DESCRIPTION 
----------- -----------
-------·--- ----------
FORt.IAL 
·ARCHITECTURAL 
DESCRIPTION 
INF'ORt.IAL 
DETAILED 
DESIGN 
SEt.tlf'ORI.AAL' 
DETAILED 
DESIGN 
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IMPLEMENTATION 
I 
OPTIONAL 
EVIDENCE  Of' 
TESTING 
--- .. ------ . ----------
EVIDENCE  Of' 
FUNCTIONAL 
TESTING 
----------- -----------
SOURCE  CODE 
H'WARE  DRAWINGS 
PROVIDED 
EVIDENCE  Of' 
t.IECHANISt.IS 
TESTING 
----------- ----------- .. 
----------- -----------
CORRESPONDS 
CLOSELY 
TO  DESIGN 
----------- ----------
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CORRECfNESS CRITERIA  BY  LEVEL- DEVELOPMENT ENVIRONMENT 
E1 
E2 
E3 
E4 
E5 
E6 
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CONFIGURATION 
CONTROL 
I 
UNIQUE 
IDENTIFICATION 
or TOE 
------------
..... __________ 
CONFIGURATION 
CONTROL 
SYSTEM 
.......................  -------------
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PROCEDURE 
------------ ·-----------
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.........................  ------------
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INTEGRATION 
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-----------·  ------------
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PROGRAMMING  LANGUAGES 
AND  COMPILERS 
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LANGUAGES 
ONLY 
COMPILER 
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DOCUMENTED 
SOURCE  CODE 
or RUN  TIME 
LIBRARIES 
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DEVELOPERS 
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SECURITY 
PROCEDURES 
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CORREcrNESS  CRITERIA  BY  LEVEL  - OPERATION 
OPERATIONAL 
DOCUMENTATION 
USER 
DOCUMENTATION 
PROVIDED 
ADMINISTRATION 
DOCUMENTATION 
PROVIDED 
OPERATIONAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
DELIVERY  AND 
CONFIGURATION 
I 
CONfiGURATION 
INFORMATION 
DELIVERY  AND 
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DIS,TR!BUTION 
PROCEDURE 
AUDITED 
SYSGEN 
PROCEDURE 
------------ ------------
------------- ------------
------------- ------------
------------ ------------
CONfiGURATION 
OPTIONS 
F"ORMALLY  DEFINED 
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OPERATION'  · 
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PROCEDURES 
DISABLEABLE 
SECURITY  FUNCTS 
IDENTIFIED 
HARDWARE 
DIAGNOSTIC  TEST 
PROCEDURES 
SECURE 
RESTART 
PROCEDURES 
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Approach to Descriptions 
4.12  The evaluation criteria for  assessment of correctness distinguish,  between criteria 
concerning the way the TOE is  developed (construction)  and criteria concerning 
the way  it will  be  used  (operation).  For each evaluation level,, these evaluation 
criteria are further broken down under various phases and aspects'. 
4.13  For each aspect or phase, documentation that must be provided for examination is 
identified, followed  by  requirements  for  its  content and  presentation or for  the 
procedures and standards it must define, followed by the evidence reqQired to show 
that the criteria in question have been met and finally the actionsc  .. to be performed 
by the evaluator are stated. 
4.14  For clarity, since there are significantly different requirements for each evaluation 
level, the criteria for  each level are set out separately.  New or changed criteria at 
each level are printed in bold.  There is a general need for greater rigour and depth 
. in  the  evidence  provided  at  higher  evaluation  levels.  This  is ; reflected  in  the 
progressive use  of the verbs state, describe  and explain  at different levels in many 
criteria for content and presentation which do. not otherwise change. 
4.15  Except at El, the burden for the provision of  evidence is on the sponsor.  This is 
then checked or audited by the evaluator. An additional requirement to produce 
evidence is  only placed on the evaluator when independent action is  required to 
provide the necessary confidence.  For example, there are requir~ments to provide 
evidence  of dynamic  testing  placed on both sponsor and  evalu~tor.  The major 
requirement is for the sponsor to provide evidence, in particular t'est plans and test 
results,  produced  as  part  of the normal development  process for  the  system  or 
product in question.  The requirement placed ori the evaluator is  to show that he 
has examined the results provided by the sponsor but has also performed his own 
tests  to  check  the  completeness,  comprehensiveness  and  accuracy  of sponsor 
supplied testing, and also to address any points of apparent inconsistency or error 
found in the results of those tests.  · 
4.16  Testing is seen as just one aspect of quality assurance.  Throughout the criteria it is 
assumed that a Quality Assurance Programme has been introduced and is  active 
throughout the whole  lifecycle  of the TOE.  This Quality Assurance Programme 
has  to  encompass  the  creation,  maintenance  and  destruction  of all  documents, 
programs and hardware with respect to the TOE.  The criteria laid  down  in this 
document can guide quality assurance assessors as  to whether the programme is 
adequate for the evaluation level at which the TOE is targeted. 
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Layout of Correctness Criteria 
4.17  The following paragraphs describe the layout and content of criteria which will be 
used for each evaluation level from E 1 to E6.  They are relevant to each level and 
will  not be repeated. for each  of them.  The individual  paragraphs within  each 
evaluation level are numbered as follows: 
<level designator>.< paragraph number within level> 
so, for example, the 3rd paragraph of level E2 is numbered E2.3.  Null paragraphs 
are inserted where necessary at each level so that the same numbered paragraph 
within each level refers to the same topic. 
Construction - The Development Process 
4.18  A major source of confidence in the correctness of  the security aspects of a TOE is 
understanding the way it was developed.  For the purposes of these criteria, four 
phases  are  identified  in the  development  process.  Factors  contributing  to the 
development of confidence are identified in the criteria for each of these phases in 
~m.  Regardless  of how  a  TOE  is  actually  produced  the  evidence  shall  be 
presented to match these phases. 
Phase 1 - Requirements 
4.19  This first  phase of the development process covers  the production of a  security 
.  target for the system or product.  The security target is the baseline for evaluation. 
It will  include  the target  evaluation level  and the claimed rating for  minimum 
strengt~ of mechanisms. 
Phase 2 -·Architectural Design 
4.20  This phase of the development process covers the overall top level definition and 
design of the TOE.  This takes the form of a descriptive high level specification, 
identifying the basic structure of the TOE, its external interfaces and its separation 
into major hardware and software components.  The specification will distinguish 
between what the TOE will do (the top level description) and how it will do it (the 
top level design).  It is particularly important that the architectural design provides 
for  a  clear  and  effective  separation  between  security-enforcing  and  other 
components.  Separation may be achieved physically, or by supporting protection 
mechanisms provided by hardware or firmware, or by other means.  A good design 
permits evaluation effort  to  be concentrated on limited  areas of the .  TOE that 
contribute to security, and enables the implementation of the security target to be 
easily followed, ·as the design is refined into greater and greater detail. 
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Phase 3 - Detailed Design 
4.21  This phase of the development process covers the refinement of the architectural 
design of the TOE to a level of  d~tail that can be used as a basis for programming 
and/or hardware construction, i.e. alt·stages of design and specification below the 
initial  top  level  sn~cification.  Components  identified  at  the  lowest  level  of 
specification  are  called  basic  components;  it  is  from  the  basic  component 
specifications that the actual software and/or hardware will be produced.  At this 
level,  security enforcing components will be identified.  Also  at this  level,  some 
non-security-enforcing components may be identified whose failure or misuse could 
compromise  security.  These  components  are security  relevant,::as  their correct 
operation is  relied upon for  the TOE to  enforce securicy.  Intermediate levels of 
specification may exist, depending on the development method employed and the 
complexity  of the  TOE.  It  is  important  that  as  the  specifications  of the TOE 
become more detailed and less abstract, the transformation is performed in a way 
that correctly preserves the intent of the top level description. 
Phase 4 -Implementation 
4.22  This phase of the development process covers the implementation of the detailed 
design of the TOE in hardware and/or software.  Each basic component is  first 
programmed or built from  the  basic component specifications.  These individual 
basic components are then to  be checked and tested against their specifications. 
Individual basic components are then integrated together in a controlled manner 
until the complete TOE exists.  The complete TOE is  then to ;  be checked and 
tested as  a whole against the security target.  It is  to be recogniied thai testing a 
basic component  or larger unit against  its  specification can only  show  errors or 
deviations from the specification, never the absence of errors.  Therefore it will be 
necessary at higher evaluation levels to supplement testing by analysis. 
Construction -The Development Environment 
4.23  The development environment comprises the measures, procedures and standards 
used by the developer whilst developing, producing and maintaining the TOE. 
Aspect 1 -Configuration Control 
4.24  Configuration  control  covers  the  controls  imposed  by  the  developer  on  his 
development, production and maintenance processes;  for example, to ensure that 
each representation of the design or its implementation is produced and changed in 
a controlled manner,  and  can be shown  to  correspond correctly to  the previous 
representations  on which  it  is  based.  Assessment  of configuration  control will 
include und~rstanding the developer's quality manageme-nt procedures.  Following 
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.  delivery of the first version of a TOE, it is almost inevitable that correction of flaws. 
or modification. to. meet changed objectives, will mean that further versions of the 
TOE  Will  need  to  be  developed  and  issued.  It  is  therefore  necessary  that 
configuration control of the TOE and  its documentation is  maintained following 
initial release and delivery.  Configuration control is  important as  a way  for the 
developer to ensure that the TOE is not modified in such a way as to invalidate the 
results of evaluation.  ·  · 
Aspect 2 - _Programming Languages and Compilers 
4.25  This aspect applies  to  basic components  implemented in software and firmware 
only.  It  includes  requirements  concerning  the  programming  languages,  the 
compiling tools and the runtime supporting libraries used to develop the TOE. 
Aspect 3-Developers Security. 
4.26  Developer  Security  covers  the  physical,  procedural,  technical  and  personnel 
measures used in the development environment.  It includes the physical security of 
the  development  location(s),  and  controls:  on.  the  selection  and  vetting  of 
developm_ent staff.  Its objective is  to protect development from deliberate attack 
and to maintain the corifidentiality of information as appropriate. 
Operation -The Operational Documentation 
4.27  Operational Documentation provides the major means by which the developer of  a 
TOE and  his  customers_  communicate.  Its  understandability,  coverage  and 
correctness are therefore important factors in secure operation of the TOE.  It can 
be  considered  to  fall  into  two  classes:  information  for  end-users  (user 
documentation)  and  information  for  administrators  (administration 
documentation). 
Aspect 1-User Documentation 
4.28  User documentation is· the information about the TOE supplied by lhe developer 
for use by end-users.  This documentation should help the end-user understand the 
security capabilities of the TOE, and the end-user's contribution to  maintaining 
security during use. 
Aspect 2 -Administration Documentation 
4.29  Administration documentation is  the information about the TOE supplied by the 
developer for use by the administrator.  This information may include information 
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not relevant  or appropriate  to  end-users.  This  documentation should  help  the 
administrator set up and operate the TOE in a way which is secure. 
Operation -The Operational Environment 
4.30  The operational environment comprises  the measures, procedures and' standards 
concerned with secure delivery, installation and operational use of a TOE.  In the 
case  of  a  system  which  is  already  in  use,  it  is  possible  to  assess  the  actual 
operational  procedure~.  In other circumstances,  it is  only  possible  to  evaluate 
proposed procedures. 
Aspect 1 -Delivery and Configuration 
431  This section covers the procedures used to maintain security during transfer of the 
TOE or its  component parts to  the user,  both on initial  delivery  and as  part of 
subsequent modification.  It includes any special procedures or operations required 
to configure the TOE during installation, or to demonstrate the authenticity of the 
delivered TOE.  Such procedures and measures are the basis for ensuring that the 
security protection offered by  the TOE is  not compromised during transfer or by 
interference with the security features during installation and configuration at the 
user·s site. 
Aspect 2- Start-up and Openition 
4.32  This covers the procedures used by the administrator in order to operate the TOE 
in a secure manner on a daily basis.  It shall cover not only day-to-day operation 
(matters such as  starting the system up) but also  other routine activities such as 
necessary backups and maintenance, and exceptional activities such as start-up and 
recovery following a failure. Almost all TOEs require maintenance, either to meet 
changed objectives, or to address failures. Thus these procedures shall provide for 
authorised modifications, replacements or additions to the TOE. 
,,· 
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LEVELE1  . 
Construction - The Development Process 
El.l  The sponsor shall provide the TOE, and the following documentation: 
The security target for the TOE 
Informal description of  the architecture of  the TOE 
Test documentation (optional) 
Library of test programs and tools used for testing the TOE (optional) 
Phase 1 - Requirements 
Requirements for Content and ~resentation 
E1.2  The security target shall state the security enforcing functions to  be. pro:vided by 
the TOE.  In the case of a  system, in addition the security target shall include a 
System Security Policy (SSP) identifying the security objectives and the .threats to 
the system.  In the case of a product, in addition the security target shall include a 
rationale, identifying the method of use for the product, the intended environmeat 
and  the  assumed  threats  within  that  environment.  The  security  enfordDg 
functions within the security target shall be specified  using an informal style as 
categorised in Chapter 2. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E1.3  In  the  case  of  a  system  the. security  target  shall  state  how  the  proposed 
functionality fulfils the security objectives and is adequate to counter the identified 
threats.  In  the  case  of  a  product  the  security  target  shall  state  how  the 
functionality is appropriate for that method of use and is adequate to counter the 
assumed threats. 
Evaluator Actions 
E1.4  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Check· that there are no inconsistencies in the security 
target. 
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Phase 2 - Architectural Design 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E1.5  The description of the architecture shall state the general structure of  the TOE.  It 
shall state the external interfaces of the TOE.  It shall state any hardware and 
firmware required by the 1!0E with a statement of the functionality of supporting 
protection mechanisms implemented in that hardware or linnware. 
Requirements for Evidence 
i 
El.6  The description or the architecture shall state how the security enfoi"Ci~g functions 
of the security target will be provided. 
Evaluator Actions 
El.7  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements j for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Phase 3 - Detailed Design 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E1.8  No Requirement. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E1.9  No Requirement. 
Evaluator Actions 
El.lO No Action. 
Phase 4 • Implementation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
El.ll Test documentation may be provided that shall contain plan, purpose, procedures 
and results of the tests.  A library of test  programs may  be provided that shall 
contain test programs and tools to enable tests covered by the test documentation 
I 
to be repeated.  , 
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Requirements for Evidence 
E1.12  Test documentation may be  provided that shall state the correspondence between 
tests and the security enforcing functions defined in the security target. 
Evaluator Actions 
E1.13  Check that the TOE satisfies the security target by performing tests covering all 
security enforcing functions identified in the security target.  Perform additional 
tests to search for errors.  The evaluator need not duplicate testing performed by or 
for the sponsor where adequate evidence of that testing is provided, but shall check 
by sampling the results or such tests. 
Construction - The Development Environment 
E1.14  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
Configuration list identifying the version or the TOE for evaluation 
Aspect 1 • Configuration Control 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
ELlS  The configuration list  shall state where  the TOE is  uniquely identified  (version 
number). 
Requirements for Evidence 
E1.16  The configuration list shall state how the TOE is uniquely identified. 
Evaluator Actions 
El.l7 Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
28June 1991  Version 1.2  Page  57 ASSURANCE - CORRECTNESS  LEVEL E1 
Aspect 2 - Programming Languages and Compliers 
Requirements Jor Content and Presentation 
El.18  No Requirement. 
Requirements for Evidence 
El.19  No Requirement. 
Evaluator Actions 
E1.20  No Action. 
Aspect 3 - Developers Security 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E1.21  No Requirement. 
Requirements for Evidence 
El.22  No Requirement. 
Evaluator Actions 
El.23  No Action. 
Operation - The Operational Documentation 
E1.24  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
•  User documentation 
Administration documentation 
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Aspect 1 - User Documentation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E1.25  The user documentation shall state the security enforcing functions relevant to the 
end-user.  It shall also give guidelines covering their secure operation. The user 
documentation  e~g.  Reference  Manuals,  User  Guides,  shall  be  structured, 
internally consistent, and consistent with all other documents  supplied for  this 
level. 
Requirements for Evidence 
El.26 The user documentation shall state how  an end.;user uses  the TOE in a  secure 
manner. 
Evaluator Actions 
El.27  Check that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Aspect 2 - Administration Documentation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E1.28  The administration  documentation  shall  state  the  security  enforcing  functions 
relevant to an administrator.  It shall distinguish two  types of functions:  those 
which allow an administrator to control security parameters, and those which only 
allow him to obtain information.  If  an administrator is required, it shall state all 
security  parameters which  are under his  control.  It shall  state each  type  of 
security-relevant event,  relevant to the administrative functions.  It shall  state 
details, sufficient for use, of procedures relevant to the administration or security. 
It  shall give guidelines on the consistent and effective use or the security features of 
the TOE and how  those features interact.  It shall state instructions on bow the 
system/product shall be installed and how, if appropriate, it shall be configured. 
The administration documentation, e.g. Reference Manuals, Administrator Guides, 
shall be structured, internally consistent, and consistent with all other documents 
supplied for this level. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E1.29  The administration documentation shall state how the TOE is administered in a 
secure manner. 
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Evaluator Actions 
E1.30  Check  that  the  infonnation  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Operation - The Operational Environment 
E1.31  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
Delivery and Configuration Documentation 
Start-up and Operation Documentation 
Aspect 1 - Delivery and Configuration 
Requirements for Procedures and Standards 
El.32 If different  configurations  are  possible,  the  impact  of the  configurations  on 
security shall be stated.  The procedures for delivery and system generation shall 
be stated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
El.33  The infonnation supplied shall state bow the procedures maintain security. 
Evaluator Actions 
E1.34  Cheek  that  the  infonnation  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Aspect 2 - Start-up and Operation 
Requirements for Procedures and Standards 
E1.35  The procedures for secure start-up and operation shall be stated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E1.36  The information supplied shall state how the procedures maintain security. 
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Evaluator Actions 
£1.37  Check that  the  information  provided. meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
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LEVELE2 
Construction - The Development Process 
E2.1  The sponsor shall provide the TOE, and the foJlowing documentation: 
The security target for the TOE 
Informal description of the architecture of the TOE 
Informal description of the detailed design 
Test documentation 
Library of test programs and tools used for testing the TOE 
Phase 1 - Requirements 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E2.2  The security target shaJI state the security enforcing functions to be provided by the 
TOE.  In the case of a system, in addition the security target shall include a System 
Security  Policy  (SSP)  identifying  the  security  objectives  and  the  threats  to  the 
system.  In the case of a product, in  addition the  security target shall include a 
rationale, identifying the method of use for the product, the intended environment 
and the assumed threats within that environment.  The security enforcing functions 
within the security target shall be Specified using an informal style as categorised in 
Chapter 2. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E2.3  In the case of a system the security target shall state how the proposed functionality 
fulfils the security objectives and is  adequate to counter the identified threats.  In 
the  case  of a  product  the  security  target  shall  state  how  the  functionality  is 
appropriate for that method of use and is adequate to counter the assumed threats. 
Evaluator Actions 
E2.4  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  'for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Check that there are no inconsistencies in the security 
target. 
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Phase 2- Architectural Design 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E2.5  The description of the architecture shall state the general structure of the TOE.  It 
shall state the  external interfaces of the TOE.  It shall  state any  hardware and 
firmware required by the TOE with a statement of the functionality of supporting 
protection mechanisms implemented in  that hardware or· firmware:  It shall state 
the separation of the TOE into security enforcing and other components. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E2.6  The description of the architecture shall state how the security enforcing functions 
of the security  target will  be  provided.  It shall  state  bow  the  separation into 
security enforcing and other components is achieved. 
Evaluator Actions 
E2.7  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Check that the  separ~tion of security enforcing and 
other components is valid. 
Phase 3 - Detailed Design 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E2.8  Th~  detailed design shall state the realisation of all security enforcing and security 
relevant functions.  It shall identify all  security mechanisms.  It shall map security 
enforcing functions  to  mechanisms  and components.  All  interfaces of security 
enforcing and  security  relevant  components  shall  be· documented  stating their 
/  purpose  and  parameters.  Specifications/definitions  for  mechanisms  shall  be 
provided.  These  specifications  shall  be  suitable  for  the  analysis  of 
interrelationships between the mechanisms employed.  Specifications need not be 
provided for components that are neither security enforcing nor security relevant  . 
. Where more than one level of specification is  provided, there shall be a clear and 
hierarchical relationship between levels. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E2.9  The detailed design shall state how the security mechanisms provide the security 
enforcing functions specified in the security target.  It shall state why components 
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for which no design information is provided cannot be either security enforcing or 
security relevant. 
Evaluator Actions 
E2.10  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements .for  content  and 
p~entation and evidence. 
Phase 4 - Implementation 
. Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E2.11  The test documentation shall contain plan, purpose, procedures and results of the 
tests.  The library of test programs shall contain test programs and tools to enable 
all tests covered by the test documentation to be repeated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
· E2.12  The  test  documentation  shall  state  the  correspondence  between  tests  and  the 
security enforcing functions defined in the security target. 
Evaluator Actions 
E2.13  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Use the library of test programs to check by sampling 
the results of tests. Check that tests cover all security enforcing functions identified 
in the security target.  Perform additional tests to search for errors. 
Construction -The Development Environment 
E2.14  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
Configuration list identifying the version of the TOE for evaluation 
Information on the configuration control system 
Information on the security of the development environment 
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Aspect 1 - Configuration Control 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E2.15  The development  process shall  be  supported by  a  configuration control system. 
The configuration list provided shall enumerate all basic components out of which 
the TOE is  built.  The TOE, its basic components and all  documents provided 
including the manuals shall possess a  unique identifier.  The use of this unique 
identifier is obligatory in references.  The configuration control system shall ensure 
that the TOE under evaluation matches the documentation provided and that only 
authorised changes are possible. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E2.16  The information on the configuration control system shall state how  it  is used in 
practice  and  applied  in  the  manufacturing  process  in  accordance  with  the. 
developer's quality management procedures. 
Evaluator Actions 
E2.17  Check  that  the  documented  procedures  are  being  applied.  Check  that  the 
information provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and  presentation and 
evidence. 
Aspect 2 - Programming Languages and Compilers 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E2.18  No Requirement. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E2.19  No Requirement. 
Evaluator Actions 
E2.20  No Action. 
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Aspect 3 - Developers Security 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E2:21  The document  on  the  security of the  development  environment  shall  state the 
intended protection for  the integrity of the TOE and  the confidentiality of the 
associated  documents.  Physical,  procedural,  personnel  and  other  security 
·measures used by the developer shall be stated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E2.22  The information on the security of the development environment-shall state how 
the integrity of the TOE and the confidentiality of the associated documentation 
are maintained. 
Evaluator Actions 
E2.23  Check  that  the  documented  procedures  are  being  applied.  Check  that  the 
information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and  presentation and 
evidence.  Search for errors in the procedures. 
Operation - The Operational Documentation 
E2.24  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
User documentation 
Administration documentation 
Aspect 1 - User Documentation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E2.25  The user documentation shall state the security enforcing functions relevant to the 
end-user.  It shall also give  guidelines covering their secure operation.  The user 
documentation e.g. Reference Manuals, User Guides, shall be structured;  internally 
consistent, and consistent_with all other documents supplied for this level. 
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Requirements for Evidence 
E2.26  Tne user  documentation shall  state  how  an  end-user uses  the  TOE in a secure 
manner. 
Evaluator Actions 
E2.27  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Aspect 2 - Administration Documentation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E2.28  The  administration  documentation  shall  state  the  security  enforcing  functions 
relevant to  an administrator.  It shall  distinguish  two  types  of functions:  those 
which allow an administrator to control security parameters, and those which only 
allow him to obtain information.  If  an administrator is  required, it shall state all 
security parameters which are under his control.  It shall state each type of security-
relevant  event,  relevant  to  the  administrative  functions.  It  shall  state  details, 
sufficient for use, of procedures relevant to the administration of security.  It shall 
give guidelines on the consistent and  effective use of the security features of the 
TOE and  bow  those  features  interact.  It  shall  state  instructions  on  how  the· 
system/product shall be installed and  how,  if appropriate, it shall be configured. 
The administration documentation, e.g. Reference Manuals, Administrator Guides, 
shall be  structured~ internally consistent, and  consistent with all  other documents 
supplied for this level. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E2.29  The administration documentation shall state how  the TOE is  administered in a 
secure manner. 
Evaluator Actions 
E2.30  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
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Operation - The Operational Environment 
E2.31  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
Delivery and Configuration Documentation 
Start-up and Operation Documentation 
Aspect 1 - Delivery and Configuration 
Requirements for Procedures and Standards 
E2.32 If  different configurations are possible, the impact of the configurations on security 
shall be stated.  The procedures for delivery and system generation shall be stated. 
A procedure approved by  the national certification body for this evaluation level 
shall be followed, which guarantees the authenticity of the delivered TOE.  While 
generating the TOE, any generation options and/or changes shall be  audited in 
such a way that it is subsequently possible to reconstruct exactly how and when the 
TOE was generated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E2.33  The information supplied shall state how the procedures maintain security. 
Evaluator Actions 
E2.34  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation  and  evidence.  Check  the  correct  application  of  the  delivery 
procedures.  Search for errors in the system generation procedures. 
Aspect 2 - Start-up and Operation 
Requirements for Procedures and Standards 
E2.35  The procedures for secure start-up and operation shall be stated.  If  any securitY 
enforcing  functions  can  be  deactivated  or  modified  during  start-up,  normal 
operation or maintenance, this shall  be  stated.  If the TOE contains  hardware 
which contains security enforcing hardware components, then administrator, end-
user, or self initiated diagnostic tests shall exist that can be performed on the TOE 
in its operational environment. 
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Requirements for Evidence 
E2.36  The information supplied shall  state how the procedures maintain security.  TK 
sponsor  shall  provide  example  resul~s from  all  diagnostic  test  procedures for 
security enforcing hardware components.  The sponsor shall provide examples of' 
any audit trail output created during start-up and operation. 
Evaluator Actions 
E2.37  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content and 
presentation and evidence.  Check the example evidence required for start-up aDd 
operation.  Search for errors in the procedures. 
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LEVEL E3 
Construction - The Development Process 
E3.1  The sponsor shall provide the TOE, and the following documentation: 
The security target for the TOE 
Informal description of the architecture of the TOE 
Informal description of the detailed design 
Test documentation 
Library of test programs and tools used for testing the TOE 
Source code or hardware drawings  for  all  security enforcing and security 
relevant components 
Informal description of correspondence between  source code or hardware 
drawings and the detailed design 
Phase 1 - Requirements 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E3.2  The security target shall describe the security enforcing functions to be provided by 
the TOE.  In the case of a system,  in addition the security target. shall include. a 
System Security Policy (SSP) identifying the security objectives and the threats to 
the system.  In the case of a product, in addition the security target shall include a 
rationale, identifying the method of use for the product, the intended environment 
and the assumed threats within that environment.  The security enforcing functions 
within the security target shall be specified using an informal style as categorised in 
Chapter2. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E3.3  In  the  case  of a  system  the  security  target  shall  describe  how  the  proposed 
functionality fulfils the security objectives and is adequate to counter the identified 
threats.  In  the  case  of a· product  the  security  target  shall  describe  how  the 
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functionality is  appropriate for  that method of use and  is  adequate to counter the 
assumed threats. 
Evaluator Actions 
E3.4  Check  that  the jnformation  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Check that there are no inconsistencies in the security 
target. 
Phase 2.· Architectural Design 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E3.5  The description of the architecture shall describe the general structure of the TOE. 
It shall describe the external interfaces of the TOE.  It shall describe any hardware 
and  firmware  required  by  the  TOE  with  a  statement  of  the  functionality  of 
supporting protection mechanisms implemented in that hardware or firmware.  It 
shall  describe  the  separation  of  the  TOE  into  security  enforcing  and  other 
components. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E3.6  The  description  of  the  architecture  shall  describe  how  the  security  enforcing 
functions  of  the  security  target  will  be  provided.  It  shall  describe  how the 
separation into security enforcing and other components is achieved. 
Evaluator Actions 
E3.7  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and  evidence.  Check that the  separation of security enforcing and 
other components is valid.  · 
Phase 3 • Detailed Design 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E3.8  The  detailed  design  shall  specify  all  basic  components.  It  shall  describe  the 
realisation of all security enforcing and security relevant functions.  It shall identify 
all security mechanisms.  It shall map security enforcing functions  to mechanistm 
and  components.  All  interfaces  of  security·  enforcing  and  security  relevant 
components  shall  be  documented  stating  their  purpose  and  pan..meters.. 
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Specifications/definitions for  mechanisms shall be provided.  These specifications 
shall  be suitable  for  the  analysis  of interrelationships  between  the  mechanisms· 
employed.  Specifications need  not be provided for  components that are neither 
security  enforcing  nor  security  relevant.  Where  more  than  one  level  of 
specification  is  provided,  there  shall  be  a  clear  and  hierarchical  relationship 
between levels. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E3.9  The  detailed  design  shall  describe  how  the  security  mechanisms  provide  the 
security enforcing functions specified in  the security target.  It shall describe why 
components for which no design information is provided cannot be either security 
enforcing or security relevant. 
Evaluator Actions 
E3.10  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Phase 4 - Implementation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E3.11  The  description  of correspondence  shall  describe  the  correspondence  between 
source code or hardware drawings and basic components of the detailed design. 
The test documentation shall contain plan, purpose, procedures and results of the 
tests.  The library of test programs shall contain test programs and tools to enable 
all tests covered by the test documentation to be repeated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E3.12  The test documentation shall describe the correspondence between tests and the 
security enforcing functions  defined in  the  security target.  It shall describe the 
correspondence  between  tests  and  the  security  enforcing  and  security  relevant 
functions  defined  in  the  detailed  design.  It shall  describe  the  correspondence 
between tests and the security mechanisms as represented in the source code or 
hardware drawings.  Evidence of retests after the discovery and correction of  errors 
relevant  to  security  is  obligatory  to  demonstrate  that  the  errors  have  been 
eliminated and no new errors have been introduced. 
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Evaluator Actions 
E3.13  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Use the library of test programs to check by sampling 
the results of tests.  Check that tests cover all security enforcing functions identified 
in the security target.  Check that the tests cover all security enforcing and security 
relevant functions  identified in  the detailed  design  and all security mechanisms 
identifiable in the source code or hardware drawings.  Check all retesting following 
the correction of errors.  Perform additional tests to search for errors. 
Construction -The Development Environment 
E3.14  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
Configuration list identifying the version of the TOE for evaluation 
Information on the configuration control system. 
Information on the acceptance procedure 
Information on the security of the development environment 
Description of all implementa,tion languages used 
Aspect 1 - Configuration Control 
Requirements for Content and Presentatio~ 
E3.15  The development process shall be supported by a configuration control system and 
an acceptance procedure.  The configuration list provided shall enumerate all basic 
components out of which the TOE is built.  The TOE, its basic components and all 
documents  provided  including  the  manuals  and  the  source  code  or hardware 
drawings  shall  possess  a  unique  identifier.  The use  of this  unique .identifier is 
obligatory in  references.  The configuration control  system  shall ensure that the 
TOE  under  evaluation  matches  the  documentation  provided  and  that  only 
authorised changes are possible. 
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Requirerhents for Evidence 
E3.16  The information on the configuration control system shall describe how it is used 'in 
practice  and  applied  in  the  manufacturing  process  in  accordance  with  the 
developer's quality management procedures. 
Evaluator Actions 
E3.17  Check  that  the  documented  procedures  are  being  applied.  Check  that  the 
information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and  presentation and 
evidence. 
Aspect 2 - Programming Languages and Compliers 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E3.18  Any programming languages used for implementation shall be well-defined, e.g. as 
in an ISO standard.  Any. implementation dependent options of the programming 
language shall be documented. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E3.19  The  definition  of the  programming  languages  shall  define  unambiguously  the 
meaning of all statements used in the source code. 
Evaluator Actions 
E3.20  Check  that  the  information  provided. meetS  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Aspect 3 - Developers Security 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E3.21  The document on the security of the development environment shall describe the 
intended protection for  the  integrity  of the TOE and  the  confidentiality  of the 
associated documents.  Physical, procedural, personnel and other security measures 
used by the developer shall be described. 
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Requirements for Evidence 
E3.22  The information on the security of the development  environment shall describe 
how  the  integrity  of  the  TOE  and  the  confidentiality  of  the  associated 
documentation are maintained. 
Evaluator Actions 
E3.23  Check  that  the  documented  procedures  are  .· being  applied.  Check  that  the 
information provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and  presentation and 
evidence.  Search for errors in the procedures. 
Operation - The Operational Documentation 
E3.24  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
User documentation 
Administration documentation 
~·  1  . 
Aspect 1 - User Documentation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E3.25  The user documentation shall describe the security enforcing functions relevant to 
the end-user.  It shall also give guidelines covering their secure operation. 1be user 
documentation e.g. Reference Manuals, User Guides, shall be structured, intemally 
consistent, and consistent with all other documents supplied for this level. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E3.26  The user documentation shall describe how an end-user uses the TOE in a secure 
manner. 
Evaluator Actions 
E3.27  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
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Aspect 2 -Administration Documentation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E3.28  The administration documentation shall describe the  security enforcing functions 
relevant to  an administrator.  It shall  distinguish  two  types  of functions:  those 
which allow an administrator to control security parameters, and those which only 
allow him to obtain information. If  an administrator is required, it shall describe all 
security parameters which are under his  control.  It shall  describe each type of 
security-relevant event, relevant to  the administrative functions.  It shall describe 
details, sufficient for use, of procedures relevant to the administration of security. 
It shall give guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the security features of 
the TOE and how those features interact.  It shall describe instructions on how the 
system/product shall be installed  and  how,  if appropriate,  it shall be configured. 
The administration documentation, e.g. Reference Manuals, Administrator Guides, 
shall be structured, internally consistent, and consistent with  all  other documents 
supplied for this level. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E3.29  The administration documentation shall describe how the TOE is administered in a 
secure manner. 
Evaluator Actions 
E3.30  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Operation - The Operational Environment 
E3.31  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
Delivery and Configuration Documentation 
Start-up and Operation Documentation 
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Aspect 1 - Delivery and Configuration 
. Requirements for Procedures and Standards 
E3.32  If  different configurations are possible, the impact of the configurations on security 
shall be described.  The procedures for  delivery and system generation shall be 
described.  A  procedure  approved  by  the  national  certification  body  for  this 
evaluation  level  shall  be  followed,  which  guarantees  the  authenticity  of the 
delivered TOE.  While generating the TOE, any generation options and/or changes 
shall be audited in such a way that it is subsequently possible to reconstruct exactly 
how and when the TOE was generated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E3.33  The information supplied shall c:lescribe how the procedures maintain security. 
Evaluator Actions 
E3.34  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation  and  evidence.  Check  the  correct  application  of  the  delivery 
procedures.  Search for errors in the system generation procedures. 
Aspect 2 - Start-up and Operation 
Requirements for Procedures and Standards 
E3.35  The procedures for secure start-up and operation shall be described.  If  any security 
enforcing  functions  can  be  deactivated  or  modified  during  start-up,  normal 
operation or maintenance, this shall be  descri~?ed.  If the TOE contains hardware 
which contains security enforcing hardware components, then administrator, end-
usert or self initiated diagnostic tests shall exist that can be performed on the TOE 
in its operational environment. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E3.36  The information supplied shall describe how the procedures maintain security.  The 
sponsor  shall  provide  example  results  from  all  diagnostic  test  procedures  for 
·security enforcing hardware components.  The sponsor shall provide examples of 
any audit trail output created during start-up and operation. 
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Evaluator Actions 
E3.37  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Check the example evidence required for start-up and 
operation.  Search for errors in the procedures. ·  ' 
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LEVEL E4 
• •  -...  ...  '  r- ~  ..  _-,  .• 
Con_structlon - The Development .Process 
E4.1  The sponsor shall provide the TOE, and the following documentation: 
The security target for the TOE 
Definition or reference to an underlying formally specified model of security 
I 
Informal  interpretation of the underlying model  in  terms of the security 
target  · 
Semiformal description of the architecture of the TOE 
Semiformal description of the detailed design 
Test documentation 
Library of test programs and tools used for testing the TOE 
Source  code or hardware drawings  for  all  security enforcing and .  security 
relevant components 
Informal description of correspondence between source code or hardware 
drawings and the detailed design 
Phase 1 - Requirements 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E4.2  The security target shall describe the security enforcing functions to be provided by 
the TOE.  In the case  of a system,  in addition the security target shall include a 
System Security Policy (SSP) identifying the security objectives and the threats to 
the system.  In the case of a product, in addition the security target shall include a 
rationale, identifying the method of use for the product, the intended environment 
and  the  assumed  threats within  that environment.  A formal  model  of security 
policy shall be provided or referenced to define the underlying security policy to be 
enforced by the TOE.  An  informal interpretation of this model  in terms of the 
security  target  shall  be  provided.  The  security  enforcing  functions  within  the 
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security target shall be specified using  both  an informal  and semiformal style  as 
categorised in Chapter 2. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E4.3  In  the  case  of a  system  the  security  target  shall  describe  how  the  proposed 
functionality fulfils the security objectives and is adequate to counter the identified 
threats.  In  the  case  of  a  product  the  security  target  shall  describe  how  the 
functionality is appropriate for that method of use and is  adequate to counter the 
assumed threats.  The informal interpretation of the formal security policy model 
shall describe how the security target satisfies the underlying secufity policy. 
Evaluator Actions 
E4.4  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
-presentation and evidence.  Check that there are no inconsistencies in the security 
target.  Check that there are no security features in the security target that conDict 
with the underlying security policy.  ' 
Phase 2 - Architectural Design 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E4.5  A  semiformal  notation  shall  be  used  in  the  architectural  design  to  produce  a 
semiformal description.  It shall describe the general structure of the TOE.  It shall 
describe the external interfaces of the TOE.  It shall describe any hardware and 
firmware required by the TOE with a statement of the functionality of supporting 
protection  mechanisms  implemented  in  that  hardware  or  firmware.  It  shall 
describe the separation of the TOE into security enforcing a:11d other components. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E4.6  The  description  of  the  architecture  shall  describe  how  the  security  enforcing 
. functions  of  the  security  target  will  be  provided.  It  shall  describe  how  the 
separation into  security  enforcing  and  other components  is  achieved.  It shall 
describe  bow  the  chosen  structure  provides  for  largely  independent  security 
enforcing components. 
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Evaluator Actions 
E4.7  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and  evidence.  Check  that the  separation of security enforcing and 
other components is valid. 
Phase 3 - Detailed Design 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E4.8  A semiformal notation shall be used to develop a semiformal detailed\desiga.  The 
detailed design shall  specify  all basic components.  It shall describe, through all 
levels of the design hierarchy, the realisation of all security enforcing and security 
relevant  functions.  It  s~all describe  the  separation  of the  TOE  into  security 
enforcing, security relevant and other components.  It shall be structured into well-
defined, largely independent basic components that facilitate testing and minimise 
the potential for violations of security.  It shail.identify all security mechanisms.  It 
shall  map  security  enforcing  functions  to  mechanisms  and  components.  All 
interfaces  of  security  enforCing  and  security  relevant  components  shall  be 
documented stating their purpose and parameters.  Specifications/definitions for 
mechanisms  shall  be  provided.  Th.ese  specifications  shall  be  suitable  for  the 
analysis  of interrelationships between the  mechanisms  employed.  Specifications 
need  not  be  provided  for  components  that  are  neither  security  enforcing  nor 
security relevant.  Where more than one level of specification is  provided, there 
shall be a clear and hierarchical relationship between levels. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E4.9  The  detailed  design  shall  describe  how  the  security  mechanisms  provide  the 
security enforcing functions specified in the security target.  It shall describe why 
components for which no design information is provided cannot be either security 
enforcing or security relevant. 
Evaluator Actions 
E4.10  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
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Phase 4 - Implementation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E4.11  The  description  of correspondence  shall  describe  the  correspondence  between 
source code  or hardware drawings  and basic components of the detailed design. 
The test documentation shall contain plan, purpose, procedures and results of the 
tests and a justification why the extent or test coverage is sufficient.  The library of 
test programs shall contain test programs and tools to enable all tests covered by 
the test documentation to be repeated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E4.12  The' test .documentation shall  describe the correspondence between tests and the 
security enforcing functions  defined  in  the security  target.  It shall  describe  the 
· · correspondence between  tests  and  the  security  enforcing  and  security  relevant 
functions  defined  in  the  detailed  design.  It  shall  describe  the  correspondence 
between tests and the security mechanisms  as  represented in the source code or 
hardware drawings.  Evidence of retests after the discovery and correction of errors 
relevant  to  security  is  obligatory  to  demonstrate  that  the  errors  have  been 
eliminated and no new errors have been introduced. 
Evaluator Actions 
E4.13  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Use the library of test programs to check by sampling 
the results of tests.  Check that tests cover all security enforcing functions identified 
in the security target.  Check that the tests cover all security enforcing and security 
relevant functions  identified  in  the  detailed  design  and  all  security  mechanisms 
identifiable in the source code or hardware drawings.  Check all retesting following 
the correction of errors.  Perform additional tests to search for errors. 
Construction - The Development Environment 
E4.14  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
Page  82 
Configuration list identifying the version of the TOE for evaluation 
Information on the configuration control system and its tools 
Audit  information  on  modifications  or all  parts  of the  TOE  subject  to 
configuration control 
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Information on the acceptance procedure 
Information on the security of the development environment 
Description of all implementation languages and compilers used 
Aspect 1 - Configuration Control 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E4.15  The development process shall be supported by a tool based configuration control 
system  and  an  acceptance  procedure.  The  configuration  list  provided  shall 
enumerate all basic components out of which the TOE is built.  The TOE, its basic 
components and all documents provided including the manuals and the source code 
or hardware  drawings  shall  possess  a unique identifier.  The use  of this unique 
identifier is obligatory in references.  The configuration control system shall ensure 
that the TOE under evaluation matches the documentation provided and that only 
authorised changes by authorised persons are possible.  The configuration control 
tools  shall  be able to control  and  audit changes  between  different  versions  of 
objects subject to configuration control. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E4.16  The information on the configuration control system shall describe how it is used in 
practice  and  applied  in  the  manufacturing  process  in  accordance  with  the 
developer's quality management procedures. 
Evaluator Actions 
E4.17  Check  that  the  documented  procedures  are  being  applied'.  Check  that  the 
information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and  presentation  and 
evidence. .  Use  the  developers  tools  to  rebuild  selected  parts or the  TOE and 
compare with the submitted version of the TOE. 
Aspect 2 - Programming Languages and Compliers 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E4.18  Any programming languages used for implementation shall be well-defined, e.g. as 
in an ISO standard.  Any implementation dependent options of the programming 
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language shall be documented. For all compilers used, the implementation options 
selected shall be documented. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E4.19  The  definition  of  the  progranuning  languages  shall  define  unambiguously  th~ 
meaning of all statements used in the source code. 
Evaluator Actions 
E4.20  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Aspect 3 - Developers SecurHy 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E4.21  The document on the security of the development environme:ttt shall describe the 
intended protection  for  the integrity of the TOE and  the  confidentiality  of the 
associated documents.  Physical, procedural, personnel and other security measures 
used by the developer shall be described. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E4.22  The information  on  the  security of the development environment shall describe 
how  the  integrity  of  the  TOE  and  the  confidentiality  of  the  associated 
documentation are maintained. 
Evaluator Actions 
E4.23  Check  that  the  documented  procedures  are  being  applied.  Check  that  the 
information provided  meets  all  requirements  for ·content  and  presentation  and 
evidence.  Search for errors in the procedures. 
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Operation - The Operational Documentation 
E4.24  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
User documentation 
Administration documentation 
Aspect 1 - User Documentation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E4.25  The user documentation shall describe the security enforcing functions relevant to 
the end-user.  It shall also give guidelines covering their secure operation.  The user 
documentation e.g. Reference Manuals, User Guides, shall be structured, internally 
consistent, and consistent with all other documents supplied for this level. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E4.26  The user documentation shall describe how an end-user uses the TOE in a secure 
manner. 
Evaluator Actions 
E4.27  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Aspect 2 • Administration Documentation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E4.28  The administration documentation shall describe the security enforcing functions 
relevant  to  an administrator.  It  shall  distinguish  two  types  of functions:  those 
which allow an administrator to control security parameters, and those which only 
allow him to obtain information. If  an administrator is required, it shall describe all 
~ecurity parameters which  are under his  control.  It  shall  describe  each type  of 
security-relevant event, relevant to  the administrative functions.  It shall descnbe 
details, sufficient for use, of procedures relevant to  the administration of security. 
It shall give guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the security features of 
the TOE and how those features interact.  It shall describe instructions on how the 
system/product shall be installed and how,  if appropriate, it shall be configured. 
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The administration documentation, e.g. Reference Manuals, Administrator Guides, 
shall be structured, internally consistent, and consistent with  all, other documents 
supplied for this leveL 
Requirements for Evidence 
E4.29  The administration documentation shall describe how the TOE is,administered in a 
I 
secure manner. 
I 
Evaluator Actions 
I 
E4.30  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements for  content  and 
pres~ntation and evidence. 
Operation - The Operational Environment 
E4.31  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
Delivery and Configuration Documentation 
Start-up and Operation Documentation 
Aspect 1 - Delivery and Configuration 
Requirements for Procedures and Standards 
E4.32  U different configurations are possible, the impact of the configurations on security 
shall be described.  The procedures for  delivery and system ge.neration shall be 
described.  A  procedure  approved  by  the  national  certification  body  for  this 
evaluation  level  shall  be  followed,  which  guarantees  the  authenticity  of  the 
delivered TOE.  While generating the TOE, any generation options and/or changes 
shall be audited in such a  way that it is subsequently possible to reconstruct exactly 
how and when the TOE was generated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E4.33  The information supplied spall describe how the procedures maintain security. 
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EvaJuator Actions 
·£4.34  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation  and  evidence.  Check  the  correct  application  of  the · delivery 
procedures.  Se~ch  for errors in the system generation procedures. 
Aspect 2 - Start-up and Operation 
Requirements for Procedures and Standards 
E4.35  The procedures for secure start-up and operation shall be described. If  any security 
enforcing  functions  can  be  deactivated  or  modified  during  start-up,  normal 
operation or maintenance, this shall be described.  Procedures shall exist which can 
restore the TOE to a secure state after. a failure, or a hardware or software error. 
If the  TOE  contains  hardware  which  contains  security  enforcing  hardware 
components,  then administrator,  end-user,  or self initiated diagnostic  tests sball 
exist that can be performed on the TOE in its operational environment. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E4.36  The information supplied shall describe how the procedures maintain security. 1be 
sponsor  shall  provide  example  results  from  all  diagnostic  test  procedures  for 
security enforcing hardware components.  The sponsor shall provide examples of 
any audit trail output created during start-up and operation. 
Evaluator Actions 
E4.37  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Check the example evidence required for start-up and 
operation.  Search for errors in the procedures. 
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Construction - The Development Process 
E5.1  The sponsor shall provide the TOE, and the following documentation: 
The security target for the TOE 
Definition or reference to an underlying formally specified model of security 
Informal interpretation of the  underlying  model  in terms  of the  security 
target 
Semiformal description of the architecture of the TOE 
Semiformal description of the detailed design 
Test documentation 
Library of test programs and tools used for testing the TOE 
Source code  or hardware drawings  for  all  security enforcing and security 
relevant components 
Informal description of correspondence between source code or hardware 
drawings and the detailed design 
Phase 1 • Requirements 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E5.2  The security target shall explain the seturity enforcing functions to be provided by 
the TOE.  In the case of a system,  in addition the security target shall include a 
System Security Policy (SSP) identifying the security objectives and the threats to 
the system.  In the case of a product, in addition the security target shall include a 
rationale, identifying the method of use for the product, the intended environment 
and  the assumed  threats within  that  environment.  A  formal  model  of security 
policy shall be provided or referenced to define the underlying security policy to be 
enforced by  the TOE.  An informal interpretation of this  model in terms of the 
security  target  shall  be provided.  The  security  enforcing  functions  within  the 
Page  88  Version 1.2  28June 1991 ITSEC  ASSURANCE- CORRECTNESS  LEVEL ES 
security target shall be specified using both an informal and  semiformal style as 
categorised in Chapter 2. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E5.3  In  the  case  of  a  system  the  security  target  shall  explain  how  the  proposed 
functionality fulfils the security objectives and is adequate to counter the identified 
threats.  In the  case  of  a  product  the  security  target  shall  explain  how  the 
functionality is appropriate for that method of use and is  adequate to  counter the 
assumed threats.  The informal interpretation of the formal security policy model 
shall explain how the security target satisfies the underlying security policy. 
Evaluator. Actions 
E5.4  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Check that there are no inconsistencies in the security 
· target.  Check that there are no security features in the security target that conflict 
with the underlying security policy. 
Phase 2 - Architectural Design 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
ES.S  A  semiformal  notation shall  be used  in the architectural  design  to  produce  a 
semiformal description.  It shall explain the general structure of the TOE.  It shall 
explain the external interfaces  of the TOE.  It shall  explain  any hardware  and 
firmware required by the TOE with a statement of the functionality of supporting 
protection mechanisms implemented in that hardware or firmware.  It shall explain 
the separation of the TOE into security enforcing and other components.  It shall 
explain the interrelationships between the security enforcing compo~ents. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E5.6  The  description  of the  architecture  shall  explain  how  the  security  enforcing 
functions of the security target will be provided.  It shall explain how the separation 
into security enforcing and other components is achieved.  It shall explain how tlie 
chosen structure provides for  largely independent security enforcing components. 
It  shall  explain  why  the  interrelationships  between  the  security  eaforciag 
components are necessary. 
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Evaluator Actions 
E5.7  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and  evidence.  Check that the separation of security enforcing and 
.other components is valid. 
Phase 3 • Detailed Design 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E5:8  A semiformal notation shall be used to develop a semiformal detailed design.  The 
detailed  design  shall  specify  all  basic  components.  It shall  explain,  through all 
levels of the design hierarchy, the realisation of all security enforcing and security 
relevant  functions.  It  shall  explain  the  separation  of  the  TOE into  security 
enforcing, security relevant and other components.  It shall be structured into well-
defined, largely independent basic components that facilitate testing and minimise 
the  potential  for  violations  of security.  It shall  incorporate  significant  use  of 
layering, abstraction and data hiding.  It shall identify all security mechanisms.  It 
shall  map  security  enforcing  functions  to  mechanisms  and  functional  units. 
Unnecessary functionality shall be excluded from  security enforcing and security 
relevant components.  All .  interfaces  of security enforcing  and  security relevant 
components shall be documented stating their purpose and parameters and effects. 
The  purpose  of ali  variables  used  by  more  than  one  functional  unit  shall  be 
explained.  Specifications/definitions for  mechanisms  shall  be provided.  These 
specifications shall  be suitable for  the analysis  of interrelationships between the 
mechanisms employed.  Specifications need not be provided for components that 
are neither security enforcing nor security relevant.  Where more than one level of 
specification  is  provided,  there  shall  be  a  clear  and  hierarchical  relationship 
between levels. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E5.9  The detailed design shall explain how the security mechanisms provide the security 
enforcing  functions  specified  in  the  security  target.  It shall  explain  why  the 
remaining  functionality  cannot  be  excluded  from  the  security  enforcing  and 
security relevant components.  It shall explain why components for which no design 
information is provided cannot be either security enforcing or security relevant. 
Evaluator Actions 
E5.10  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
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Phase 4 - Implementation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
ES.ll The source code and hardware drawings shall be completely structured into small, 
comprehensible,  separate  sections.  The  description  of  correspondence  shall 
explain  the  correspondence  between  source  code  or  hardware  drawings  and 
functional units of the detailed design.  The test documentation shall contain plan, 
purpose, procedures and results of the tests and a justification why the extent of test 
coverage is sufficient.  The library of test programs shall contain test programs and 
tools to enable all tests covered by the test documentation to be repeated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E5.12  The test documentation shall explain the  correspondence between tests and the 
security  enforcing  functions  defined  in the  security  target. , It shall  explain  the 
correspondence  between  tests  and  the  security  enforcing  and  security  relevant 
functions  defined  in  the  detailed  design.  It  shall  explain  the  correspondence 
between tests and the security mechanisms as  represented in the source code or 
hardware drawings.  Evidence of retests after the discovery and correction of errors 
relevant  to  security  is  obligatory  to  demonstrate  that  the  errors  have  been 
eliminated and no new errors have been introduced. 
Evaluator Actions 
E5.13  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Use the library of test programs to check by sampling 
the results of tests.  Check that tests cover all security enforcing functions identified 
in the security target. ·Check that the tests cover all security enforcing and security 
relevant functions  identified in the detailed  design  and  all  security  mechanisms 
identifiable in the source code or hardware drawings.  Check all retesting following 
the correction of  errors.  Perform additional tests to search for errors. 
Construction - The Development Environment 
E5.14  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
Configuration list identifying the version of the TOE for evaluation 
Information on the configuration control system and. its tools 
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Audit information  on modifications  of all  objects of the  TOE subject  to 
configuration control 
Information on the acceptance procedure 
Information on the integration procedure 
Information on the security of the development environment 
Description of all implementation languages and compilers used 
Source code of  all runtime libraries used 
Aspect 1 • Configuration Control 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E5.15  The development process shall be supported by a tool based configuration control 
system and an acceptance procedure.  The configuration control tools shall ensure 
that the person responsible for acceptance or an object into configuration control 
was  not one or its designers or develope~s.  The configuration list provided shall 
enumerate all basic components out of which the TOE is built.  The TOE, its basic 
components and all documents provided including the manuals and the source code 
or hardware drawings  shall possess a unique identifier.  The use  of this  unique 
identifier is obligatory in references.  The configuration control system shall ensure 
that the TOE under evaluation matches the documentation provided and that only 
authorised changes by authorised persons are possible.  All objects created during 
the development  process which  pass  through the acceptance procedure shall be 
subject ·  to  configuration  control.  All  security  enforcing  and  security  relevant 
objects under configuration control shall be identified as such.  The configuration 
control tools shall be able to control and audit changes between different versions 
of objects subject to configuration control.  All modifications or these objects shall 
be audited with originator, date and time.  The configuration control tools shall be 
able to support the creation and handling or variable relationships between objects 
under configuration control.  In the event or a change to any of these objects, the 
tools shall be able to identify all other objects under configuration control affected 
by this change together with an indication or  whether they are security enforcing or 
security relevant objects.  . 
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Requirements for Evidence 
; 
E5.16  The information on the configuration control system and the integration procedure 
shall  explain  how  they  are used  in practice  and  applied  in  the  manufacturing 
process in accordance with  the developer's quality management procedures.  The 
mformation on the configuration control system shall explain how the tools ensure 
that the person responsible for acceptance or an object was not one or its designers 
or developers.  Example audit trail output from  the configuration control system 
shall be provided. 
Evaluator Actions 
E5.17  Check  that  the  documented  procedures  are  being  applied.  Check  that  the 
information provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and  presentation  and 
evidence.  Check  the example  audit trail output.  Use  the  developers  tools  to 
create selected parts of the TOE and compare with  the submitted version of the 
TOE. 
Aspect 2 - Programming Languages and Compliers 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
- E5.18  Any programming languages used for implementation shall be well-defined, e.g. as 
in an ISO standard.  Any implementation dependent options of the programming 
language shall be documented.  For all compilers used, the implementation optiom 
selected shall be documented.  The source code of any runtime libraries shall be 
provided. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E5.19  The  definition  of  the  programming  languages  shall  define  unambiguously  the 
meaning of all statements used in the source code. 
Evaluator Actions 
E5.20  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
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Aspect 3 - Developers Security 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E5.21  The document on the security of the development environment shall explain the 
intended protection for  the integrity of the TOE and  the  confidentiality of the 
associated documents.  Physical, procedural, personnel and other security measures 
used by the developer shall be explained. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E5.22  The information on the security of the development environment shall explain how 
the .integrity of the TOE and the confidentiality of the associated documentation 
are maintained. 
Evaluator Actions 
E5.23  Check  that  the  documented  procedures  are  being  applied.  Check  that  the 
information provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and  presentation and 
evidence.  Search for errors in the procedures. 
Operation - The Operational Documentation 
E5.24  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
User documentation 
Administration documentation 
Aspect 1 - User Documentation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E5.25  The user documentation shall explain the security enforcing functions relevant to 
the end-user.  It shall also give guidelines covering their secure operation.  The user 
documentation e.g. Reference Manuals, User Guides, shall be structured, internally 
consistent, and consistent with all other documents supplied for this level. 
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Requirements for Evidence 
E5.26  The user documentation shall explain how  an end-user uses the TOE in a secure 
manner. 
Evaluator Actions 
E5.27  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
prtsentation and evidence, 
Aspect 2 - Administration Documentation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E5.28  The administration documentation shall explain  the  security enforcing functions 
relevant to  an administrator.  It shall  distinguish  two  types  of functions:  those 
which allow an administrator to control security parameters, and those which only 
allow him to obtain information.  If an administrator is required, it shall explain all 
security parameters which  are  under his  control.  It shall  explain each  type of 
security-relevant event,  relevant to the administrative functions.  It shall explain 
details, sufficient for use, of procedures relevant to the administration of security. 
It shall give guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the security features of 
the TOE and how those features interact.  It shall explain instructions on how the 
system/product shall be installed and how,  if appropriate, it shall be configured. 
The administration documentation, e.g. Reference Manuals, Administrator Guides, 
shall be structured, internally consistent, and consistent with  all other documents 
supplied for this level. 
Requirements for Evidence 
ES .  .l9  The administration documentation shall explai~ how the TOE is administered in a 
secure manner. 
Evaluator Actions 
E5.30  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
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Operation - The Operational Environment 
E5.31  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
Delivery and Configuration Documentation 
Start-up and Operation Documentation 
Aspect 1 - Delivery and Configuration 
Requirements for Procedures and Standards 
E5.32  H different configurations are possible, the impact of the configurations on security 
shall be explained.  The procedures for  delivery and  system generation shall be 
explained.  A  procedure  approved  by  the  national  certification  body  for  this 
evaluation  level  shall  be  followed,  which  guarantees  the  authenticity  of the 
delivered TOE.  While generating the TOE, any generation optionS and/or changes 
shall be audited in sucJt a way that it is subsequently possible to reconstruct exactly 
bow and when the TOE was generated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
ES.33  The information supplied shall explain how the procedures maintain security. 
Evaluator Actions 
E5.34  Check  that  the  information  p(ovided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation  and  evidence.  Check  the  correct  application  of  the  delivery 
procedures.  Search for errors in the system generation procedures. 
Aspect 2 - Start-up and Operation 
Requirements for Procedures and Standards 
E5.35  The procedures for secure start-up and operation shall be explained. If  any security 
enforcing  functions  can  be  deactivated  or  modified  during  start-up,  normal 
operation or maintenance, this shall be explained.  Procedures shall exist which can 
restore the TOE to a secure state after a failure, or a hardware or software error.  H 
the  TOE  contains  hardware  which  contains  security  enforcing  hardware 
components,  then administrator,  end-user,  or self initiated  diagnostic  tests  shall 
exist that can be performed on the TOE in its operational environment. 
i 
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Requirements for Evidence 
E5.36  The information supplied shall explain how the procedures maintain security.  The 
sponsor  shall  provide  example  results  from  all  diagnostic  test  procedures  for 
security enforcing hardware components.  The sponsor shall provide examples of 
any audit trail output created during start-up and operation. 
Evaluator Actions 
E5.37  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Check the example evidence required for start-up and 
operation.  Search for errors in the procedures. 
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Construction - The Development Process 
E6.1  The sponsor shall provide the TOE, and the following documentation: 
The security target for the TOE 
Definition or reference to an underlying formally specified ~odel  of security 
·~·· 
Informal interpretation of the underlying  model  in  terms  of the security 
target 
Formal description of the architecture of the TOE 
Semiformal description of the detailed design 
Test documentation 
library of test programs and tools used for testing the TOE, including tools 
which  can  be  used  to  detect  inconsistencies . between  source  code  and 
executable  code  if .there  are any  security  enforcing or security  relevant 
source code components (e.g. a disassembler and/or a debugger) 
Source code or hardware drawings  for  all  security enforcing and security 
relevant components 
Informal description of correspondence between source code or hardware 
drawings  and the detailed design and the formal  specification of security 
enforcing functions 
Phase 1 - Requirements 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E6.2  The security target shall explain the security enforcing functions to be provided by 
the TOE.  In die case of a system, in addition the security target shall include a 
System Security Policy (SSP) identifying the security objectives and the threats to 
the system.  In the case of a product, in addition the security target shall include a 
rationale, identifying the method of use for the product, the intended environment 
and the  assumed  threats within  that environment.  A  formal  model of security 
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policy shall be provided or referenced to define the underlying security policy to be 
enforced by  the TOE.  An informal interpretation ofthis model in terms of the 
security  target  shall  be provided.  The  security  enforcing  functions  within  the 
security  target  shall  be  specified  using  both  an  informal  and  formal  style  as 
categorised in Chapter 2. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E6.3  In  the  case  of  a  system  the  security  target  shall  explain  how  the  proposed 
functionality fulfils the security objectives and is adequate to counter the identified 
threats.  In  the  case  of  a  product  the  security  target  shall  explain  how  the 
functionality is  appropriate for that method of use and is adequate to counter the 
assumed threats.  The informal interpretation of the formal security policy model 
shall explain how the security target satisfies the underlying security policy. 
Evaluator Actions 
E6.4  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Check that there are no inconsistencies in the securi1J 
target.  Check that there are Iio security features in the security target that conflict 
with the underlying security policy. 
Phase 2 -Architectural Design 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E6.5  A formal notation shall be used in the architectural design to produce a formal 
description.  It shall explain the general structure of the TOE.  It shall explain the 
external  interfaces  of the  TOE.  It  shall  explain  any  hardware  and  firmware 
required by the TOE with a statement of the functionality of supporting protection 
mechanisms  implemented  in  that  hardware  or firmware.  It  shall  explain  the 
separation of the TOE into security  enforcing  and  other components.  It shaD 
explain the interrelationships between the security enforcing components. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E6.6  The  description  of  the  architecture  shall  explain  how  the  security  enforcing 
functions of the security target will be provided.  It shall explain how the separation 
into security enforcing and other components is achieved.  It shall explain how the 
chosen structure provides for  largely independent security enforcing components. 
It  shall  explain  why  the  interrelationships  between  the  security  enforcing 
components are necessary.  It shall explain, using a combination of formal and 
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informal techniques, how it is consistent with the formal securitY policy model of 
the underlying security policy.  · 
Evaluator Actions 
E6.7  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and  evidence.  Check that the separation of security enforcing and 
other components is valid.  Check that formal arguments are valid. 
Phase 3 - Detailed Design 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E6.8  A semiformal notation shall be used to develop a semiformal detailed design.  The 
detailed design  shall specify  all  basic components.  It  shall  explain,  through  all 
levels of the design hierarchy, the realisation of all security enforcing and security 
relevant  functions.  It  shall  explain  the  separation  of  the  TOE into  security 
enforcing, security relevant and other components.  It shall be structured into well-
defined, largely independent basic components that facilitate testing and minimise 
the potential  for  violations  of security.  It  shall  incorporate  significant  use  of 
layering, abstraction and data hiding.  It shall identify all security mechanisms.  It · 
shall  map  security  enforcing  functions  to  mechanisms  and  ~nctional  units. 
Unnecessary functionality shall be excluded  from  security enforcing and security 
relevant components.  All  interfaces  of security  enforcing  and security relevant 
components shall be documented stating their purpose and parameters and effects. 
The  purpose  of all  variables  used  by  more  than  one  functional  unit  shall  be 
explained.  Specifications/definitions for  mechanisms  shall  be provided.  These 
specifications shall be suitable for  the analysis  of interrelationships between the 
mechanisms employed.  Specifications need not be provided for:;:·components  that 
are neither security enforcing nor security relevant.  Where more than one level of 
specification  is  provided,  there  shall  be  a  clear  and  hierarchical  relationship 
between levels. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E6.9  The detailed design shall explain how the security mechanisms provide the security 
enforcing  functions  specified  in  the  security  target.  It shall  explain  why  the 
remaining functionality cannot be excluded from the security enforcing and security 
relevant  components.  ' It shall  explain  why  components  for  which  no  design 
information is provided cannot be either security enforcing or security relevant. 
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Evaluator Actions 
E6.10  Check  that  the  info'rmation  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Phase 4 - Implementation 
Requirements for Content and Pr-esentation 
E6.11  The source code and hardware drawings shall be completely structured into small, 
comprehensible,  separate  sections.  iVfhe  description  of  correspondence  sbail 
explain  the  correspondence  between · source  code  or  hardware  drawings  .and 
functional units of the detailed design.  It shall explain the correspondence betweea 
the security mechanisms as represented in the source code or hardware draWings 
and the formal specification or security enforcing functions in the security target. 
The test doCU:mentation shall contain plan, purpose, procedures and results of  the 
tests and a justification why the extent of test coverage is sufficient.  The library of 
test programs shall contain test programs and tools to enable all tests covered by 
the test documentation to be repeated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E6.12  The test  documentation shall explain the correspondence between tests and the 
formal specification or  security enforcing functions defined in the security taJ&et.  It 
shall  explain  the  correspondence  between  tests  and  the  security  enforcing  and 
security  relevant functions  defined  in the  detailed  design.  It shall  explain the 
correspondence between tests and the serurity mechanisms as. represented in. the 
source code or hardware drawings.  Evidence of retests after the discovety and 
correction of errors relevant .to security is obligatory to demonstrate that the errOIS 
have been eliminated and no new errors have been introduced. 
Evaluator Actions 
E6.13  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Use the library of test programs to check by sampling 
the results of tests.  Check that tests cover all security enforcing functions identified 
in the security target.  Check that the tests cover all security enforcing and security 
relevant functions  identified in the· detailed  design  and all  security mechanisms 
identifiable in the source code or hardware drawings.  Check all retesting following 
the correction of errors.  Perform additional tests to search for errors.  Investigate 
any  suspected  inconsistencies  between  source  code  ancl  executable  code  found 
during testing using the sponsor supplied tools. 
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Construction - The Development Environment 
E6.14  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
Configuration list identifying the version of the TOE for evaluation 
Information on the configuration control system and its tools 
Audit information on modifications  of all  objects of the TOE subject to 
configuration control 
Information on the acceptance procedure 
Information on the integration procedure 
Information on the security of the development environment 
Description of all implementation languages and compilers used 
Source code of all runtime libraries used 
Aspect 1 - Configuration Control 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E6.15  The development process shall be supported by a tool based configuration control 
system and an acceptance procedure.  The configuration control tools shall ensure 
that the person responsible. for acceptance of an object into configuration control 
was not one of its designers or developers.  The configuration Jist provided shall 
enumerate all basic components out of which the TOE is built.  The TOE, its basic 
components and all documents provided including the manuals and the source code 
·or hardware drawings shall  possess  a  unique identifier.  The use of this unique 
identifier is obligatory in references.  The configuration control system shall ensure 
that the TOE under evaluation matches the documentation provided and that only 
authorised  changes  by  authorised  persons  are  possible.  All  tools  used  in  the 
development process shall be subject to configuration control.  All objects created 
during the development process which pass through the acceptance procedure shall 
be subject to configuratio~ control.  All  security enforcing and security relevant 
objects under configuration control shall be identified as such.  The configuration 
control tools shall be able to control and audit changes between different versions 
of objects subject to configuration control.  All modifications of these objects shall 
be audited with originator, date and time.  The configuration control tools shall be 
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able to support the creation and handling of variable relationships between objects 
under configuration control.  In the event of a change to any of these objects, the 
tools shall be able to identify all other objects under configuration control affected 
by this change together with an indication of whether they are security enforcing or 
security relevant objects. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E6.16  The information on the configuration control system and the integration procedure 
shall  explain  how  they  are  used  in practice  and  applied · in  the  manufacturing 
process in accordance with the developer's quality management procedures.  The 
information on the configuration control system shall explain how the tools ensure 
that .the person responsible for acceptance of ari object was not one of its designers 
or developers.  Example audit trail output from the configuration control system 
shall be provided. 
Evaluator Actions 
E6.17  Check  that  the  documented  procedures  are  being  applied.  Check  that  the 
information provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and  presentation  and 
evidence.  Check the example audit trail output.  Use the developers tools to create 
selected parts of the TOE and compare with the submitted version of the TOE. 
Aspect 2 • Programming Languages and Compliers 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E6.18  Any programming languages used for implementation shall be well-definetL e.g. as 
in an ISO standard.  Any implementation dependent options of the programming 
language shall be documented.  For all compilers used, the implementation options 
selected shall be documented.  The source code of any runtime libraries shall be 
provided. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E6.19  The  definition  of  the  programming  languag·es  shall  define  unambiguously  the 
meaning of all statements used in the source code. 
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Evaluator Actions 
E6.20  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Aspect 3 - Developers Security 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E6.21  The document on the security of the development environment  __ shall explain the 
intended protection for  the integrity  of the TOE and  the  confidentiality of the 
associated documents.  Physical, procedural, personnel and other security measures 
used by the developer shall be explained. 
Requirements for ·Evidence 
E6.22  The information on the security of the development environment shall explain how 
the integrity of the TOE and the confidentiality of the associated documentation 
are maintained. 
Evaluator Actions 
E6.23  Check  that  the  documented  procedures  are  being  applied.  Check  that  the 
information provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and  presentation and 
evidence.  Search for errors in the procedures. 
Operation - The Operational Documentation 
E6.24  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
User documentation 
Administration documentation 
Aspect 1 • User Documentation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E6.25  The user documentation shall explain the security enforcing functions relevant to 
the end-user.  It shall also give guidelines covering their secure operation.  The user 
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documentation e.g. Reference Manuals, User Guides, shall be structured, internally 
consistent, and consistent with all other documents supplied for this level. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E6.26  The user documentation shall explain how an end-user uses the TOE in a secure 
manner. 
Evaluator Actions 
E6.27  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
Aspect 2 - Administration Documentation 
Requirements for Content and Presentation 
E6.28  The administration  documentation shall  explain the security enforcing functions 
relevant to  an administrator.  It shall  distinguish  two  types  of functions:  those 
which allow an administrator to control security parameters, and those which only 
allow him to obtain information.  If  an administrator is required, it shall explain all 
security parameters which  are under his  control.  It shall  explain each type of 
security-relevant event, relevant to the administrative functions.  It shall explain 
details, sufficient for use, of procedures relevant to the administration of security. 
It shall give guidelines on the consistent and effective use of the security features CJf 
the TOE and how those features interact.  It shall explain instructions on how the 
system/product shall be installed and how,  if appropriate, it shall be configured 
The administration documentation, e.g. Reference Manuals, Administrator Guides. 
shall be structured, internally consistent, and consistent with all other documenli 
supplied for this level. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E6.29,  The administration documentation shall explain how the TOE is  administered in  a 
secure manner. 
Evaluator Actions 
E6.30  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence. 
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Operation - The Operational Environment 
E6.31  The sponsor shall provide the following documentation: 
Delivery and Configuration Documentation 
Start-up and Operation Documentation 
Aspect 1 - Delivery and Configuration 
Requirements for Procedures and Standards 
E6.32  If  different configurations are possible, they shall be defined in terms of the formal 
architectural design,  and the  impact  of the  configurations  on security shall  be 
explained.  The procedures for delivery and system generation shall be explained. 
A procedure approved by  the national certification body for this  evaluation level 
shall be followed, which guarantees the authenticity of the delivered TOE.  While 
generating the TOE, any generation options and/or changes shall be. audited in 
such a way that it is subsequently possible to reconstruct exactly how and when the 
TOE was generated. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E6.33  The information supplied shall explain how the procedures maintain security. 
Evaluator Actions 
E6.34  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirement~ for  content  and 
presentation  an.d  evidence.  Check  the  correct  application  of  the  delivery 
procedures.  Search for errors in the system generation procedures. 
Aspect 2 - Start-up and Operation 
Requirements for Procedures and Standards 
E6.35  The procedures for secure start-up and operation shall be explained. If  any security 
enforcing  functions  can  be  deactivated  or  modified  during  start-up,  normal 
operation or maintenance, this shall be explained.  Procedures shall exist which can 
restore the TOE to a  secure state after a failure, or a hardware or software error. If 
the  TOE  contains  hardware  which  contains  security  enforcing  hardware 
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components,  then administrator,  end-user,  or self initiated diagnostic _tests  sball 
exist that can be performed on the TOE in its operational environment. 
Requirements for Evidence 
E6.36  The information supplied shall explain how the procedures maintain security.  The 
sponsor  shall  provide  example  results  from  all  diagnostic  test  procedures  for 
security enforcing hardware components.  The sponsor shall provide examples of 
any audit trail output created during start-up and operation. 
Evaluator Actions 
E6.37  Check  that  the  information  provided  meets  all  requirements  for  content  and 
presentation and evidence.  Check the example evidence required for start-up and 
operation.  Search for errors in the procedures. 
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5  RESULTS OF EVALUATION 
Introduction  · 
5.1  Evaluation of a TOE in accordance with the correctness and effectiveness criteria 
set out in this  document provides a measure of the assurance that the TOE will 
meet its security target.  This· is  indicated by the evaluation level achieved and :a 
rating for the minimum strength of the security mechanisms of the TOE. 
Rating 
5.2  The rating  awarded  to  a  TOE as  the  results  of evaluation  shall  consist  of the 
following:  · 
a  reference  to  the  security  target  for  the TOE used  as  the  baseline  fm: 
evaluation; 
the evaluation level achieved by assessment of correctness and consideration 
of effectiveness; 
the confirmed rating of the minimum strength of the security mechanisms of 
the TOE. 
5.3  The security target shall be specified in a manner that is suitable for evaluation by 
an independent body and which  is  in accordance with  the criteria for  the staled 
evaluation level and type of TOE. 
5.4  The evaluation level awarded shaH only be EO, El, E2, E3, E4, E5 or E6. 
5.5  The confirmed rating of minimum strength shall only be.awarded if the roE bas 
been successfully evaluated, ie. it is not awarded EO.  The rating awarded shaD only 
be basic, medium or high. 
5.6  A TOE that satisfies all the correctness criteria  'for its targeted evaluation level and 
passes  all  aspects  of  consideration  of effectiveness  at  that  level,  including the 
claimed  minimum  strength  of mechanisms,  shall  be awarded  the  rating of that 
evaluation level and minimum strength of mechanisms. 
5.7  A  TOE that  is  found  to  contain  an  exploitable  vulnerability  that has  not been 
eliminated during the course of evaluation shall be withdrawn from evaluation or 
awarded EO.  · 
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5.8  A  TOE that fails  to provide  satisfactory evidence  to  satisfy  the  criteria for  its 
targeted evaluation level but where  no  exploitable vulnerability has  been found 
may be awarded a lower evaluation level  where the evidence in question is  not 
required  to  satisfy  the  criteria  for  that  level.  If there  is  insufficient  time  or 
resources to consider the TOE against that lower level, or if unanswered questions 
exist, it shall either be withdrawn from evaluation or awarded EO. 
5.9  A  TOE will  only  fail  evaluation  on grounds  of effectiveness  if an exploitable 
vulnerability is found  ~d  not eliminated.  In this case it must be withdrawn from 
evaluation or awarded EO.  · 
5.10  A TOE assigned  a rating of EO  will  have no rating for  the minimum strength of 
mechanisms since it has been demonstrated that there is  inadequate assurance in 
the TOE. 
5.11  The report produced by  the evaluator containing and  supporting  the  evaluation 
results shall be presented in a form acceptable for consideration by the appropriate 
national certification body. 
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6  · GLOSSARY AND REFERENCES 
Introduction 
6.1  This chapter contains definitions of technical terms that are used with a meaning 
specific to this document.  Technical terms used within this document that are not 
defined here are used throughout the document in a manner consistent with their 
generally accepted meaning. 
Definitions 
6.2  Atceptance  Procedure:  a  procedure which  takes  objects  produced  during  the 
development, production and maintenance processes for  a Target of Evatuation 
and, as a positive act, places them under the controls of a Configuration Contm1 
system. 
6.3  Accreditation:  has two definitions according to circumstances: 
a)  the  procedure  for  accepting  an  IT  system  for  use  within  a  particular 
environment; 
b)  the  procedure  for  recogrusmg  both  the  technical  competence  and  the 
impartiality ofa test laboratory to carry out its associated tasks. 
6.4  Administration  Documentation:  the information  about a  Target of Evaluation 
supplied by the developer for use by an administrator. 
6.5  Administrator:  a  person  in  contact  with  the  Target  of  Evaluation  who is 
responsible for maintaining its operational capability. 
6.6  Architectural Design:  a phase of the Development Process wherein the top level 
definition and design of a Target of Evaluation is specified. 
6.7  Assurance:  the confidence that may be held in the security provided by a Target of 
Evaluation. 
6.8  Assurance Profile:  an assurance requirement for a TOE whereby different levels of 
confidence are required in different security enforcing functions. 
6.9  Availability:  the prevention of the unauthorised withholding  of information oc 
resources. 
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6.10  Basic Component:  a component that is identifiable at the lowest hierarchical level 
of specification produced during Detailed Design. 
6.11  Binding or Functionality:  an  aspect  of the  assessment  of the effectiveness of a 
Target of Evaluation,  namely  the  ability  of its  security  enforcing  functions  and 
mechanisms to work together in a way which is mutually supportive and provides an 
integrated and effective whole. 
6.12  Certification:  the  issue  of  a  formal  statement  confirming  the  resu!ts  of  an 
evaluation, and that the· evaluation criteria used were correctly applied. 
6.13  Certification  Body:  an  independent  and ·  impartial  national  organisation  that 
performs certification. 
6.14  Component:  an identifiable and self-contained portion of a Target of Evaluation. 
6.15  Confidentiality:  the prevention of the unauthorised disclosure of information. 
6.16  Configuration:  the selection of one of the sets of possible combinations of features 
of a Target of Evaluation. 
6.17  Configuration  Control:  a  system  of  controls  imposed  on  changing  controlled 
objects produced during the development, production and maintenance processes 
for a Target of Evaluation.  ., 
6.18  Construction:  the process of creating a Target of Evaluation. 
6.19  Corporate Security Policy:  the .set of laws,· rules and practices that regulate how 
assets  including  sensitive  information  are  managed,  protected  and  distributed 
within a user organisation.  ·  · 
~.20 · Correctness:  a property of a representation of a Target of Evaluation such that it 
accurately reflects the stated security target for that system or product. 
6.21  Covert  Channel:  the  use  of a  mechanism  not  intended  for  communication to 
transfer information in a way which violates security. 
6.22  Critical Mechanism:  a  mechanism within  a  Target  of Evaluation whose failure 
would create a security weakness. 
6.23  Customer:  the person or organisation that purchases a Target of Evaluation. 
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6.24  Delivery:  the process whereby a copy of the Target of Evaluation is transferred 
from the developer to a customer. 
6.25  Detailed  Design:  a  phase  of the  Development  Process  wherein  the  top  level 
definition and design of a Target of Evaluation is refined and expanded to a level of 
detail that can be used as a basis for implementation. 
6.26  Developer:  the person or organisation that manufactures a Target of Evaluation. 
6.27  Developer  Security:  the ·physical,  procedural  and  personnel  security  controls 
imposed by a developer on his Development Environment. 
6.28  Development Environment:  the organisational measures, procedures and standards 
used whilst constructing a Target of Evaluation. 
6.29  Development Process:  The set of phases and tasks whereby a Target of Evaluation 
is constructed, translating requirements into actual hardware and software. 
6.30  Documentation:  the written (or otherwise recorded) information about a Target of 
Evaluation required for  an evaluation.  This information may,  but need not,  be 
contained within a single document produced for the specified purpose. 
6.31  Ease of Use:  an aspect  of the  assessment  of the  effectiveness  of a Target  of 
Evaluation,  namely  that it cannot  be configured  or used  in a  manner which  is 
insecure but which  an administrator or end-user would  reasona~l:y believe to be 
secure. 
6.32  Effectiveness:  a  property  of a  Target  of Evaluation  representing  how  well  it 
provides security in the c~ntext of its actual or proposed operational use. 
6.33  End-user:  a person in contact with a Target of Evaluation who makes use only of 
its operational capability. 
6.34  Evaluation:  the assessment of an IT system or product against defined  evaluatio~ 
criteria. 
6.35  Evaluator:  the independent person or organisation that performs an evaluation. 
6.36  Evaluator Actions:  a component of the evaluation criteria for a particular phase or 
aspect  of  evaluation,  identifying  what  the  evaluator  must  do  to  check  the 
information supplied by the sponsor of the evaluator, and the additional activities 
he must perform. 
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6.37  Formal Model or Security Policy:  an underlying model of security policy expressed 
in. a formal style,  i.e. an abstract statement of the important principles of security 
that a TOE will enforce. 
6.38  Functional Unit:  a functionally distinct part of  a basic component. . 
6.39  Functionality  Class:  a  predefined  set  of  complementary  security  enforcing 
functions capable of.being implemented in a Target of Evaluation. 
6.40  Implementation:  a  phase  of the  Development  Process  wherein  the  detailed 
specification  of a  Target  of Evaluation is  translated  into  actu_~ hardware  and 
software. 
6A 1  Integrity:  the prevention of the unauthorised modification of information. 
6.42  Object:  a passive entity that contains or receives information. 
6.43  Operating Procedure:  a set of rules defining correct use of a Target of Evaluation. 
6.44  Operation:  the process of using a Target of Evaluation. 
6.45  Operational  Documentation:  the  information produced  by  the  developer  of a 
Target of Evaluation to specify and explain how customers should use it. 
6.46  Operational Environment:  the organisational measures, procedures and standards 
to be used whilst operating a Target of Evaluation. 
6.47  Penetration Testing:  tests performed by an evaluator on the Target of Evaluation 
in order to confirm whether ·or not known wlnerabilities are actually exploitable in 
practice.  · 
6.48  Product:  a  package  of IT  software  and/or  hardware,  providing  functionality 
designed for use or incorporation within a multiplicity of systems. 
6.49  Product Rationale:  a description of the security capabilities of a product, giving the 
necessary information for a prospective purchaser to decide whether it will help to 
satisfy his system security objectives.  · 
6.50  Production:  the process whereby copies of the Target of Evaluation are generated 
for distribution to customers. 
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6.51  Programming Languages and Compilers:  the tools used within the Development 
Environment in the construction of the software and/  or firmware  of a Target of 
Evaluation. 
6.52  Rating:  a measure for the assurance that may be held in a Target of Evaluatio~ 
consisting of a reference to its security target, an evaluation level  established by 
assessment  of the  correctness  of its  implementation  and  consideration  of its 
effectiveness in the context of actual or proposed operational use, and a confirmed 
rating of the minimum strength of its security mechanisms. 
6.53  Requirements:  a phase ofthe Development Process wherein the security target of 
a Target of Evaluation is produced. 
6.54  Requirements  for  Content  and  Presentation:  a component  of ·the  evaluation 
criteria for a particular phase or aspect of evaluation identifying what each item of 
documentation identified as  relevant to that phase or aspect of evaluation shall 
contain and how its information is to be presented. 
6.55  Requirements for Evidence:  a component of the evaluation criteria for a particular 
phase or aspect of evaluation defining the nature of the evidence to show that the 
criteria for that-phase or aspect have been satisfied. 
6.56  Requirements  for  Procedures  and  Standards:  a  component  of the  evaluation 
criteria for a particular phase or aspect of evaluation identifying the nature and/or 
content of procedures or standard approaches  that shall be adopted or utilised 
when the TOE is placed into live operation. 
· 6.57  Security:  the combination of confidentiality, integrity and availability. 
6.58  Security  Enforcing:  that  which  directly  contributes  to  satisfying  the  security 
objectives of the Target of Evaluation. 
6.59  Security Mechanism:  the logic or algorithm that implements a particular security 
enforcing or security relevant function in hardware and software. 
6.60  Security Objectives:  the contribution to security which a Target of Evaluation is-
intended to achieve. 
6.61  Security Policy:  see Corporate Security Policy, System Security Policy, Technical 
Security Policy. 
6.62  Security Relevant:  that which is not secilrity enforcing, but must function correctly 
for the Target of Evaluation to enforce security. 
28June 1991  Version 1.2  Page  us GLOSSARY AND REFERENCES  ITSEC 
6.63  Security Target:  a specification of the security required of a Target of Evaluation, 
used  as  a  baseline  for  evaluation.  The  security target  will  specify  the  security 
enforcing functions  of the Target of Evaluation.  It will  also specify the security 
objectives, the threats to those objectives, and any specific security mechanisms that 
will be employed. 
6.64  Sponsor:  the person or organisation that requests an evaluation. 
6.65  Storage Object:  an objC?ct that supports both read and write accesses [TCSEC]. 
6.66  Strength or Mechanisms:  an aspect  of the  assessment  of the effectiveness of a 
Target of Evaluation, namely the ability of its  security mechanisms  to withstand 
direct  attack  against  deficiencies  in  their  underlying  algorithms,  principles  and 
properties. 
6.67  Subject:  an active  entity, generally in the  form  of a  person,  process,  or device 
[TCSEC]. 
6.68  Suitability or Functionality:  an aspect of the assessment of the effectiveness of a 
Target of Evaluation,· namely the suitability of its security enforcing functions and 
mechanisms  to  in  fact  counter  the  threats  to  the  security  of  the  Target  of 
Evaluation identified in its security target. 
6.69  System:  a  specific  IT installation,  with  a  particular  purpose  and  operational 
environment. 
6. 70  System  Security Policy:  the set  of laws,  rules  and  practices  that regulate  how 
sensitive information and other resources are managed, protected and distributed 
within a specific system. 
6.71  Target  or Evaluation:  an IT system  or product which  is  subjected  to  security 
evaluation. 
6.72  Technical  Security  Policy:  the  set  of laws,  rules  and  practices  regulating  the 
processing of sensitive information and the use of resources by the hardware and 
software of an IT system or product. 
6.73  Threat:  an action or event that might prejudice security. 
6.74  Tool:  a product used in  the construction and/or documentation of a Target of 
Evaluation. 
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6.75  User Documentation:  the inf6nnation about a Target of Evaluation supplied by the 
developer for use by its end-users. 
6.76  Vulnerability:  a security weakness in a Target Of Evaluation (for example, due to 
failures in analysis, design, implementation or operation). 
6.77  Vulnerability Assessment: · an aspect of the assessment of 'the effectiveness of a 
Target of Evaluation,  namely  whether  known  vulnerabilities  in that Target of 
~  <I 
·!}  Evaluation could  in practice compromise its security as specified in the securitj 
target. 
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Annex A- EXAMPLE FUNCTIONALilY CLASSES 
Introduction 
Al  This annex sets out example predefined functionality classes, as defined in Chapter 
2.  These classes form an annex to the criteria.since they are intended as examples, 
not definitive  classes  to be used in real  evaluations.  It is  hoped that they will 
stimulate debate on actual security functionality requirements.  Indeed, the need to 
create definitive predefm.ed functionality classes attracted widespread agreement 
during the .  consultative process  preceding the  publication of this  version of the 
criteria. 
A2  Work  is  already  underway  in  standardisation  bodies  and  other  industry 
orgarusations to develop standards for security functionality in specific contexts.  It 
is  anticipated that such  work  will  produce  authoritative  definitions  of security 
functionality that can be adapted for use with  these  criteria and included in or 
referenced by the next definitive version of this document. 
A3  the present examples provide a basic point of reference and show how predefinec:l 
functionality Classes  can be evolved from existing  criteria:  indeed, .  these classes  · 
have been adapted with minimal alteration from [ZSIEC]. 
A4  Each class  consists  of a  statement of objectives,  followed  by  the  requirements 
· presented under appropriate generic  headings.  Absence  of a  generic  heading 
within the description of a class means that no requirements exist for that heading. 
The classes F-B2 and F-B3 also contain other information necessary for inclusion as 
part of a  security target;  this specifies  the mandatory mechanisms required for 
compatibility with the TCSEC.  ~ 
AS  The five  example functionality Classes  F-Cl, F-C2, F-B 1,  F-B2,  and F-B3 form a 
hierarchy, since they haye been derived from the functionality requirements of the 
hierarchical TCSEC classes.  In the description of these classes, those parts of each 
class which are new or have changed from the preceding class are printed·in bold. 
A6  Other  hierarchy-based  functionality  classes  may  be  created  in  the  future,  by 
standardisation bodies and industry organisations, to address other types of security 
objectives (e.g. for integrity and availability).  In the interim, the example classes F  .. 
IN, F-AV, F-DI, F-DC, and.,F-DX have been included to illustrate the broad range 
of security  requirements  that  can  be  expressed  in  the  form  of a  predefined 
functionality class. 
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Example Functionality Class F-C1 
Objective 
' 
A 7  Example  class  F-Cl  is  derived  from  the  functionality  requirements  of the  US 
TCSEC class Cl. It provides discretionary (need-to-know) access control. 
Identification and Authentication 
AS  The  TOE  shall  identify  and  authenticate  users.  This  identification  and 
authentication shall take place prior to all other interactions between the TOE and 
the user.  Other interactions shall' only be possible  after successful  identification 
and authentication.  The authentication information shall be ·stored in such a  way 
that it can only be accessed by authorised users. 
Access Control 
A9  The TOE shall be able to distinguish  and administer access  rights between each 
user and the objects which are subject to the administration of rights, on the basis 
of an individual user, or on the basis of membership of a group of users, or both.  It 
shall be possible to completely deny users or user groups access to  an object.  It 
sh8.ll not be possible for anyone who is not an authorised user to grant or revoke 
access rights to an object. 
AlO  With each attempt by users or user groups to access objects which are subject to the 
administration  pf  rights,  the  TOE  shall  verify  the  validity  of  the  request. 
Unauthorised access attempts shall be rejected. 
···-~. 
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Example Functionality Class F-C2 
Objective 
A 11  .  Example  class  F  -C2  is  derived  from  the  functionality  requirements  of the US 
· TCSEC class C2.  It provides  a more finely  grained discretionary access control 
than class Cl, making users  individually accountable for  their actions  through 
identification  procedures,  auditing  of  security  relevant  events,  and  resource 
isolation. 
ldentHicatlon and Authentication· 
A12  The TOE shall uniquely identify and authenticate users.  ·This  identification and 
authentication shall take place prior to all other interactions between the TOE and 
the user.'  Other interactions shall  only be possible after successful  identification 
and authentication.  The authentication information shall be stored in such  a. way 
that it can only be accessed by  authorised users.  For every interaction the TOE. 
shall be able to establish the identity of the user. 
Access Control 
A 13  The TOE shall be able to  distinguish and administer access nghts between each 
user and the objects which are subject to the administration of rights, on the basis 
of an individual user, or on the basis of membership of a group of users, or both.  It 
shall be possible to completely deny users or user groups access to  an object. · It 
shall also be possible to restrict a user's access  to  an object to  those operations 
which do not modify it.  It shall be possible to grant the access rights to an object 
down to the granularity of an individual user.  It shall not be possible for anyone 
who is  not an authorised user to grant or revoke access rights  to an object.  1be -
administration  of rights  shall  provide  controls  to  limit  propagation  of access 
rights.  In the same way, only authorised users shall be able to introduce new users 
or delete or suspend existing users. 
A14 ·  With each attempt by users.or user groups to access objects which are subject to the 
administration  of  rights,  the  TOE  shall  verify  the  validity  of  the  request. 
Unauthorised access attempts shall be rejected. 
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Accountability 
A15  The TOE shall contain an accountability component which is able, for each of the 
following events, to log that event together with the required data: 
a)  Use of the identification and authentication mechanism: 
Required data:  Date;  ti:me;  user identity supplied;  identification of the 
equipment on  ~hich the identification and authentication mechanism was 
used (e.g. terminal-id);  success or failure of  the attempt. 
b)  Actions that attempt to exercise access rights to an object which is subject 
to the administration of rights: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  name of the object;  type of . 
access attempt;  success or failure of  the attempt. 
c)  Creation or deletion of an object which is subject to the administration of 
rights: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  name of the object;  type of 
action.  +. 
d)  Actions by authorised users affecting the security of the TOE: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  type of action;  name of the · 
object to which the action relates (such actions are introduction or deletion 
(suspension) of users;  introduction or removal of storage media;  start up 
or shut down ofthe.TOE). 
A.16  Unauthorised users shall not be permitted to access accountability data.  It shall 
be  possible to selectively account for the actions of one or more users.  Tools to 
examine and to  maintain the accountability files  shall exist and be  documented. 
These tools shall allow the actions of  one or more users to be identified selectively. 
Audit 
Al7  ~Tools to examine the accoqntability files tOr the purpose of audit shall exist and be""" 
documented.  These tools  shall  allow  the actions  of one  or  more  users  to  be 
identified selectively. 
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Object Reuse 
A.18  All  storage objects  returned  to  the  TOE shall be  treated  before  reuse  by  other 
subjects, in such a way that no conclusions can be drawn regarding the preceding 
content. 
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Example Functionality Class F-81 
Objective 
A19  Example  class  F-BI  is  derived  from  the  functionality  requirements  of the  US 
TCSEC  class  Bl.  In  addition  to  discretionary  access  control  it  introduces 
functions  to  maintain  sensitivity  labels  and  uses  them  to  enforce  a  set  of 
mandatory access  control  rules  over  all  subjects  and  storage objects  under its 
control.  It is possible io accurately label exported information. 
ldentHicatlon and Authentication 
A20  The TOE shall uniquely identify and authenticate users.  This  identification and 
authentication shall take place prior to all_ other interactions between the TOE and 
the user.  Other interactions shall only be possible after successful identification 
and authentication.  The authentication information shall be stored in such a way 
that it can only be accessed by authorised users.  For every interaction the TOE 
shall be able to establish the identity of the user. 
Access Control 
A.21 
A22 
The TOE shall be able to distinguish and administer access  rights between each 
user and the objects which are subject to the administration of rights, on the basis 
of an individual user, or oil the basis of membership of a group of users, or both.  It 
shall be possible to completely deny users or user groups access  to an object.  It 
shall also be possible to restrict a user's  access  to  an object to  those operations 
which do not modify it.  It shall be possible to grant the access:-!lghts to an object 
down to the granularity of an individual user.  It shall not be possible for anyone 
who is  not an authorised user to grant or revoke access rights to  an object.  The 
administration of rights shall provide controls to limit propagation of access rights. 
The actions  for  adding and deleting user identities known  to  the TOE, and the 
action to 'temporarily suspend  all  of a user's  access  rights,  shall be restricted to 
authorised users. 
In addition the TOE shall provide all subjects and storage objects (e.g. processes, 
files,' storage segments, devices)  under its control with  attributes.  The values of 
these attributes shall serve as a basis for mandatory access rights.  Rules shall 
specify which combinations or attribute values of subject and object are necessary 
for a subject to be granted access to that object. 
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A23  When exporting an object its attributes shall be exported in· such a way that the 
recipient can reconstruct thei~value unambiguously. 
A24  The mandatory access rights shall be designed in 'such a manner that the following 
special case can be realised: 
The attribute consists or two  parts.  Part one has hierarchically ordered values, 
part two  represents a set.  (In the official world  part one contains classifications 
e.g. unclassified, confidential, secret, top secret.  Part two contains categories.) 
An attribute A is said to  domin~te an attribute B if: 
Par:t one of A is hierarchically greater than, or equal to, part one orB and part two 
orB is a proper subset or, or equal to, part two of  A. 
A25  The following rules shall be enforced: 
a)  Read access by a subject to an object is only permitted if the attribute or the 
subject dominates that of the object. 
b)  Write access by a subject to  an object is only permitted if the attribute or 
the object dominates that or the subject. 
A26  The attributes of a subject created to act on behalf of a user shall be dominated by 
that  user's  clearance  and  authorisation  as  .  determined  at  identification  and 
authentication time.  If-imported data does not have attributes, an authorised user 
shall be able to assign attributes to· the data  .. 
A27  Each export channel shall be identifiable as either single-level or multi-level.  It 
shall be impossible to transmit or receive data via channels designated as single-
level, unless the attributes ()f that data match a riXed  prespecified attribute.  Data 
transmitted to or received from a single-level channel shall be communicated, with 
a corresponding attribute, unless it is possible for an authorised user to specify the 
attribute or the channel  in  a  way  that  cannot  be  imitated.  In  this  case,  the . 
attribute or the data is implicitly specified by the attribute of  the channel. 
· A28  For multi-level channels it shall be ensured by  the communication protocol that 
the recipient can completely and unambiguously reconstruct and pair the received 
data and attributes. 
A29  Unauthorised users shall not be able to change the security relevant attributes or a 
channel.  It shall not be possible to change these attributes without the change. 
being performed explicitly. 
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A30  The TOE shall mark human readable output with attribute values.  The values of 
the attributes shall be determined according-to the rules laid down  i~ the TOE. 
Authorised  users  shall  be  able to  specify  the  printable name or each attribute 
value. 
A31  With each attempt by users or user groups to access objects which are subject to the 
administration  of  rights,  the  TOE  shall  verify  the  validity  of  the  request. 
Unauthorised access attempts shall be rejected.  The values or the attributes shall 
serve as the basis for decisions concerning mandatory access control.  The rules 
shall unambiguously specify when a subject is allowed access to such a protected 
object~  If  discretionary access rights a~  alsO  assigned for an object, access shall 
only be permitted provided that both the discretionary and the mandatory access 
rights allow such access. 
Accountability 
A32  The TOE shall contain an accountability component which is able, for each of the 
following events, to log that event together with the required data: 
a)  Use of the identification and authentication mechanism: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity supplied;  identification of the 
equipment on which  the identification-and authentication mechanism was 
used (e.g. terminal-id};  success or failure of the attempt;  authorisation or 
the user. 
b)  Actions that attempt to exercise access rights to an object which is subject to 
the administration of rights: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  name of the object;  type  of 
access attempt;  success or failure of the attempt;  attribute or the object. 
c)  Creation or deletion of an object which is  subject to the administration of 
rights: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  name of the object;  type of 
action;  attribute of the object. 
"·' 
d)  Actions by authorised users affecting the security of the TOE: 
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Required  data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  type  of action;  name  and 
attribute  of  the  object  to  which  the  action  relates  (such  actions  are 
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introduction or deletion (suspension) of users;  introduction or removal of 
storage  media;  start  up  or shut  down  of the  TOE;  assignation  of an 
attribute;  change or attributes, markings or classification or a channel). 
Unauthorised users shall not be permitted to access accountability data.  It shall be 
possible  to  selectively  account  for  the  actions  of one or  more  users.  Tools to 
examine and  to maintain the  ac~ountability files  shall exist  and  be documented. 
These tools shall allow the actions of one or  more users to be identified selectively. 
'  . 
Audit  · 
A.34  Tools to examine the acco~untability files for the purpose of auditshall exist and be 
·.documented.  These  tools  shall  allow  the  actions  of one  or  more users  to be 
identified selectively .. 
Object Reuse 
A.35  All  storage  objects  returned ·to  the  TOE shall  be treated before reuse by other 
subjects, in such a way  that no conclusions can be drawn regarding the preceding 
content. 
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Example Functionality Class F-82 
Objective 
A36  Example  class  F  -Bl is  derived  from  the functionality  requirements  of the US 
TCSEC class Bl.  It extends mandatory access control to all subjects and objects 
and strengthens the authentication requirements of  class Bl. 
Mandatory Mechanisms 
A37  This  class  requires  access  control  to  be  implemented  by  a  single  reference 
validation mechanism that implements the reference monitor concept, te. that the 
mechanism  is  tamperproof,  always  invoked,  and  small  enough  (of sufficiently 
simple organisation  and complexity)  to  be  subjected  to  analysis  and  tests, the 
completeness of  which can be assured. 
Identification and Authentication 
A.38  The TOE shall uniquely identify and authenticate users.  This  identification and 
authentication shall take place prior to all other interactions between the TOE and. 
the user  .. Other interactions shall only be possible after successful identification 
and authentication.  The authentication information shall be storep in such a way 
that it can only be accessed by authorised users.  Identification and authentication 
shall be handled via a trusted path between user and TOE initialised by the user. 
For every interaction the TOE shall be able to establish the identity of the user. 
Access Control · 
A39  The TOE shall be able to distinguish and administer access rights between each 
user and the objects which are subject to the administration of rights, on the basis 
of an individual user, or on the basis of membership of a group of users, or both.  It 
shall be possible to group access rightS to support roles.  As a minimum the roles 
of TOE operator and administrator shall  be  definable.  It  shall  be possible  to 
completely deny users or user groups access to an object.  It shall also be possible to 
restrict a user's access to an object to those operations which do not modify it.  It 
shall be possible to grant the access rights to an object down to the granularity of an 
individual user. 
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access rights to an object.  The .administration of rights shall provide controls to 
limit  propagation  of access  rights.  The  actions  for  adding  and  deleting  user 
identities known to the TOE, and the action to temporarily suspend all of a user's 
access rights, shall be restricted to authorised users. 
A41 ·In addition the TOE shall provide  all subjects and objects (e.g.  processes, files., 
storage segments,  devices)  with  attributes.  The values  of these  attributes shall 
serve as a basis for manda~ory  access rights.  Rules shall specify which combinations 
of attribute values of subject and object are necessary for a subject to be granted 
access to that object. 
A42  When exporting an object its attributes shall be exported in such a way that the 
recipient can reconstruct their value unambiguously. 
-- A43  The mandatory access rights shall be designed in such a manner that the following 
special case can be realised:- ,~ 
The attribute consists of two parts.  Part one has hierarchically ordered values, part 
two represents a  set.  (In the official world part one contains classifications  e.g. 
unclassified, confidential, secret, top secret.  Part two contains categories.) 
An attribute A is said to dominate an attribute B if: 
Part one of A is hierarchically greater than, or equal to, part o,ne of B and part two 
. of B is a proper subset of, or equal to, part _two of A 
A44  The following rules shall be enforced:_ 
a)  Read access by a subject to an object is only permitted if the attribute of  the 
subject dominates that of the object. 
b)  Write access by a subject to an object is only permitted if the attribute of  the 
object dominates that of the subject. 
A45  The attributes of a subject created to act on behalf of a user shall be dominated by 
that  user's  clearance  and  authorisation  as  determined  at  identification  and 
authentication time.  If  imported data does not have attributes, an a:uthorised ·user 
shall be able to assign attributes to the data. 
A46  Each export channel shall be identifiable as  either single-level or multi-level.  It 
shall be impossible to transmit or receive data via channels designated as single-
. level, unless the attributes of that data match a fixed  prespecified attribute.  Data 
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transmitted to or received from a  single~level channel shall be communicated with 
a corresponding attribute, unless it is possible for an authorised user to specify the 
· attribute of the channel in a way that cannot be imitated.  In this case, the attribute 
of the data is implicitly specified by the attribute of the channel. 
A47  For multi-level channels it shall be ensured by the communication protocol that the 
recipient can completely and unambiguously reconstruct and pair the received data 
and attributes.  For multi-leveJ) channels it shall be possible to state-the  ,~aximum 
and minimum attributes.  No data shall be transmitted to a  multi-level channel 
unless the attribute of. the data dominates the minimum attribute of the channel 
and is dominated by the maximum attribute or  the channel. 
A48  Unauthorised users shall not be able to change the security relevant attributes of a 
channel.  It shall not be possible to change these attributes without the change 
being performed explicitly. 
A49  The TOE shall mark human readable output with attribute values.  The values of 
the attributes shall be determined according to the rules laid down in the TOE. 
Authorised users shall be able to specify the printable name of each attribute value. 
ASO  A user shall be notified immediately of any cha~ge in the security level associated 
with that user during an interactive session.  The user shall be able at all times to 
review all the subject's attributes. 
A51- With each attempt by users or user groups to access objects which.are subject to the 
administration  of  rights,  the  TOE  shall  verify  the  validity  of  the  request. 
Unauthorised access attempts shall be r~jected.  The values of the attributes shall 
serve as  the basis for decisions concerning mandatory access control.  The rules 
shall unambiguously specify when a subject is  allowed access to such a  protected 
object.  If discretionary access rights are also assigned for an opject, access ·shall 
only be permitted provided that both the discretionary and the mandatory access 
rights allow such access. 
A52  There shall be no known storage channels that can transfer information between 
processes without verification or access rights (i.e. covertly) that have a  maximum 
bandwidth (determined by actual measurement or engineering estimation) that is 
unacceptably  high~  (See  the Covert  Channel  Guideline  section  of the TCSEC 
[TCSEC] for guidance on acceptability.) 
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Accountability 
A53  The TOE shall contain an accountability component which is able, for each of the 
·following events, to log that event together with the required data: 
a)  Use of the identification and authentication mechanism: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity supplied;  identification of the 
equipment on which  the identification and authentication mechanism was 
used (e.g.  terminal-id);  success or failure of the attempt;  authorisation of 
the user. 
b)  Actions that attempt to exercise access rights to an object which is subject to 
the administration of rights: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  name of the object;  type of 
access attempt;  success or failure of the attempt;  attribute of the object. 
c)  Creation or deletion of an object which is  subject to  the administration of 
rights: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  name of the object;  type of 
action;  attribute of the object. 
d)  Actions by authorised users affecting the security of the TOE: 
Required data:  Date;  time;·  user identity;  type  of action;  name and 
attribute  of  the  object  to  which  the  action  relates  (such  actions  are . 
. introduction orcdeletion (suspension) of users;  introduction or remoVal of 
storage  media;  start  up  or  shut  down  of the TOE;  aSsignation  of an 
attribute;  change of attributes, markings or classification of a channel). 
A54  Unauthorised users shall not be permitted to access accountability data.  It shall be 
possible  to  selectively  account  for  the  actions  of one  or more  users.  Tools  to 
examine and  to  maintain the accountability files  shall  exist  and be documented. 
These tools shall allow the actions of one or more users to be identified selectively. 
Audit 
A.55  Tools to examine the. accountability files for the purpose of audit shall exist and be 
documented.  These tools  shall  allow  the  actions  of one  or  more  users  to  be 
identified selectively.  In addition the TOE shall be able to  audit known  events 
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which could be misused to allow an unauthorised Dow of infonnation by exploitmg 
'  covert channels. 
Object Reuse 
A56  All  storage  objects  returned to the TOE shall be treated before reuse by  other 
subjects, in such a way that no conclusions can be drawn regarding the preceding 
content. 
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Example Functionality Class F~B3  ·  .. 
Objective 
A57  Example class  F-83 is  derived  from  the functionality  requirements  or the  US 
TCSF;C classes 83 and AJ ..  ln·additipn to the functions or cla~s 82,- it provides 
functions· to support distinct security administration· roles,. and audit is expanded 
to signal security relevant events. 
Mandatory Mechanisms 
A58  'IQis  class  requires  access  control  to  be  implemented  by  a  single  reference 
validation mechanism that implements the reference monitor concept, i.e. that the 
mechanism  is  taniperproof,  always  invoked,  and  small  enough  (of  sufficiently 
simple  organisation  and  complexity)  to  be  subjected  to  analysis  and  tests,  the 
completeness of which can be assured. 
Identification and Authentication 
A59  The TOE shall uniquely identify and authenticate users.  This identification and 
authentication shall take place prior to all other interactions between the TOE and 
the user.  Other interactions shall only be possible after successful identification 
and authentic'!-tion.  The authentication information shall be stored in such a way 
that it can only be accessed by authorised users.  Identification and authentication 
shall be handled via a trusted path between user and TOE initialised by the user or 
by the TOE.  For every interaction the TOE shall be able to establish the identity of 
the user. 
Access Control 
A60  The TOE shall be able to distinguish and administer access  rights between each 
user and the objects which are subject to the administration of rights, on the basis 
of an individual user, or on the basis of membership of a group of users, or both.  lt 
shall be possible to group access rights to support roles.  As a minimum the roles of 
TOE  operator  and  administrator  shall  be  definable.  The  roles  of the  TOE 
operator, TOE administrator and TOE security officer shall be separated.  It shall 
be possible to completely deny users or  user groups access to an object.  It shall also 
be possible to restrict a user's access to an object to those operations which do not 
modify it.  It shall be possible to grant the access rights to an object down to the 
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granularity of an individual user.  It shall not be possible for anyone who is not an 
authorised user to grant or revoke access rights to an object. 
A.61  For each object which is subject to the administration or rights, it shall be possible 
to supply a list or users and a list of user groups with their associated rights to this 
object.  In addition, for each such object it shall also be possible to supply a list or 
users  and  a  list  or user groups  who  are  denied  access  to  this  object.  The 
administration of rights shall provide controls to limit propagation of access rights. 
The actions for  adding and  deleting user identities known  to  the TOE, and the 
action to  temporarily suspend  all  of a user's access  rights,  shall be restricted to 
authorised users. 
A.62  In addition the TOE shall provide all  subjects  and  objects  (e.g.  processes, files, 
storage segments,  devices)  with  attributes.  The values  of these  attributes shall 
serve as a basis for mandatory access rights.  Rules shall specify which combinations 
of attribute values of subject and object are necessary for a subject to be granted 
access to that object. 
A63  When exporting an object its attributes shall be exported in such a way  that the 
recipient can reconstruct their value unambiguously. 
A64  The mandatory access rights shall be des~gned in such a manner that the following 
special case can be realised: 
The attribute consists of two parts.  Part one has hierarchically ordered_values, part 
two  represents a set.  (In the official world part one contains classifications e.g. 
unclassified, confidential, secret, top secret.  Part two contains categories.) 
An attribute A is said to dominate an attribute B if: 
Part one of A is hierarchically greater than, or equal to, part one of B and part two 
of B is a proper subset of, or equal to, part two of A 
A65  The following rules shall be enforced:-
a)  Read access by a subject to an object is only permitted if the attribute of the 
subject dominates that of the object. 
b)  Write access by a subject to an object is only permitted if the attribute of the 
object dominates that of the subject. 
A66  The attributes of a subject created to act on behalf of a user shall be dominated by 
that  user's  clearance  and  authorisation  as  determined  at  identification  and 
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authentication time.  If  imported data does not have attributes, an authorised user 
shall be able to assign attributes to the data. 
A67  Each export channel shall  be identifiable as  either single-level or multi-level.  It 
shall be impossible to transmit or receive data via channels designated as single-
level, unless the attributes of that data match a fixed  prespecified attribute. Data 
transmitted to or received from a single-level channel shall be communicated with 
a corresponding attribute, unless it is possible for an authorised user to specify the 
attribute of the channel in a way that cannot be imitated.  In this case, the attribute 
of the data is implicitly specified by the attribute of the channel. 
A.68  For multi-level channels it shall be en,sured by the communication protocol that the 
recipient can completely and unambiguously reconstruct and pair the received data 
and attributes.  For multi-level channels it shall be possible to state the maximum 
ana minimum attributes.  No  data shall  be transmitted to  a mul.ti-level  channel 
unless the  attribute of the data dominates the minimum a:ttribute of the channel 
and is dominated by the maximum attrib~te of the channel. 
A.69  Unauthorised users shall not be able to change the security relevant attributes of a 
channel.  It  shall  not be possible  to  change  these  attributes without the change 
.  being performed explicitly. 
A.70  The TOE shall mark human readable output with attribute values.  The values of· 
the attributes shall be determined according  to  the rules  laid down in the TOE. 
Authorised users shall be able to specify the printable name of each attribute value.·· 
A.71  A user shall be notified immediately of any change in the security level associated 
with that user during an interactive session. ·  The user shall be abie at all times to 
review all the subject's attributes. 
A. 72  With each attempt by users or user groups to access objects which are subject to the 
administration  of  rights,  the  TOE  shall  verify  the  validity  of  the  request. 
Unauthorised access attempts shall be rejected.  The values of  the attributes shall 
serve  as  the basis for  decisions  concerning  ma~datory.  access  control.  The  rules 
·shall unambiguously specify when a subject is  allowed access to such· a protected 
object.  If discretionary access rights are also  assigned  for  an object, access shall 
only be permitted provided that both  th~ discretionary and the mandatory access 
rights allow such access. 
A.73  There shall be no known storage or timing channels that can transfer information 
between processes without verification of access  rights  (i.e.  covertly)  that have a 
maximum  bandwidth  (determined  by  actual  measurement  or  engineering 
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estimation) that is unacceptably high.  (See the Covert Channel Guideline section 
of the TCSEC [TCSEC] for guidance on acceptability.) 
Accountability 
A 74  The TOE shall contain an accountability component which is able, for each of the 
following events, to log that event together with the required data: 
. .  a)  Use of the identification and authenticatiJ.Jn mechanism: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity supplied;  identification of the 
equipment on which  the identification and authentiCation mechanism was 
used (e.g.  terminal-id);  success or failure of the attempt;  authorisation of 
the user. 
b)  Actions that attempt to exercise access rights to an object which is subject to 
the administration of rights: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  name of the object;  type of 
access attempt;  success or failure of the attempt;  attribute of the object. 
c)  Creation or deletion of an object which is  subject to the administration of 
rights: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  name of the object;  type of 
action;  attribute of the object. 
d)  Actions by authorised users affecting the security of the TOE: 
Required data:  Date;  l:r.te;  user identity;  type  of action;  name  and 
attribute  of  the  object  to  which  the  action  relates  (such  actions  are 
introduction or deletion (suspension) of users;  introduction or removal of 
storage  media;  start  up or shut  down  of the  TOE;  assignation  of an 
attribute;  change of attributes, markings or classification of a channel). 
A 75  Unauthorised users shall not be permitted to access accountability data.  It shall be 
possible  to  selectively  account  for  the  actions  of one or  more  users.  Tools  to 
examine and to maintain the accountability files  shall  exist  and be documented. 
These tools shall allow the actions of one or more users to be identified selectively. 
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Audit 
A 76  Tools to examine the accountability files for the purpose of audit shall exist and be 
documented.  These tools  shall allow  the  actions  of one  or  more users  to  be 
identified selectively.  In addition the TOE shall be able to  audit known events 
which could be misused to allow an unauthorised flow of information by exploiting 
covert channels. 
A 77  Additionally, there shall b_e a mechanism to monitor the occurrence or  events which 
are either particularly security relevant or which, due to  the fcequency of their 
occurrence,  can  become  a  critical  threat  to  the  security  or the  TOE.  'Ibis 
mechanism shall be able without delay to notify a special user, or a  user with a 
special role, or the occurrence or such events.  The mechanism shall take the least 
disruptive action to tenninate such events. 
Object Reuse 
A 78  All storage objects returned to the. TOE shall be treated before reuse by other 
subjects, in such a way that no conclusions can be drawn regarding the preceding 
content. 
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Example Functionality Class F-1 N 
Objective 
A 79  Example functionality class F-IN is for TOEs with high  integrity requirements for 
data and programs.  Such requirements may be necessary in  database TOEs, for 
example. 
Identification and Authentication 
ABO  The TOE shall uniquely identify and  authenticate users.  This identification and 
authentication shall take place prior to all other interactions between the TOE and 
the user.  Other interactions shall only be possible after successful identification 
and authentication.  The authentication information shall be stored in such a way 
that it can only be accessed for  review or modffication by  authorised users.  For 
every interaction the TOE shall be able to establish the identity of the user. 
Access Control 
A81  The TOE shall be able to distinguish and administer access  rights of users, roles 
and  processes  to  explicitly  designated objects.  (Roles  denote users with special 
attributes).  It shall be possible to restrict access by users to these objects in such a 
manner that  this  access  is  only  possible  via  specially  established  processes.  In 
addition, it shall be possible to allocate objects to  a predefined type.  It shall be 
possible  to  specify  for  each  type  of object which  users,  roles  or processes  can 
possess  certain  access  types  to  these  objects.  This  should  make  it possible  to 
restrict user access to objects of a certain type in such a manner that this access is 
only  possible  via  fixed  established  processes.  It  should  onl}i"  be  possible  for 
authorised users to define new types  or to grant or revoke access  rights to types. 
These  actions  shall  be  initiated  explicitly  by  this  user.  · For  these  actions  all 
communication between the TOE and the user shall be via a trusted path. 
A82  The following  minimum access rights shall exist:  read, write, add, delete, rename 
(for  all  objects),  execute,  delete,  rename  (for  executable  objects),  creation  of 
objects of a certain type, deletion of objects of a certain type. 
A83  With each attempt by users or user groups to access objects which are subject to the 
administration of rights,  the TOE shall  verify  the validity  of this  access  attempt. 
Unauthorised access attempts shall be rejected. 
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Accountability 
A84  The TOE shall contain an accountability component which is able, for each of the 
following events, to log that event together with the required data: 
a)  Use of the identification and authentication mechanism: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity supplied;  identification of the 
equipment on which  the identification and  authentication mechanism was 
used (e.g. terminal~id); success or failure of the attempt. 
b)  Actions that attempt to exercise access rights to an object which is subject to 
the administration of rights: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  name of the object;  type of 
access attempt;  success or failure of the attempt. 
c)  Creation or deletion of an object which  is  subject to  the administration of 
rights: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  ·user identity;  name of the object;  type of 
action. 
d)  Actions by authorised users affecting the security of the TOE: 
Required  data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  type. of action;  name  and 
attribute  of  the  object  to  which  the  action  relates  (such  actions  are 
introduction or deletion (suspension) of users;  introduction or reiilO'Yal of 
storage media;  start up or shut down of the TOE). 
e)  Definition or deletion of types: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  type of action;  name of  the type. 
f)  Assignation of a type to an object: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  name of the object;  name of the 
type. 
g)  Granting or revocation of ac~ess rights for an object or an object type: 
··  ; June 1991 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity;  type of action;  type of access 
right;  mime of the subject;  name of the object or name of the object type. 
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ASS  Unauthorised users shall not be permitted to access accountability data.  It shall be 
possible to  selectively account  for  the  actions  of one or more users.  Tools  to 
examine and to  maintain the accountability files  shall  exist  and be documented. 
These tools shall allow the actions of one or more users to be identified selectively. 
The structure of the accountability records shall be described completely. 
Audit 
A86  Tools to examine the accountability files for the purpose of audit.shall exist and be 
documented.  These tools  shall allow the actions  of one or  more users· to be 
identified selectively. 
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Example Functionality Class F-AV 
,, . 
ObJective 
·-'- :  - ·-.. 
A87  Functionality class F-A  V sets high requirements for the availability of a complete 
TOE or special functions of a TOE.  Such requirements are significant for TOEs 
that control manufacturing processes, for example. 
Reliability of Service 
A88  The TOE shall be able to recover from a failure  of certain· individual hardware 
components (e.g. a board of an individual processor in a multiprocessor TOE) in 
such a manner that all constantly required functions remain continuously available 
in the remaining TOE.  After the failed component has been repaired, it sball be 
possible to reintegrate it into the TOE in such a way that the continuous operation 
of constantly required functions  is  assured.  Following the integration the TOE 
shall achieve its original degree of tolerance against TOE failures.  Maximum times 
shall be stated for the duration of such a reintegration process. 
A89  Irrespective of its load at any time, the TOE shall be able to guarantee a maximum 
response  time  for  certain  specified  actions.  In addition,  for  certain  specified 
actions, it shall be guaranteed that the TOE will not be subject to deadlock. · 
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Example Functionality Class F-DI 
Objective  , 
.I 
A90  Example  functionality  "Class  F-DI  sets  high  requirements  With  regard  to  the 
safeguarding of data integrity during data exchange. 
Identification and Authentication 
A91  The TOE shall uniquely identify and  authenticate users.  This identification and 
authentication shall take place prior_ to all other interactions between the TOE and 
the user.  Other interactions shall only be possible after  succes~ful identification 
and authentication.  The authentication information shall be stored in such a way 
that it can only be accessed for review or modification by authorised users.  For 
every interaction the TOE shall be able to establish the identity of the user. 
'  .  i 
A92  Prior to the establishment of .a  copnection the peer entity (computer, process or 
user)  shall  be uniquely  identified  and  authenticated.  User data shall  only  be 
exchanged  after  identifi~tion  and  authentication  have  been  successfully 
.  completed.  On  receipt  of data  it  shall  be possible  to  uniquely  identify  and 
authenticate  the  sender of the  data.  All  authentication  information  shall  be 
protected against \inauthorised access and forgery. 
AccountabiiHy 
A93  The TOE shall contain an accountability component which is able, for each of the 
following events, to log that event together with the requited data:!. 
a)  Use of the identification and authentication mechanism: 
· Required  data:  Date;  time;  initiator  of  the  identification  and 
authentication;  name of the subject to be identified;  success or failure of 
the action. 
b)  Identified errors in the data exchange: 
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Required data:  Date;  time;  peer entity in the data exchange;  nature of the 
error;  success or failure of the attempted correction. 
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c)  Data Exchange: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity of the initiator;  name of the peel' 
entity (computer, process or user);  parameters of the establishment of the 
connection (if these vary) .. 
A94  Unauthorised users shall not be permitted to access accountability data.  It shall be 
possible  to selectively account for  the  actions  of one or more users.  Tools to 
examine and to maintain the accountability files  shall  exist  and be documented. 
These tools shall ~How  the actions of one or more users to be identified selectively~ 
The structure of the accountability records shall be described completely. 
Audit 
A95 · Tools to examine the accountability files for the purpose of audit shall exist and be 
documented.  These tools  shall  allow  the  actions  of one or  more useiS  to be 
identified selectively. 
Data Exchange 
Data Integrity 
A96  Methods for error detection and error correction shall be applied in the case of 
data exchange.  These mechanisms shall be designed in such a way that intentional 
manipulations of. the address fields  and user data can be identifietl.  Knowledge 
only of the algorithms applied in the mechanisms without any special additioual 
. knowledge  shall  not enable  unrecognised  manipulations  of the  aforementioned 
data.  The additional  knowledge  required for  this  shall be protected in such a 
manner that it can only be accessed by a few authorised users. 
A97  Moreover, mechanisms shall be used which reliably uniquely identify as an error 
the unauthorised replay of data. 
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Example Functionality Class F-DC 
Objective 
A98  Example functionality Oass F-DC is intended for TOEs with high demands on the 
confidentiality of data during data exchange.  An example candidate for this class is 
a cryptographic device. 
Data Exchange 
Data Confidentiality 
A99  The TOE shall have a facility to encrypt user information prior to exchange and (at 
the receiving end) to decrypt it automatically.  An algorithm officially approved by 
a certification authority shall be applied.  It shall be assured that the parameter 
values (  e~g. keys) required for decrypting are protected in such a manner that no 
unauthorised person can access this data. 
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Example Functionality Class F-DX 
Objective 
AlOO  Example functionality class F-DX is  intended for networks with high demands on 
.  the confidentiality and integrity of the information to be exchanged.  For example, 
this can be the case when sensitive information .has to be exchanged via insecure 
(for example: public) netw~rks. 
ldentHicatlon and Authentication 
AlOl The TOE shall uniquely identify and authenticate users.  This identification and 
authentication shall take place prior to all other interactions between the TOE and 
the user.  Other interactions sh3.ll  only be po_ssible  after successful identification 
and authentication.  The authentication information shall be stored in such a way 
that it can only be accessed for  review or modification by authorised users.  For 
every interaction the TOE shall be able to establish the identity of the user~ 
A.102  Prior to the exchange of user data the peer entity (computer, process or user) shall 
be uniquely identified and authenticated.  User data shall only be exchanged after 
identification and authentication have been successfully completed.  On receipt of 
data it shall be possible to uniquely identify and authenticate the sender of the data. 
All  authentication information shall be protected against unauthorised access and 
forgery. 
Accountability 
' 
A103 The TOE shall contain an accountability component which is able, for each of the 
following events, to log that event together with the required data: 
a)  Use of the identification and authentication mechanism: 
Required  data:  Date;  time;  initiator  of  the  identification  and 
authentication;  name of the subject to be identified;  success or failure of 
the action. 
b)  Identified errors in the data exchange: 
. , June 1991 
Required data:  Date;  time;  peers in the data exchange;  type of the error; 
success or failure of the attempted correction  . 
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c) 
ITSEC 
Connection establishment: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity of the initiator;  name of the peer 
entity (computer, process or user);  establishment parameters (if these vary). 
d)  Special data exchange transactions: 
Required data:  Date;  time;  user identity of the transmitter;  user identity 
of the recipient; · user information communicated;  date and time of the 
receipt of the data. 
A.104  Unauthorised users shall not be permitted to access accountability data.  It shall be 
possible  to  selectively  account  for  the  actions  of one or more users.  Tools  to 
examine and to  maintain the accountability files  shall exist  and be documented. 
These tools shall aJlow the actions of one or more users to be identified selectively. 
The structure of the accountability records shall be described completely. 
Audit 
A.105  Tools to examine the accountability files for the purpose of audit shall exist and be 
documented.  These tools  shall  allow the actions  of one or  more users to be 
identified selectively. 
Data Exchange 
Access Control 
A 106  All  information  previously  transmitted  which  can  be  used  for  unauthorised 
decryption shall be protected in such a way that only such persons who positively 
need such access in order to  be able to perform their duties can access this data. 
Data Confidentiality 
A107 The  TOE  shall  offer  the  possibility  of  end-to-end  encryption  which  ensures 
confidentiality regarding the recipient over large sections  of the communication 
channel.  In  addition,  traffic  flow  confidentiality  shall  also  be  guaranteed  on 
designated data communication links. 
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Data Integrity 
A 108  The TOE shall be designed in such a way that unauthorised manipulation of user 
data and accountability data and unauthorised replay of data are reliably identified 
as errors. 
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Annex B  - THE CLAlMS LANGUAGE 
Introduction 
B.l  Within  the  context  of the IT security evaluation criteria it  is  helpful  to have a 
means  of describing  the  claimed  security  functions  provided  by  an IT security 
product in semiformal style, but still expressed using natural language.  The Oaims 
Language defined in this Annex was developed to meet that requirement. 
B.2  The benefits of using the Claims Language to specify security functionality are that: 
a)  it provides  a  semiformal style  of specification, but because it  is  based on 
natural language, it can be read and understood without special knowledge 
of a notation or set of rules; 
b)  it indicates the necessary linking and grouping of claims; 
c)  it reduces the scope for ambiguity in the interpretation of the claims; 
d).  it enables the claims for a TOE t.o be expressed in a way that is suited to the 
process of evaluation. 
B.3  The Claims Language facilitates controlled extension of the predefined notation to 
handle concepts for which no suitable elements exist.  Within a Claims Dorument, 
normal' natural language can be used to describe mechanisms and assumptions if a 
more  formal  approach  is  not  necessary.  The  Claims  Language  is  sufficiently 
flexible  to allQw  any set of claims peculiar to  a  specialised TOE to  be defined 
. without  any  departure  from  the  rules  of the  language;  thus  sponsors  of an 
evaluation are not in any way constrained to make their claims fit the language. 
Overview 
B.4  Using the Oaims Language, security functions are expressed using a set of rules for 
generating Action Phrase Templates, each of which provides the framework for a 
particular type of claim.  Each Action Phrase Template is  then combined with one 
of a set of Target Phrases to create an outline claim.  Nouns and phrases specific to 
the product, the function and/or the vendor are then substituted into the outline 
claim to create a real claim.  An example of the generation of a claim will be found 
in paragraphs B.30 to B.34 of this Annex. 
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B.S  A5  part of the statement of a  claim it is  possible  to  include  a  reference  to  the 
mechanism that implements the claim. 
B.6  It is permissible to  o~t  or modify the linking words used in outline claims in order 
to improve the readability or grammatical accuracy of Claims. 
B. 7  Examples of permissible changes are: 
a)  substituting the plural for the singular, or vice versa; 
b)  inserting or removing the definite and indefinite articles;  .. 
c)  changing prepositions. 
B.8  It is permissible to introduce new action or target phrases where no existing phrases 
are appropriate, provided that ·such phrases have been discussed with and approved 
by the Certification Body.  · 
B.9  A standard layout shall be used for Claims Documents containing Oaims Language 
claims,  as  set. out  in  paragraphs  B.38  to  B.44  of this  Annex.  Oaims shall  be 
grouped  under  a  standardised  headings  based  on  the  Generic  Headings  for 
Functionality. This aids understanding and facilitates comparison with other TOEs. 
Warnings 
B.lO  Care should be taken when formulating claims which are configuration dependent. 
It may be possible to configure a TOE in ways which are insecure (i.e. some of the 
claims are invalidated).  If this  is  the case, restrictions to exclude such insecure 
options or combinations of options should be stated as environmental constraints 
(see paragraph B.41 of this Annex onwards). 
B.ll  Care should also be take to formulate claims at an appropriate level of granularity. 
If a proposed claim seems  to  encompass several Generic Headings,  or requires 
more substitutions than are possible using the appropriate template, then the claim 
is at too high a level and needs to be broken down into a series of simpler claims. 
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Action Phrase Templates 
B.li.  Action Phrase Templates shall be generated from the framework below, with italics 
indicating words or phrases in the template to be replaced by specific claim-related 
substitutions in an actual claim, with [] indicating optional parts, and < > indicating 
selection of an option from the relevant list of options following: 
This  TOE  [<qualifier>]  <verb>  <action>  ...  [  <time>  ]  [ using  the 
mechanism defined in paragraph n  ]. 
Where <qualifier> may be: 
contains a function that 
or  must be used in an environment that 
· . and <verb> may be: 
will 
or  will not 
or  can be configured to 
or  can be configured to not 
or  cannot be configured to 
and <action> may be: 
establish 
or  detect 
or  control 
or  permit 
or  prevent 
or  ensure 
or  record in object 
and  ~time> may be: 
' 
before security-relevant-event 
or  after security-relevant-event. 
B.13  The environment  option of <qualifier> ·is  only  used  in  defining  environmental 
constraints where great precision is required. 
B.l4  Where details of specific mechanisms form part of the security target, they shall be 
defined as part of the Claims Document through a linked mechanism specification 
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paragraph. If  no such link is included, details of the mechanism do not form part of 
the security  target and will be treated as  proprietary information.  The function 
option  of  <qualifier>  is  optional.  It  is  used  to  name  the  particular  product 
mechanism that implements a particular claim.  This name is  inCluded  purely for 
explanatory purposes. 
B.lS  Some example Action Phrase templates are: 
This product will ensure ... 
This product contains an audit utility that will establish ... 
This product can be configured to permit ... 
This product must be used in an environment that will prevent ... 
This add-in board will record in its audit trail ... 
This product Will prevent ... before completion of secure startup. 
Target Phrases 
B.l6  The permitted set of Target Phrases is as follows, with [] indicating optional parts of 
the phrase: 
1  ... audit-infonnation concerning security-relevant-events 
2  ... the identity of a process requested 
3  ... the identity of the {user, process}  requesting a process 
4  ... the identity of the {u.ser,process}  requesting access-type to an object 
5  ... the identity of a process executed 
6  ... the rejection of a process request 
7  ... the identity of an pbject to which access-type was requested 
8  ... the identity of an object to which access-type was granted 
9  ... the identity of an objeCt to which access-type was refused 
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.  f  •.  10 
11· 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
Annexa 
... the access-set of a user 
.  .. the  access-set of a process 
...  th~ access-set of a {user,process} 
... the access-set of an object 
... the access-type granted to a {user,process} in respect of an object 
... access-type by {user,process}  in respect of an object 
... the actions performed by a {user,process}  in respect of an object 
... the factors affecting the access-set of a user 
... the factors affecting the access-set of a process 
... the factors affecting the access-set of a {user,process} 
... the factors affecting the access-set of an object 
... clearing of information from an object 
... the security-attributes of an object 
... the correctness of the security-attributes of an object 
...  the  security-attributes  of an object  formed  by  combining  a  number of 
objects 
25  ...  the security-attributes  of a set of objects  formed  by  partitioning a sinpe 
object 
26  ...  the  granting of access-type  to an object  cannot cause deadlock throUih 
{user,process}es using access-type to objects 
27  ...  the  {user,process}es  using  access-type  to  an  object  which  has  caused 
deadlock 
28  ...  the  granting  of  access~type to  an object  cannot  cause  livelock through 
{user,process}es using access-type to objects 
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29  ...  the  {user,process}es  using  access-type  to  an  object  which  has  caused 
livelock 
30  ... security-attribute of object is identical to that of object 
31  ... claim [not] to become time-critical 
32  ... claim [not] to become accelerated or delayed 
33  ... claim [not] to become time-dependent 
34  ... claim [not] to be by-passed 
35  ... claim [not] to be deactivated 
36  ... claim [not] to be corrupted 
Substitutions 
B.17  Substitutions shall be made for the following nouns/phrases (italicised in the Action 
Phrase Templates and Target Phrases above):-
access-set;  access-type;  audit-information;  claim;  factors;  function;  n;  object; 
product;  process;  security-attribute;  security-relevant-event;  user;  {user,process} 
B.18  All  substitutions shall be explained using natural language,  either in  a  separate 
section  of  the  Claims  Document  (see  paragraph  B.39  of  this  Annex),  or 
immediately following the claim where the substitution is used. 
B.19  Some examples of possible substitutions are:-
access-set 
access-type 
access-type 
audit  -information 
audit-information 
claim 
factors 
function 
n 
object 
object 
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replaced by  read/write access to 1/0 ports 
replaced by  read permission  : 
replaced by  read/write/delete permission 
replaced by  date and time 
replaced by  terminal number 
replaced by  (a cross-reference to another claim) 
replaced by  number of incorrect responses 
replaced by  password system 
replaced by  (a paragraph number) 
replaced by  file 
replaced by  resource control block 
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object 
TOE 
TOE 
process 
security-attribute 
security-attribute 
security-attribute 
security-relevant-event 
security-relevant  -event 
security-relevant  -event 
user 
user 
{user  ,process} 
Annexa 
replaced by  hard  disc storage (i.e. a type of object) 
replaced by  operating system 
replaced by  PC security board 
replaced by  unprivileged task 
replaced by  integrity of data 
replaced by  actual destination 
replaced by  apparent source 
replac~d by  attempted privilege violations 
. replaced by  user logoff 
replaced by  change of security level 
replaced by  data entry clerk 
replaced by  security administrator 
replaced by  job. (i.e. implying any user) 
B.20  There are parts  of the Action  Phrases  and  Target Phrases which  are in square 
brackets[];  these are optional words or phrases which may be included or omitted 
as appropriate to the vendor's claim. 
B.21  Most noun and phrase substitutions are straightforward.  However, some particular 
conventions exist and are explained below. 
B.22  The definition of an access-set depends on whether it is related to:-
a)  an  object;  in  which  case  it  represents  the  list  of users,  processes  and 
{user,process}es, each with an associated access-type, able to use an object. 
c 
b)  a process or a user or a {  user,process};  in which case it represents the list of 
objects, each with an associated access-type, available to a user, a process or 
a {user,process}. 
·  B.23  Thus, access-set is~ (notional) list of all the objects a user can access, together with 
what he can do to each one and via which processes, or a (notional) list of all the 
users who can access an object, via which processes and what they can do to it. 
B.24  Access-type is the series of ways of using an object and is vendor-defined.  Typical 
examples of these are create, read, write, delete, execute or a combination of these or 
none. 
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B.25  As a specific example the set could be defined as: 
a)  "Amend" allows a record to be updated but does not allow new records to be 
added to the file. 
b)  "Create" allows  new records  to  be added  to  the  file  but does  not allow 
existing ones to be changed. 
d)  "Delete" allows records to be removed from the file. 
· e)  "Execute" allows the file  to be loaded into memory and then scheduled for 
runriing as a program. 
f)  "Read" allows data in records to be copied to working storage~ 
B.26  Many objects will possess identical security attributes.  Thus if a  c~aim will apply to 
all  objects  of a  particular type  the substitution will  usually be best expressed in 
terms of the type of object, rather than by listing all possible objects of that type. 
Mechanisms 
B.27  As part of a claim it is possible to- include a description of the mechanism used to 
implement that claim.  This is done through the "using" option of the claim's Action 
Phrase Template, by giving  a  reference to a  paragraph in  the Claims Document 
that  specifies  and/or explains  the  mechanism  employed.  Evaluation will  then 
include confirmation that the stated mechanism is the mechanism used. 
B.28  Any  appropriate  method  may  be  used  to  define  or  describe  the  mechanism, 
provided that the explanation is sufficient for evaluation to determine at the level 
of confidence corresponding to the targeted Evaluation Level:  · 
a)  the claimed mechanism is present in the product; 
b)  its operation matches the claimed specification; 
c)  it is the mechanism actually used to implement the claim. 
B.29  In many cases it may be easier and clearer to define a mechanism by reference to a 
published standard, or give a table of types of inputs and the corresponding results, 
rather  than  providing  details  of  the  algorithm  employed  using  either  natural 
language or a specification or programming language. 
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Example 
B.30  As an example, the following Action Phrase Template may be generated using the 
rules specified: 
This TOE will establish ... 
where the word in italics can be replaced by a specific term. 
B.31  Similarly, a Target Phrase may be selected such as: 
... the identity of an object to which access-type was requested. 
B.32  Putting these together gives: 
This TOE will establish the identity of an object to which access-type was requested 
into which some possible substitutions are: 
add-in security board 
any file 
write or delete permission 
B.33  Thus a complete claim could be: 
for 
for 
for 
TOE 
object 
access~type 
This add-in security board will  establish the identity of any file  to which write or 
delete permission was requested.· 
B.34  Obviously  this  example  is  extremely artificial.  In practice for  real TOEs highly 
specific claims are made, often related to a particular real or assumed environment. 
Claims Document Structure 
Use of Genenc Headings for Functionality 
B.35  Oaims shall be grouped under the Generic Headings set out in Chapter 2 of these 
criteria.  Not all TOEs will  make claims under all headings;  where there are no 
claims made for a particular heading this shall be stated.  Claims shall be included 
for any events or actions that are to be prevented. 
B.36  Table  B.l  identifies  Target  Phrases  which  will  often  appear  under  particular 
Generic Headings.  The table is  intended for  use  as  a general guide  only;  the 
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flexibility of the Claims Language means that often other Target Phrases will also 
be appropriate.  · 
B.37  Table  B.2  cross-references  Target  Phrases  to  the  possible  substitutions  they 
contain. 
Layout of Oaims Documents 
B.38  A security target using_ the Claims Language shall be set out using the following 
structure: 
a)  the security objectives of the target including any constraints or assumptions 
concerning  the  real  or assumed  environment  of the  TOE,  set  out  as  a 
Product Rationale (or in the case of a system, a System Security Policy); 
.  . 
b)  an informal specification of the claims in natural language, or a reference to 
another  document  containing  that  informal  specificatipn  (this  may  be a 
reference to a functionality class defined in informal style), and a correlation 
of these informal claims to the security objectives;  · 
c)  global substitutions; 
d)  claims under each Generic Heading in tum; 
e)  details of security mechanisms; 
f)  the claimed rating of the minimum strength of mechanisms; 
g)  the target evaluation level. 
B.39  Under  the  Global  Substitutions  heading  any  general  substitutions  used  in  the 
Action or Target Phrases of more than one claim shall be defined and explained. 
B.40  These substitutions  shall  be  overridden  where  different  (usually  more  specific) 
substitutions are given as part of particular claims. 
B.41  If  the TOE relies upon properties of its real or assumed environment in order for it . 
to function correctly, these shall be specified in the rationale or policy section of  _the 
Oaims Document.  Evalu~tion will assume that these constraints/assumptions will 
hold in actual use. 
B.42  Each such constraint/assumption shall be expressed either in natural language or in 
the  Oaims Language  (using  the Action  Phrase environment  qualifier).  Where. 
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ambiguity  exists  (because  natural  language  has  been used)  the  evaluators Ul. 
interpret  such  constraints/assumptions  in  a  way  that  is  consistent  with  other 
assumptions or claims. 
B.43  Some claims may remain valid even if a particular assertion is not true.  Where this 
is  the case,· natural language shall  be used  to  indicate which claims remain tme 
when' that assertion fails. 
B.44 .  An example of an assertion (expressed in natural language) is: 
The RAM backup battery must not be removed from the securitY board or allowa! 
to discharge below its minimum operating voltage. 
Format of Individual Claims 
B.45  Each substitution in the Action or Target phrases used to form a claim whid:t is DOt 
identified and defined in the global substitutions section of the Claims Docnmemt 
must be defined and expressed in natural language immediately followiJ!g the-~ 
where it appears. 
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Table 8.1 Claims Target Phrases and Generic Headings· 
Identification and Authentication 
I  Access Control 
I  I  Accountability 
I  I  I  Audit 
I  I  I  I  Object Reuse 
I  I  I  I  I  Accuracy 
I  I  I  I  I  I  Reliability of Service 
I  I  I  I. I  I  I  Data Exchange 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1  Audit information  X  X xxxxxx 
2  Identity of process requested  X  X  X  X  X  X 
3  Identity of {  u,p} requesting a process  X  X  X  X  XX 
4  Identity of {  u,p} requesting an object  X  X  X  X  X  X 
5  Identity of process executed  X  X  X  X  X  X 
6  Rejection of process request  X  X  X  X  X  X 
'7  Identity of object requested  X  X  XX  X  X 
8  Identity of object granted  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
9  Identity of object refused  X  X  X  X  X  X 
10  Access-set of user  X  X 
11  Access-set of process  X  X 
u  Access-set of { u,p}  X  X 
13  Access-set of object  X  X 
14  Object access granted to { u,p}  X  X  X  X  X 
15  Object access by {  u,p}  X  X  X  X  X 
16  Object acti~ns performed by {  u,p}  X  X  X  X 
17  Factors affecting user access-set  X  X 
18  Factors affecting process access-set  X  X 
19  Factors affecting {  u,p} access-set  X  X 
20  Factors affecting object access-set  X  X 
21  Clearing information from object  X  X 
22  Security-attributes of object  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
23  Correctness of security-attributes of object  X  X 
24  Security-attributes of combination object  X  X  X 
25  Security-attributes of partitioned object  X  X  X 
26  Granting access causes no deadlock  X  X 
~7  Deadlock can .be detected  X  X 
28  Granting access causes no livelock  XX 
29' Uvelock can be detected  XX 
30  Objects have identical security-attributes  X  X  X 
31  Time-critical claim  -x 
32  Accelerated or delayed claim  X 
33  Time-dependent claim  X 
34  By-pass claim  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
35  Deactivate claim  X  X  X  X  X  X  X  X 
36  Corrupt claim  X  XXX XXX X 
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Table 8.2 .Claims Target Phrases and Permitted Substitutions 
access-set 
I  access-type 
I  I  audit-information 
I  I  I  claim 
l  I  I  I  object 
I  I  I  I  I  process 
I  I  I  I  I  I  security-attribute 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  security-relevant-evcm 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  user 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  {user,process} 
I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I  I 
1  Audit information  X  X 
2  Identity of process requested  X 
3  Identity of {  u,p} requesting a process  X  X 
4  Identity of {  u,p} requesting an object  X  X  X 
5  Identity of process executed  X 
6  Rejection of process request  X 
7  Identity of object requested  X  X 
8  Identity of object granted  X  X 
9  Identity of object refused  X  X 
10  Access-set of user  X  X 
11  Access-set of process  X  X 
12  Access-set of { u,p}  X  X 
13  Access-set of object  X  X 
14  Object access granted to {  u,p}  X  X  X 
15  Object access by { u,p}  X  X  X 
16  Object actions performed by {  u,p}  X  X 
17  Factors affecting user access-set  X  X 
18  Factors affecting process access-set  X  X 
19  Factors affecting {  u,p} access-set  X  X 
20  Factors affecting object access-set  X  X 
21  -Clearing information from object  X 
22  Security-attributes of object  X  X 
23  Correctness of security-attributes of object  X  X 
24  Security-attributes of combination object  X  X 
25  Security-attributes of partitioned object  X  X 
26  Granting access causes no deadlock  X  X  X 
27  Deadlock can be detected  X  X  X 
28  Granting access causes no livelock  X  x- X 
29  Livelock can be detected  X  X  X 
30  Objects have identical .security-attributes  X  X 
31  Time-critical claim  X 
32  Accelerated or delayed claim  X 
33  Time-dependent claim  X 
34  By-pass claim  X 
35  Deactivate claim  X 
36  Corrupt claim  X 
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